Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689

Defendant was convicted in Hampden County for rape of a child with force under G. L. c. 265, § 22(a) and indecent assault and battery of a child under fourteen under G. L. c. 265, § 13(b).
Defendant challenged a warrantless entry into his apartment, the subsequent seizure of a cushion cover, and the voluntariness of a DNA buccal swab; he also challenged first complaint testimony at trial.
Victim resided on the second floor; grandmother resided on the first floor with the defendant; the building layout allowed access via the first-floor apartment passage to the second floor.
Police responding to a 911 rape call entered the grandmother’s apartment with the grandmother’s implied consent, finding the victim inside; the cushion where evidence lay was located during an emergency entry.
An officer obtained a buccal swab from the defendant at the police station after informing him in English, with the defendant signing a voluntary DNA consent form; the officer stated the defendant could decline and that consent was voluntary.
DNA from the couch cushion’s semen stain matched the defendant’s DNA, with probability statistics presented to the jury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the entry into the home lawfully consented to?	Police reasonably believed mother had authority.	Proper authority and diligent inquiry lacking.	Yes; entry lawful and consistent with apparent authority.
Was the cushion cover seizure lawful as fruit of the initial entry?	Evidence seized during lawful entry was admissible.	Seizure tainted by illegal entry.	Lawful entry justified seizure; no fruit-of-poisonous-tree issue.
Was the buccal swab consent voluntary given intoxication or language issues?	Defendant understood English and consent was voluntary.	Intoxicated and language barrier compromised voluntariness.	Consent voluntary; Defendant understood form and signed knowingly.
Did first complaint testimony improperly influence the jury?	Testimony relevant to credibility and state of mind.	Testimony overly prejudicial and invaded first complaint doctrine.	No abuse of discretion; testimony admissible to rebut fabrication theory and explain timing.

Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254 (2010) (diligent inquiry and apparent authority in consent to enter)
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 458 Mass. 383 (2010) (apparent authority and nonemergency consent entry analysis)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (reasonable belief of authority; two-step inquiry)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (objective standard for reasonable belief of authority)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (knowledge of right to refuse not prerequisite to voluntary consent)
Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60 (2011) (first complaint doctrine and admissibility balancing)
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214 (2009) (first complaint testimony and admissibility context)
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234 (2005) (consent and voluntariness in non-Miranda context; English language not dispositive)