Commonwealth v. Smith
621 Pa. 218
| Pa. | 2013Background
- On Oct. 23, 2008 Daniel Smith, uninjured after a multi-vehicle crash that later caused one death and severe injury to another, was asked at the scene by Officer Agostino to submit to blood testing to "eliminate" alcohol or drugs as a factor.
- Officer Agostino (out of uniform) told Smith he could refuse; Smith consented, was driven to a hospital, had blood drawn, and was returned to the scene.
- Lab tests showed BACs of .088 and .082; Smith was arrested and charged with DUI offenses and homicide-by-vehicle while DUI.
- At suppression, Smith argued his consent was not "knowing" because he was not told the results could be used in a criminal prosecution; the trial court credited the officer and denied suppression.
- The Superior Court reversed, holding officers have a duty to inform drivers that blood-test results may be used criminally and that failure to do so can render consent invalid.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a per se duty to warn was required and whether suppression was proper under the totality of the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Smith's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether police must inform a person that blood-test results may be used criminally before consent is valid | No; Fourth Amendment consent is judged by the objective totality of circumstances — no categorical duty to warn is required | Yes; following Danforth/Walsh, officer must advise of criminal use like a Miranda-style warning for consent to be "knowing" | Rejected Superior Court’s per se duty rule; no categorical requirement to warn that results may be used criminally; apply totality of circumstances |
| Whether Smith’s consent was voluntary/knowing under the Fourth Amendment | Consent was voluntary and knowing: officer said Smith could refuse, Smith was uninjured, told test was to eliminate drugs/alcohol, and was not in custody | Consent invalid because Smith lacked notice of criminal investigative purpose (per Danforth/Walsh) | Consent was valid under the totality: trial court’s factual findings credited officer; a reasonable person would have contemplated criminal/investigative use; suppression was improper |
| Whether Superior Court misapplied precedent by reweighing facts / imposing a new rule | Superior Court improperly imposed a per se rule and reweighed credibility contrary to standard of review | Superior Court correctly applied Walsh/Danforth to invalidate consent | Superior Court erred: appellate court must accept trial court fact findings when supported by record and not create bright-line warning rule |
| Whether Danforth/Walsh require separate "knowledge" prong distinct from voluntariness | No; knowledge of purpose is a factor within voluntariness/totality analysis, not a separate mandatory element | Yes; those cases require awareness of criminal purpose for consent to be valid | Court repudiated any rule that knowledge is a separate, necessary element; objective awareness is one factor among many under the totality of circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (Voluntariness of consent judged under totality of the circumstances; no per se Miranda-style warning requirement)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (Fourth Amendment governs non-testimonial bodily intrusions; medical blood draws are searches to be justified case-by-case)
- Commonwealth v. Walsh, 460 A.2d 767 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (discussed defendant's awareness of criminal purpose when evaluating consent — treated below as persuasive precedent)
- Commonwealth v. Danforth, 576 A.2d 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. en banc) (applied Walsh to suppress blood evidence where record showed no notice of criminal investigative purpose)
- Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427 (Consent-voluntariness factors include knowledge and absence of coercion; knowledge of right to refuse is a factor but not a separate burden)
- Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 821 A.2d 1221 (No single fact is dispositive in consent analysis; courts must consider the totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (Consent and seizure contexts require case-specific, objective analysis rather than bright-line rules)