Commonwealth v. PORTER P.

Mass. 254 juvenile. Commonwealth P., v. Porter a P., a juvenile. Commonwealth vs. Porter Suffolk. September 2009. March 2010. Spina, Cordy,

Present: C.J., & JJ. Marshall, Ireland, Cowin, Gants, Botsford, Seizure, Search Expectation Firearms. and privacy, of Consent. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. appeal In an from an order entered in the suppressing gun Juvenile Court a by during the police seized a search room in family of a a transitional that, occupied by juvenile, shelter the this despite court concluded the facts room, juvenile that the did own the he not that was limited in his use of room, the and that shelter staff a key members had master could and enter shelter, by the room to ensure he abiding was the rules of the the room, juvenile a expectation nevertheless had reasonable J., which functioned as his home. dissenting, with whom [258-261] Cowin, J., joined. Spina, In an from an appeal order entered in the suppressing gun Juvenile Court by police during seized the a search of a room in a family transitional occupied by shelter the juvenile, this court concluded that director the the authority shelter lacked actual to the by consent search the room police, where the director was not a with a coinhabitant shared of ac- the cess to and the where written terms of the shelter manual that provided she did police permit not her to allow the police enter further, [262-267]; the room search for contraband or evidence where search, apparent the director also lacked to consent to the the officers’ belief that had valid to search the room law, therefore, the based on mistake of search of the room was required gun suppression unconstitutional of both the found [267-269] by police, who entered room without search warrant and without exigency, well unprompted inculpatory claim as as an statement by juvenile immediately made outside room after arrest follow- his [275], ing gun seizure This court concluded that of a a warrantless search home officer Rights does not violate art. 14 of Declaration if Massachusetts voluntary apparent officer has the consent of individual an consent, give such even where it turns out that the individual authority, only lacked common if the fact reasonable mistake of occurs diligent despite inquiry by consenting officer as to the individual’s home. common over the [269-274] Complaint sworn the Suffolk Divi- County received and to in on sion of the Juvenile Court October Department Leslie A motiоn to evidence was heard suppress pretrial Harris, E. J. an interlocutory appeal to prosecute

An for leave application J., Judicial Court for the by Spina, Supreme was allowed Court, the the by Suffolk. After review Appeals the county to obtain further appellate leave granted Judicial Court Supreme review. (Rachel him) for the juvenile. A. Scotch with

James D. Corbo Celio, the Com- for Attorney, Kathleen Assistant District monwealth. submitted amici

The briefs for curiae: following Services, & Eisenberg, Beth Committee for Public Counsel L. Dohan, Kaban, Reinstein, T. & Gloria Y. John Joshua Barbara Tan Public Counsel Services & others. for Committee for the

Ruth Coalition for Home- Bourquin A. for Massachusetts less & another. for

David M. & Lawrence Friedman Suffolk Siegel Lawyers Justice, Inc. J. The Commonwealth was leave granted appeal Gants, from an order entered in the Juvenile Court gun suppressing seized the a search of a room in a transitional during by shelter the and statement that he family by juvenile occupied made after his arrest. been notified the shelter’s Having by the juvenile director that the allegedly gun, possessed determined the the officers that director had to consent to their and conducted a search the warrantless the room with her consent. After the found the gun, made an juvenile sug- statement unprompted inculpatory The was gestеd gun belonged juvenile him. charged with reason of the unlawful of a delinquency possession ammunition, (h).1 G. L. firearm and in violation of c. § ordered hearing, After an evidentiary judge suppression A of this justice and the statement to gun single police. an interlocu- court the Commonwealth leave pursue granted Court. See from the order in tory judge’s Appeals appeal as in 422 Mass. 1501 (a) (2), Mass. Crim. P. 15 R. appearing the allowance of (1996). juve- Court reversed Appeals license, initially charged carrying a firearm without juvenile 1The (a), amended the L. c. but the Commonwealth in violation of G. § complaint. Mass. 254 P., nile’s motion to suppress. Commonwealth v. Porter 73 Mass. (2008). Ct. 85 We granted his for further App. application appel- late review. We affirm the allowance of the motion to suppress.2

Background. In the allowance a motion to reviewing sup- we judge’s of fact absent clear press, accept findings error. Alvarado, Commonwealth v. (1995), cited. cases We summarize the found facts as judge, uncontroverted supplemented by facts in the record. See Com- Watson, (2000). monwealth n.5 We then determine “the correctness of con- judge’s application stitutional to the facts as found.” principles Commonwealth v. Sсott, quoting Mercado,

The juvenile and his mother moved into a room at the Rox- Inc., Center, bury (shelter) Multi-Service House Family Shelter March, in 2006. The shelter for provides temporary housing otherwise homeless families and assists them in securing more situations. a contractual permanent living Through arrangement Commonwealth, with the the shelter is to families obligated accept by referred there Transitional Assistance if are Department vacant rooms of them. size house Families appropriate may situation, remain the shelter until find a they permanent living a unless commit violation shelter’s mies and regula- stay tions. The is between four and typical eight months. Apart dollars, from a fee of key the families do not deposit thirty pay five at shelter. shelter,

