Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873

Background

Appellant James Melvin Smith was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime, receiving a death sentence in 1985.
Key witnesses included Green and Rucker (both pled guilty in exchange for testimony) and Harris, who identified Appellant as the shooter after prior inconsistent statements.
Post-conviction relief requests (PCRA) were filed; multiple attorneys and courts handled the case over decades, with a remand for evidentiary proceedings and ultimately a new penalty-phase hearing stipulated by the parties.
The PCRA court granted evidentiary hearings on Atkins imprisonment issues, forced medication, and certain ineffective-assistance claims, and dismissed guilt-phase trials claims without a hearing, which the Supreme Court reviewed on appeal.
Appellant argued after-discovered evidence, Brady violations, and ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding Harris, Barbara (Appellant's sister), and prior acquittal materials.
This Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief, holding most claims waived or lacking merit, and approved a new penalty phase while ruling guilt-phase claims warranted no relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Actual innocence via after-discovered evidence	Smith argues Harris and Barbara recantations constitute after-discovered evidence.	Commonwealth contends these claims are waived or not producible/admissible and not likely to change outcome.	No relief for actual innocence; after-discovered evidence claims rejected or deemed previously litigated.
Batson and Swain challenges to jury selection	Prosecutor discriminated in voir dire; Batson should apply retroactively; systemic bias shown by notes and culture.	No preservation of Batson error; cannot apply Batson retroactively; lack of record for Swain; no showing of actual discrimination.	Waived/unsatisfied under U.S. and Pennsylvania principles; Batson retroactivity not available on PCRA grounds.
Post-trial/appellate ineffectiveness for Batson	Counsel should have raised Batson claims post-trial and on appeal.	Uderra standard applies; no proof of actual purposeful discrimination; lack of trial record to support apellete relief.	Waived/insufficient showing; no relief for Batson-based ineffectiveness.
Mental health evidence and trial counsel ineffectiveness	Counsel failed to investigate mental-health history, impacting competency/insanity/diminished capacity defenses.	Defenses were inconsistent with trial strategy; no actual incompetence proven; no admissible diminished-capacity basis given Appellant's testimony.	No ineffective-assistance relief; defenses not supported by pre-trial evidence and strategic decisions found reasonable.
Brady and disclosure of mental-health records	Commonwealth suppressed/failed to disclose mental-health records and prior evaluations.	Records were publicly accessible; no suppression; not a Brady violation given availability of evidence.	No Brady relief; no suppression shown.
Statute of limitations for conspiracy to kill and PIC	Charges time-barred; counsel should have quashed these counts.	Petitioner was still serving sentences for related offenses; tolling applies; PCRA not cognizable for barred claims.	Not cognizable under PCRA; no relief.
Accomplice/co-conspirator liability instruction	Charge was defective; should have given corrupt-and-polluted-source instruction; ineffective assistance for failing to object.	Evidence showed Appellant was shooter; instruction not dispositive; total charge viewed; no prejudice shown.	No prejudice; instruction deemed acceptable in context; no relief.
General ineffective assistance of trial counsel	Stipulations and cross-examinations prejudiced defense; failed to present adequate defenses.	Strategic decisions; adequate cross-examination; no reasonable probability of different outcome.	No relief on these ineffective-assistance claims.

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (three-part burden-shifting framework for race-based peremptory challenges)
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1965) (required showing of systematic race-based jury exclusion across cases)
Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (Pa. 2004) (collateral-review burden for proof of actual discrimination under PCRA)
Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 2006) (post-trial Batson issues on collateral review require record and separate analysis)
Chmiel, 536 Pa. 244, 639 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1994) (accomplice testimony warning and judicial instruction standards)
Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1999) (insanity defense and defense strategy limitations)
Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458, 587 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1991) (insanity defense standard and cognitive capacity considerations)
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due-process standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt)