Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430

Background

Late-night bar fight in Dorchester escalated; surveillance video and witness testimony captured parts of events leading to two fatal shootings (victims: Jovany Eason and Manuel Monteiro).
Tavares was present outside the bar carrying a handgun, pointed it at Eason, and (per some testimony) attempted to "rack" it; Emmanuel Pina obtained the gun from Tavares and then fired, killing both victims.
Tavares did not fire the fatal shots but ran behind Pina while Pina chased and shot Eason; both Tavares and Pina were indicted for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm without a license.
Jury convicted both defendants of first-degree murder (deliberate premeditation) and Tavares of unlawful possession; Tavares appealed challenging sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions/response to a jury question, and prosecutor argument.
Trial judge instructed on joint venture/aiding and abetting and transferred intent; during deliberations the jury asked whether an aider is liable to the same degree as the perpetrator, and the judge answered that the aider is liable to the same degree as the perpetrator.
Supreme Judicial Court concluded the judge’s answer misstated the law in context, creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; first-degree murder convictions reversed and remanded for new trial, firearm possession conviction affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Tavares's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for 1st‑degree murder via joint venture	Evidence (Tavares brought gun, pointed it, attempted to chamber a round, let Pina take gun, followed Pina) supports inference Tavares shared shooter’s intent to kill	Tavares lacked the requisite deliberate‑premeditation; he didn’t fire the gun and his intent was ambiguous	Court: Evidence was sufficient to survive required‑finding motion (trial denial proper)
Failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter sua sponte	Not addressed by Commonwealth (no request)	Jury could reasonably view Tavares’s conduct as wanton/reckless, supporting involuntary manslaughter instruction	Court: Instruction would have been appropriate on the facts, but judge not required to give it sua sponte because defendant did not request it
Judge’s answer to jury question whether aider is liable to same degree as perpetrator	If jury found Pina guilty of 1st‑degree murder and Tavares aided him, aider is liable to same degree	Judge’s unqualified answer could have misled jury into thinking Tavares must be convicted of same degree as Pina, foreclosing lesser convictions	Court: Answer was misleading in context and eliminated possibility of lesser conviction; created substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice — new trial required
Prosecutor’s closing statements (improprieties)	Humanizing victims and arguing accountability tied to evidence; justice requires forceful advocacy	Certain remarks improperly suggested malice could be inferred solely from pointing the gun and overemphasized victim loss	Court: Some sympathy language should be avoided; statements implying malice from mere pointing were improper; references to accountability were permissible here because tied to evidence

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (discusses joint venture/aiding and abetting principles)
Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131 (intent may be inferred from knowledge and participation)
Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245 (joint venturer liability when defendant passed/possessed gun and participated)
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316 (distinguishes inference of malice from shooting versus mere pointing)
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266 (codefendants may be convicted of different offenses despite joint participation)
Commonwealth v. Elliot, 430 Mass. 498 (codefendant who passed gun may be guilty of different degree than shooter)
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243 (limits on victim‑humanizing appeals to jury; verdict must rest on evidence)