Each new resident of the and his including juvenile mother, as of the intake is a manual part given setting procedure, manual, forth the shelter’s mies and According to the regulations. residents are allowed to have visitors during only posted visiting hours, and meet with them in the visitors’ may only lounge.3 Residents are not enter room at another resident’s permitted acknowledge filed 2We the amicus briefs the Committee for Public Massachusetts, Services, Counsel American Civil Liberties Union Youth Center, Institute, Advocacy Project, Children’s Law and Criminal Justice Har School; vard the Mas Law Massachusetts Coalition for Homeless and Institute; Justice, Lawyers for sachusetts Law Reform and Suffolk Inc. guests,” may “professional 3Residents meet with which include social officials, counsellors, hours, workers, during regular but school business only activity play in the children’s area. R, a be- must commit to Because residents for any time any purpose. hours week employ- at least twenty per ing actively engaged or education, ment, looking employment or training, or job from out of the shelter are to be the residents housing, required are also required The residents weekday. to 3 every p.m. a.m. curfew, Each of the week. day a which varies by abide by a room and her furnished family resident and his or provided director, however, has a The a to his or her room.4 given key shelter, and the staff door in the every master key opens room. every a resident’s key members have master opens to enter room any of the shelter’s staff have Members (maintenance, room inspec- “for business purposes professional tions, the director. If a etc.),” with the only knowledge but exterminator, such as a “business professional,” repair escorted by he or she must be to resident’s requires member, with the director’s shelter staff staff approval. time without warning conduct “room checks” may any Stan- monitor with the shelter’s “Good Housekeeping compliance those regulations, including affecting dard” and other rules health and The manual has “zero tolerance safety. policy and the to violent acts committed residents” regards posses- sion of resident in “[ajny weapon weapon; possession the right will be terminated The shelter “reserves immediately.” warrant,” the manual to contact the Police should the situation member may does not state that the shelter director or staff consent to a search of a resident’s room. Brown, 25,2006, director, M.

On October the shelter’s Cynthia learned after heard rumors that the had a having juvenile gun, had admitted having from a officer that the to security juvenile and ar- Brown contacted Boston gun. police department for the “to out how meeting following morning figure ranged proceed.” [to] 26, 2006, at 10:30 Detective On October approximately a.m., met with Brown

Frank and four other officers McLaughlin “take care of at the The officers indicated their desire to shelter. for all these families out of “concern quietly” [the situаtion] turmoil in their own lives.” Brown who were . . . in time of her to manual authorized told the officers that the resident’s rearrange are allowed to the furniture. 4The residents not R, enter residents’ rooms to conduct room checks and that she had residents’ rooms inspected several earlier after days reports use. The suspected drug officers reviewed the of the portions manual authorizing staff to make controlled room entries. Detec- tive confirmed McLaughlin with Brown that her closets, search residents’ rooms included the to search ability drawers, bureaus, and other not in view. The detec- places plain tive testified at the evidentiary hearing he “[absolutely” believed that Brown had the to consent to a police search of the room. juvenile’s He based this belief on the shel- manual, ter’s rules and in regulations the resident’s as well as Brown’s aof master to the possession key residents’ rooms.

Brown and the officers would conduct agreed a search of the room “under her to ask policies.” They planned then, juvenile relinquish and if he possession gun summons him to cooperated, court at a later date. then They pro- room, ceeded where Brown knocked upstairs on door bat announced she was a room conducting check. When no answered, one she used her master key to the door. The open room, was in be and it juvenile bat he had been appeared lying in bed moments before. Brown that she was there to explained conduct a room check and had be with her because of al- that the had a legations juvenile his Detective gun possession. asked the McLaughlin out of the room into the juvenile step and be hallway, Two or three juvenile officers complied. began to search the room while be detective and Brown attempted wib be who denied When speak juvenile, Brown having gun. school, asked he was not in he stated bat he why was home sick that day. their search of the the officers found a During Clock caliber .40 firearm hollow bullets in be containing point undemeab a duffel in be closet. clip bag then juvenile was handcuffed and under arrest. placed not direct Spontaneously, response questioning said, it; be “The has no bodies on it’s police, juvenile gun statement, clean.” After the made this an read juvenile officer the Miranda but the officers did not juvenile warnings, initiate questioning.

Discussion. that be warrantless search of juvenile argues his room at the shelter and be seizure of his firearm violated Constitution; the Fourth ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍Amendment to the United States art. 14 259 (2010) Mass. 254 Commonwealth 276, L. c. and G. Declaration of Rights; the Massachusetts

of regarding that his statement to 1. He also argues § “fruit of the poisonous be as the firearm should suppressed Sun v. United Wong and seizure under tree” of the search illegal States, 471, (1963). 371 U.S. of the room violated determine whether search

1. To 276, 1, Amendment; 14; first L. c. we must Fourth art. or G. § in the constitutional sense took place. determine whether a search Frazier, (1991). 244 n.3 v. Commonwealth conduct has “This determination turns on whether of reasonable expectation intruded on constitutionally protected Montanez, 410 Mass. Commonwealth privacy.” Ciraolo, (1986). “The 476 U.S. citing California of is whether measure of the defendant’s expectation privacy of the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation privacy search, whether society willing in the of object as reasonable.” Commonwealth v. recognize expectation Montanez, “The the burden of establish- defendant bears supra. both elements.” Id. “In of examining ing expectation privacy under art. we do not reach the same necessarily question result as under Fourth Amendment Id. analysis.”

If no one has а reasonable in the place expectation privacy searched, the are free to search that without a war- place See, cause, rant and without as often as wish. probable Greenwood, (1988) (no U.S. e.g., California left outside curti- garbage reasonable expectation privacy Pratt, home); 660- lage (1990) (same). If a defendant a reasonable has expectation in the absence of search the may place, privacy, cause or with a warrant by probable exigency, only supported Bustamonte, See Schneckloth v. consent. Voisine, (1973); a reason- whether a defendant has determining

Generally, searched, we look to able expectation place determinative, factors, be includ- none of which needs various searched, whether the defendant the nature of the ing place it, it he access to whether owned the whether controlled place, others, took and whether the defendant accessible to freely in that Com- his place. “normal protect privacy” precautions cert, 540, 545, denied, Pina, U.S. monwealth v. (2010) juvenile. R, 832 (1990), and cases cited. These factors may provide guid- ance when the searched is not the place defendant’s home. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, (2006) (search of Welch, firm); files at law Commonwealth v. (1995) (search of station); lieutenants’ room at fire Com- Montanez,

monwealth v. (search at 301-302 supra of hallway’s Pina, Commonwealth v. dropped ceiling); supra at 544-546 (search of wallet left in halfway house where defendant no resided). longer

However, where, here, as searched interior of place home, need we not consult such in factors that the has a deciding juvenile reasonable expectation privacy, because the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 expressly provide that every has the to be secure right unreason- against able and searches seizures in his home. See Fourth Amendment to the United (“The States Constitution to be right people houses, effects, secure in their and persons, un- papers against seizures, reasonable and .”); searches shall not be violated . . art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“Every searches, has a subject be secure from all unreasonable seizures, houses, and of his his his and all his person, papers, the case of the search of the possessions”). interior of “[I]n (cid:127)— homes and hence most prototypical commonly litigated — criterion, area of there is a protected privacy ready roots law, in the common of the minimal deep expectation privacy exists, that and that is to be reasonable” acknowledged (emphasis States, original). Kyllo United 533 U.S. United States v. United States Dist. Court the E. Dist. Mich., of the home is (“physical entry the chief evil which of the Fourth Amend- against wording home,” directed”). ment is In of the view “all “sanctity details, details are intimate because the entire area [in home] is held safe from government eyes” original). prying (emphasis States, Kyllo v. United at 37.

The that the room his mother shared at the shelter juvenile was a transitional it was their home. living nonetheless space, The He and juvenile belongings his room. slept kept room, his mother them the key allowing degree possessed did not inherent in a locked door. The facts he privacy Mass. 254 Porter room, and his use of the limited in that he was own the enter and could key had a master staff members shelter not diminish do business purposes” room “for professional can be in the room. same interest of his legitimacy house, both a tenant in a boarding of a hotel or said of patron in their of privacy a reasonable enjoy expectation of whom (1964) (hotel U.S. 483 California, rooms. See Stoner v. 376 States, (1948) (board 451 McDonald United v. patron); Olson, Indeed, in Minnesota U.S. tenant). house ing clear that Court made (1990), the United States Supreme — home with or but one friend’s stays night who guest —rent “has a legitimate without a and with or without key, paying home.” Id. at “That the of in his host’s 98. expectation privacy of the house is not a host who has ultimate control guest has of with the guest having legitimate expectation inconsistent short, in the home. Id. In of whether regardless privacy” in a resided in a mansion or a room juvenile single palatial shelter, he owned the residence transitional of whether regardless rent, or allowed to remain without regardless paying had a master key whether his landlord or shelter director could enter to ensure that he was the rules of the abiding by house, the had a in his reasonable juvenile expectation privacy 5,6 home. 5Having juvenile expectation privacy concluded that the had a reasonable room, juvenile standing that the under the Fourth in his we also conclude has challenge Amendment to the United States Constitution to the constitutional Illinois, (1978) ity U.S. of the search of the room. See Rakas (standing under Fourth requirement properly “is more subsumed substantive dоctrine”). juvenile charged posses with unlawful Amendment Because the firearm, (h), standing to contest sion of a G. L. c. he has automatic § under art. 14 of the Massachusetts the reasonableness of search of his room Amendola, Rights. Declaration of charged standing” where defendant is (adopting doctrine of “automatic under Massachusetts and seeks to exclude evidence possessory offense Rights). Declaration of that, surrounding light circumstances 6The contends “in of all the dissent shelter,” residency objectively “there is no reasonable juvenile’s] at the [the so, were a search of in the room.” Post at 278. If this expectation privacy sense, mean which would the room would not be a search the constitutional any predica without lawfully could enter and search the room that the wished, tion, ac they wished. The whenever as often as dissent, 276, 278, differently treated no from cording post at should be station, duty, see Com by the officers on a common room in a fire shared Welch, ceiling dropped or the monwealth v.

2. Because the had a juvenile reasonable expectation in his room and because the entered his room without a search warrant and without claim of the burden exigenсy, shifts to the Commonwealth to that the was reason prove able because it had the consent of with actual or appar ent over the room. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. (1990); Commonwealthv. Burgess, Mass. Here, (2001). did not juvenile consent to the entry, Brown did, coercion, and her consent was “unfettered by express and also implied, something more than mere to a ‘acquiescence ” Voisine, claim of lawful authority.’ Commonwealth v. cert, Walker, 548, 555, Commonwealthv. quoting denied, then, 429 U.S. 943 is whether question, Brown, director, as shelter had actual or apparent search of the room.

A third has actual party authority to consent to a warrantless search of a home when the third shares party .7 common over the home Georgia Randolph, 103, (2006); Matlock, 547 U.S. 106 United States v. 415 U.S. 164, Ortiz, (1974). See also Commonwealth v. (1996); Commonwealth v. Maloney, Mass. 787- (1987). “The which authority justifies consent third-party does not rest the law of . . upon . but rests rather on property mutual use of ac property persons generally having joint cess or control for most so that it is reasonable to purposes, that of the co-inhabitants to recognize any has right permit in his own and that the others have assumed inspection right that risk one of their number the common area might permit to be searched.” at Georgia Randolph, supra quoting Matlock, United States v. at 171 n.7. supra The reasonableness of a consent search “is in significant part see Commonwealth v. Mon- hallway apartment building, of a common an tanez, (1991). agree While we with the dissent the shelter personal residents in this case surrendered a substantial amount of housing, agree they temporary in return for we do not that the rooms call their homes should be treated as if were a common area under the Fourth Amendment or art. 14. party’s present 7The third consent is nullified if another resident physically Georgia Randolph, expressly refuses consent. 547 U.S. here, juvenile expressly did not we do not address

Because refuse consent exception. this R, about the understanding authority a function of held commonly that affect each other’s exercise in may ways that co-inhabitants at 111. The supra Supreme interests.” Georgia Randolph, Court has declared: which, if . . to different facts on imagine

“It is . easy known, no common could be authority sensibly suspected. himself, identifies as a say, A on the scene who under- landlord or a hotel calls no manager up customary without the consent guests to admit standing of the current ... A tenant in thе ordinary occupant. does not take rented to formal subject course premises let or informal that the landlord visitors agreement may into the . . . and a hotel has dwelling, guest customarily no reason to to allow but his expect manager anyone into own his room.” employees States, Id. v. United 365 U.S. citing Chapman (1961) (landlord enter could not valid consent to give tenant), rented to Stoner space California, supra (hotel clerk was without to search of room). guest’s common does not mean

Consequently, simply to enter the right wish to search. Land- premises lords often retain that contractually hotels right, routinely do, but that does not allow the landlord or hotel manager consent to a search of defendant’s or hotel apartment States, room. See Chapman v. United at 616-617 (express covenant landlord may give “view waste” not contraband); to search for United States v. permit police (1951) (hotel Jeffers, patron gives “implied maids, to such as express jani- permission persons [to enter] tors or in the of their duties” but not to repairmen performance Weiss, 370 Mass. police); (locker attendant at have had Logan may Airport locker, had conduct search of defendant’s nо power private that, search). held a college to authorize We have when police a college student executes ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍residence hall contract permits to enter the student’s room “to dormitory officials inspect hazards to health or officials’ safety,” college personal a health and safety to enter room to conduct inspec- tion entitle those officials to consent to a search does not police R, Neilson,

for evidence of a crime. Commonwealth v. 423 Mass. 75, 76, Here, shelter’s manual allowed shelter enter staff to the room for business “professional purposes,” rodents, such as to make exterminate insects and repairs, monitor with the shelter’s “Good compliance Housekeeping Standard,” and to escort “business into the room professionals” these but it did not shelter accomplish purposes, staff permit to allow the to enter to search for and police seize contraband or evidence.

Therefore, the entitlement of a shelter staff member under the terms of a contract or manual resident to enter a resident’s room rules, to search for health or risks or violations of safety house search, tо remove contraband found during private narcotics, firearms and including to invite to seize police that contraband not entitle that does shelter staff member to grant consent to the to enter the room with her to conduct the police Leone, search. See id. Cf. Commonwealth v.

(1982) (“Evidence discovered and seized by private parties used, admissible without to the methods unless State offi- regard search”). cials have instigated shelter participated staff member such consent if the resident may grant police only of the room has that the third allow agreed writing may party to enter to contraband search for or evidence of police Neilson, crime. See Commonwealth v. at supra 79-80. We understand that the need clear as to who guidance has common over residence and therefore who is consent, because, here, entitled to actual as on such give they rely search, consent in to conduct a warrantless as deciding opposed the residence and for a search warrant.8 securing applying Therefore, have we declare under art. 14 that person may in Com holding heavily precedent 8While the in this case rests on the Neilson, (1996), monwealth recognize we that we Guirola, found no constitutional violation in Boston Hous. Auth. in the Neilson distinguished opinion. which was cited but not Neilson, Guirola, Hous. Auth. su Boston In pra Housing Authority the exterminator who was sent to a Boston (BHA) manager shotgun a sawed-off vis apartment property observed closet, kitchen, powder ible from the broom ammunition in the and white bedrooms, manager, telephoned one of the and informed the site who BHA apartment, officer. The officer entered the removed sawed- and then obtained a search warrant. Id. We housing held that the shotgun, off shotgun and seizure of the sawed-off apartment officer’s into the (2010) 456 Mass. 254 to a search of a home

actual to consent warrantless (1) the if the is a coinhabitant with shared only police person home, home, is, of access to the lives person roommate, a houseguest either as a member of the or family, duration and who is full access given whose is of substantial stay landlord, home; (2) the shows the generally to the or person, a written contract to allow entitling pohce or evidence.9 to enter the home to search for seize contraband No such entitlement be custom may reasonably presumed oral agreement.10’11 management entry without notice

was constitutional because the lease allowed emergency discovery shotgun, and the of the sawed-off ammuni- purposes, for tion, “presented emergency permit, and white a sufficient under the powder lease, entry safety apartment the BHA officer’s initial purposes.” Id. at The court upheld also officer’s into shotgun emergency apartment exception to seize the sawed-off under the requirement, “danger community the warrant because of the police posed by shotgun.” the sawed-off Id. 829. See Commonwealth v. cert, Snell, 766, 774-775, denied, (1999), quoting 527 U.S. 1010 Bates, App. (emergency Ct. exception when “applies purpose police entry gather is not to rather, activity emergency, evidence of criminal an respond because of to an immediate need for protection property”). assistance for the of life or day Because the waited one after their initial conversation with Brown to enter the the Commonwealth does not contend here that the warrant- police entry justified less into the room could be without consent as appropriate an response emergency. to an only 9We declare this standard under art. rather than under the Fourth Amendment, though even it is consistent with Federal constitutional case law. law, If it differs at all from Federal scope constitutional case it narrows the authority, actual and therefore does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. only applies sought 10Thisstandard when consent is to conduct a search residence; private occupied area of an we do not address here whether the apply sought same standard should where consent is to search the common apartment unoccupied area or basement of an or an apartment. house room or cert, 617, 624, denied, Connolly, See Commonwealth v. 400 U.S. (1970) (“Since freely the basement a common area available to all tenants, search”). give one tenant could we ad permission to its Nor do apply property, dress whether this standard should to commercial where an privacy expectation may individual’s be less substantial. See Commonwealth Blinn, 126, 128, dismissed, appeal quoting 482 U.S. 921 States, (1986) (“the govern Dow Chem. v.Co. United “greater ment ‘has latitude to conduct commercial inspections warrantless property” expectation because “the that the owner of commercial significantly property enjoys property sanctity in such differs from the ac ’ ”). corded an individual’s home” 11Even a coinhabitant of the had actual to a if home to consent juvenile. P., need not be defined Coinhabitancy by any legal relationship, a lease. See v. Georgia such as that of or cotenants on spouses (2006); 547 U.S. 110-111 United States v. Mat Randolph, lock, (1974) (unmarried 415 U.S. person living in same bedroom with consent to search together juvenile may Martin, bedroom). See also Commonwealth v. Rather, it should be defined by person’s demonstrated intent to make a residence his or her home for some of time. v. Ran Georgia substantial See period generally 110-112; Matlock, v. United States dolph, supra Therefore, the author & n.7. an would lack overnight houseguest consent, duration, to his or her is substantial in its ity stay unless v. and he or she is “the run of house.” United States given (8th 1975) 525 F.2d Cir. who Turbyfill, (houseguest and was of indefi had been for several weeks staying “occupant nite duration” who “had the run of the house” could consent to Clutter, F.2d search). See United States v. police cert, denied, 1990), (1991) (“As a (6th general Cir. U.S. 947 consideration, that mature family there is reason every suppose admit to look about the members possess residence, members since in common family experience family LaFave, house”); have the run of the 4 W.R. Search and Seizure 8.5(e), (4th 2004). at 235 & n.117 ed. § standard, Brown did not have actual

Under this to search for a firearm. consent to the into room entry room, and the manual not a coinhabitant of the shelter She was to enter the room to did not her to allow permit Rather, manual reserved for contraband or evidence. search room “for of shelter staff to enter residential right any profes- etc.),” (maintenance, business room inspections, sional purposes allowed to enter for and to “business accompany professionals” not reasonably Law enforcement investigation those purposes. The manual business understood to be “professional purpose[].” shelter staffs kind and reserved also weapons prohibited warrant,” but the Police should the situation to contact “right allow the does not reserve the this reservation suitcase, home, overnight not extend to a closed the consent would search belong to the coinhabitant. bag, gym bag inside the home that did not located Davis, 2003); United States (9th United States 332 F.3d 1163 Cir. Salinas-Cano, 1992). (10th Cir. F.2d 861 Commonwealth Porter

to enter a resident’s room to search for firearm if accompanied staff.12 actual authority concluded that Brown did nоt have Having of the room we turn to search police, had the to consent. whether she apparent authority 177, 179, (1990) (Rod In Illinois Rodriguez, riguez), the United States Court held that the Fourth Supreme Amendment’s of “unreasonable searches and sei proscription zures” is not violated when a warrantless home is based on the consent of a third who the at the time party police, had common entry, reasonably, believed mistakenly, reasoned, the over The Court authority premises. satisfy “[T]o Amendment, the the ‘reasonableness’ Fourth requirement what is demanded of the generally factual determinations many — that must be made regularly by agents government warrant, whether the officer execut magistrate issuing warrant, ing or the officer a search or seizure conducting — under one of the to the warrant exceptions requirement is not correct, be they but that be always they always reasonable.” Id. at The 185-186. Court concluded that Constitution is “[t]he no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though believe that the erroneously) who has consented to their is a resident of the than it premises, is violated when enter without a warrant they because reason they believe are ably (though erroneously) of a violent pursuit Id. felon who is about to at escape.” authority Apparent an “judged against standard: would the facts available objective to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ had over consenting party Ohio, 188, Id. at 1, Terry v. premises?” U.S. quoting 392

Federal courts have universally limited apparent authority fact, See, reasonable mistakes of not mistakes of law. e.g., Ruiz, United States v. United (9th F.3d 2005); 428 882 Cir. Davis, States v. United (9th 2003); 332 F.3d 1170 Cir. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, States (10th Cir.), 142 F.3d 1230 12Our conclusion that Brown did not have actual to consent search of the room rests on both the Fourth Amend 9, supra. ment and art. 14. note cert, denied, Brazel, (1998); 525 U.S. 900 United States v. cert, denied, Cir.), (11th (1997); F.3d 522 U.S. 822 Brown, (2d 1992); United States v. F.2d Cir. Salinas-Cano, (10th United States v. F.2d Cir. 1992); United States 939 F.2d Whitfield, (D.C. 1991). Cir. The decision “thus to situa Rodriguez applies tions in which an officer would have had valid consent to search if facts were as he believed them to be.” United reasonably States 1074. “An officer’s mistaken belief Whitfield, supra law, reasonable, as to the even if cannot establish apparent Davis, United States v. at 1170. See United authority.” cert, Elliott, denied, (2d 1995), 50 F.3d Cir. States 516 U.S. 1050 “validates searches that {Rodriguez only facts, are based on reasonable mistake as to not those based on an erroneous ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍conclusion drawn the known legal from LaFave, Seizure, facts”). See Search and generally W.R. su at 175 & 8.3(g), n.126. pra § law, in this case one of not of officers’ mistake fact. Detective and the other took consider- officers McLaughlin care able to ascertain whether Brown had to a search of room. Prior to Detective entering conferred with Brown and reviewed the McLaughlin portions the rooms. ac- They the manual to staff searches of pertaining understood the relevant facts Brown’s author- curately regarding to the erred not in their They understanding to consent search. ity the of their into Brown’s diligence facts or inquiry search, but in their understanding to consent authority law; to believed that these facts them valid consent they gave law, when, did not.13Because search the room as a matter of law, mistaken, understanding 13Their while was not unreasonable. law, however, 8, supra. no matter how police See note A officer’s error of Davis, reasonable, authority. United States 332 apparent cannot establish 483, California, 2003). See Stoner (9th Cir. F.3d (1964) argument that had reasonable basis to (rejecting government’s police authority that clerk had to consent to seаrch of hotel believe hotel by Amendment are not to be declaring rights protected that “the the Fourth agency the law of or unrealistic doctrines applications eroded strained 1997) People, ”); (Colo. Petersen authority’ P.2d ‘apparent (if misunderstanding apparent to establish of law were sufficient officer’s search, would authority “protections of the Fourth Amendment to consent to average police officer believed was reason effectively limited to what the be able”). (2010) to to consent authority not have actual or apparent Brown did search, was not reason- search of the room warrantless art. 14. able under the Fourth Amendment or of the room was concluded that officers’ search Having Amendment and art. we unconstitutional under the Fourth search of a decide under art. 14 whether warrantless need not We choose to decide authority. home bemay justified by apparent issue, has been (1) fully this issue because at our request, decided, briefed, (2) our earlier decisions have but not suggested, see authority, infra, art. 14 doctrine of adopts apparent doctrine, (3) our trial courts are this already obliged apply Court of a consent recently bеcause has Appeals approved search based on See Commonwealth v. solely authority. apparent Dejarnette, Ct. 95-96 App.

Even before United States Court decided Rod- Supreme we riguez, supra, suggested authority may justify apparent a warrantless search where the consent lacks giving actual but we have never a warrantless authority, approved search on See Commonwealth v. exclusively apparent authority. Maloney, 399 Mass. that live-in (holding friend of defendant’s could boy sister search because he to be a lawful “appeared occupant enter,” while permit simultaneously recognizing sister, consent); actual who also present, Wahlstmm, (1978) (hold- ing that of store had “sufficient of author- employee appearance to consent to search but case on basis of ity” deciding common, actual, See also Commonwealth v. authority). Rog- ers, J., (Greaney, dissenting) Mass. (officer’s in addition to entry justified by authority, apparent actual Ct. authority); Commonwealth Lopez, App. J., (Lenk, 831 n.4 further review dissenting), appellate date, (2009) (“To no warrantless granted, on the basis of solely has been in Massachusetts upheld .”). to consent. . Consistent with these past apрarent we under decisions but for the first time today, explicitly adopt art. authority. 14 the doctrine of apparent home,

“The officers to enter into a for whatever police intrusion into one’s serious represents governmental purpose, Peters, (2009), 453 Mass. Commonwealth v. privacy.” (2010) DeJesus, Commonwealth v. quoting (2003). 439 Mass. In art. 14 general, allows to enter a home in four police (1) circumstances: warrant judicial supported probable cause, Anderson, Commonwealth v. (1989); 406 Mass. cause such as hot of a violent probable plus exigency, pursuit trying Commonwealth v. 413 Mass. suspect escape, Paniaqua, doctrine, (1992); (3) under the aid” where “emergency have “an reasonable police objectively basis believe there bemay someone inside who is or in imminent injured harm,” Peters, danger Commonwealth v. physical supra 819; consent of a with common voluntary home, over the at 264-265. circumstances,

In each of the first three art. 14 is not violated reasonable mistakes of fact. We evaluate the reasonableness of a officer’s conduct based on the police information available time, to him at the not on what we later learn to be true. Com- (1981) (“whether monwealth v. 382 Mass. Young, was rеasonable and therefore response lawful [is] to be evaluated in relation to the it scene as could appear time, officers at the not itas seem to a scholar after the may event with the benefit of leisured If retrospective analysis”). cause in a search warrant affidavit is on informa- probable based tion from a reliable do source we not personal knowledge, conclude that there has been a violation of art. 14 if the informa- inaccurate, tion turns out to be the affiant did not provided know the information to be false show reckless disregard Wilkerson, its truthfulness. Commonwealth v. (2002), Storey, quoting cert, denied, (1979), (1980) (“existence 446 U.S. 955 arrest,’ ‘at cause is determined the moment of not probable events”). If a officer has light subsequent probable

cause to believe that a has committed a violent suspect just crime and reason that he fled into an to believe apartment, if there is not time to obtain a warrant because of circum- exigent stances, do that there has been a violation of we not conclude if, no art. 14 when the enter the apartment, suspect DiSanto, there. Commonwealth v. Ct. longer App. cert, denied, n.7, & U.S. 855 If the enter a home based on an reasonable objectively basis to believe that someone inside is or is in imminent injured 456 Mass. 254 juvenile. P., a

Commonwealth harm, there has conclude that we do not of danger physical that no one is home. 14 if it turns out a violation of art. been Peters, this same reason See Commonwealth By v. if a warrantless believe that art. 14 is violated we do not ing, obtains the voluntary after a officer search of a home occurs police believes, after diligent inquiry, a he reasonably consent of person home, that the but it turns out has common over the authority Illinois Rodriguez, lacked common See authority. con in the context of authority U.S. Apparent of actual finding authority sent to search is a officer’s police fact.14,15 a of based on reasonable mistake not that a search of a home does violate While we conclude consent of an voluntary art. 14 if the officer has police consent, such we give individual with apparent authority of fact occurs do so if the reasonable mistake only despite as to the individual’s diligent consenting inquiry police common over the home.16To conduct a authority diligent inquiry, First, a officer take two offi- must basic police steps. police facts, cer must base his conclusion of actual on not as- authority he He must continue his inquiry sumptions impressions. until a actual has reliable information on which to base finding facts, officers authority consent. absence sufficient “[I]n have a to seek further information in order to determine duty that the the neces- whether infer inviter has they may reasonably reasonable, uphold 14Because the mistake of fact must be we do not finding supporting searches where the either know their information a authority disregard falsity. of its See apparent to be false or act in reckless James, 2003) (“It United (8th States 353 F.3d Cir. cannot be rely theory authority, a certain when the apparent reasonable to on .”). authority . consenting party’s know what the actual is . themselves only apparent applies 15The doctrine of reasonable mistake consent; (and sug fact as to actual we do not decide whether do not that) mistakenly gest justify where a officer it would warrantless search LaFave, voluntary. generally 4 W.R. believes that the consent was free and See 8.1(b), (4th 2004), ed. and cases cited. Search and Seizure § reasonably officer 16We do not consider the circumstances in which home, gain entry may rely occupant of an of a home to into on the conducting a search. See where the officer has no intention of 815, 822, granted, Lopez, appellate review App. Ct. further (2009) (because only entry, he “acted purpose officer’s limited Mass. 1103 authority of reasonably entering making inquiry” further into without consent). gave opened who motel room door and woman to consent to an sary authority or search of the premises.” Rosario, (7th 1992). United States v. F.2d Cir. Cos, United (10th 2007) States 498 F.3d Cir. must offer (“government some additional evidence mere [beyond of third on the presence to a claim of party premises] support ap- Goins, 644, United States v. 437 F.3d parent authority”); 649 cert, denied, (7th Cir.), (2006) 549 U.S. 832 to obligated (police take “sufficient to assure themselves of the truth” of precautions assertion of actual search); authority by person consenting Waller, United v. (6th 2005), States 426 F.3d 846 Cir. quot- 97-6485, United ing States vs. U.S. Ct. Nos. McCoy, 97- App., (6th & 1999) Cir. May (“government cannot establish third that its relied agents reasonably upon party’s ap- situation, ‘if faced with an agents, parent ambiguous nevertheless without further If the proceed making agents inquiry. do not learn if the make it enough, circumstances unclear whether about to be searched is to “mutual property subject use” сonsent, “then giving warrantless is unlawful person ’ ”). without further inquiry”

Second, even when the consenting individual asserts explicitly there, that he lives “the if circumstances could con- surrounding truth,” be such that a reasonable ceivably would doubt its person officer must make further to resolve the inquiry at ambiguity. Rodriguez, officer owes a supra rather than duty facts explore, ignore, contrary tending sug- that the to the search lacks actual gest consenting authority. Police must not the individual consent- only thoroughly question ing search with to his or her actual authority, respect circumstances also close attention to whether the surrounding pay indicate that the individual is truthful and accurate in consenting common over the See United asserting premises.17,18 Cos, v. (ambiguous States 1130 circumstances require suggest verify consenting 17We do not that officer must tenancy registry the title ownership individual’s with the landlord or reasonably accepting consenting before individual’s claim of common (2006) (“no authority. Georgia Randolph, burden on See 547 U.S. possibility [tenancy] arrangements, to eliminate the atypical regular place”); to doubt that the scheme was in United absence reason cert, Elliott, denied, (2d 1995), States v. 50 F.3d Cir. 516 U.S. 1050 (1996) building (police relying were reasonable in on owner’s consent verifying building’s search of common areas and unleased rooms without R, Goins, su- United States to make additional inquiry); officers friend (defendant’s taking cooking pans girl pra clothing “provided adequate sup- of female from bag apartment lived there “on-and-off” that she port representations” [her] search). and could consent akin to the is argues

The juvenile apparent rule to the exclusionary adopted faith” “good exception Leon, United States Court in United States Supreme that we refuse to author- apparent should adopt we refused to under art. 14 for same reasons ity adopt It true that we “never the ‘good faith good exception. adopted faith’ and we do not it now.” Commonwealth exception, adopt Valerio, faith” The “good exception, however, rule, and therefore is an to the exclusionary exception where there is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. only applies States, v. United S. Ct. Herring (accept- Amendment vio- that there was a Fourth ing “parties’ assumption Leon, lation”); at of (invalidity United States v. 925-926 supra conduct a war- search warrant not When challenged). and make a reason- rantless search of home bаsed on consent able of fact to the actual consenting authority mistake as party’s consent, the search is not in violation of the Fourth Amend- 14, ment or art. and therefore the whether the exclusion- question mie should to the evidence seized the search is ary during apply that, never reached. It although for this reason Rod- perhaps Leon, was decided six after United States v. riguez, supra, years operation rooming by city). diligence inquiry The of the as house was licensed reasonably accomplished will be be at the time and measured what can Carrasco, 43, See, (1st United States v. e.g., F.3d place of the consent. 540 49 2008) (officers reasonably “at the Cir. acted where no information ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍available authority). person giving indicated that consent lacked actual time of the search” diligent inquiry require required 18Itis whether the we under art. 14 is unclear Court in Illinois v. Supreme under the Fourth Amendment. The United States 177, that, Rodriguez, (1990), made clear even when the consent 188 residence, have a ing explicitly individual asserts that he lives at the duty person when “a would doubt its truth.” inquiry of further reasonable however, are divided as to Appeals, Circuit courts of the United States Court of authority may finding appearances aсtual on alone. whether base their of Almeida-Perez, 1162, (8th (Tenth 2008) See United States v. Cir. F.3d 1171 549 go appear behind “require police Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit verify authority,” Eighth Circuit “has been more liberal party ances to third context”). allowing impressions to form their from about 274 P,

supra, Leon decision was not cited in the Rodriguez decision. Because is not based on the apparent authority “good faith” rule, there exception exclusionary is no conflict in logical our but not faith” adopting apparent authority “good exception.19 19Many adopted States have either the doctrine of apparent under their own presumed compatibility Constitutions or its with their Constitutions. 478, (Colo. 1994); People Hopkins, v. P.2d McCaughey, 870 481 State v. 669, State, 602, (1995); (Ind. 127 Idaho 673-674 Lee v. 849 N.E.2d 610 cert, denied, 2006), Licari, 243, (2007); U.S. 1211 549 State 659 N.W.2d cert, denied, (Minn. 2003), (2005); 253 Sawyer, 544 U.S. 1054 State 147 cert, 191, 195-196 denied, (2001), (2002); Maristany, N.H. 537 U.S. 822 State v. 299, Strader, 421, (1993); 133 NJ. Pa. cert, denied, (2008). Basking, 128 S. Ct. 1452 See also 1181, (Pa. 2009) Super. A.2d Ct. (apparent does not I, 8, frustrate the “enhanced privacy” notion of embodied in art. of § Constitution).

Pennsylvania — — Hawaii, Montana, Supreme Washington Courts of three States recognize apparent authority have refused to doctrine under their State 433, McLees, (1995); Lopez, Constitutions. See State v. 78 Haw. Statе Morse, (2000); Mont. State v. 2d Each Wash. of these courts provisions rested its conclusion on in its State Constitution that provided right privacy, provisions prohibiting rather than unreasonable I, Lopez, supra citing searches. See State v. at art. of Hawai’i Constitu § houses, (“right people tion to be secure in their persons, papers and ef McLees, violated”); against. fects . . of shall privacy invasions not be State v. II, supra citing (“right art. Montana Constitution of individual § well-being society infringed is essential to the of a free and shall not be Morse, interest”); showing a compelling without state State v. I, (“No citing Washington art. Constitution shall be disturbed in § affairs, invaded, law”). private his or his without Article 14 home provide privacy beyond right “be expressly does not secure searches, Justices, Opinion from all unreasonable seizures.” 795, (1978). right privacy, albeit one created Massachusetts has unreasonable, 214, by right against (“person statute. G. L. c. 1B shall have a § However, determining privacy”). substantial or serious interference with his statutory provision, the lawfulness of a search under this we have said that the 14, analysis hinge mirrors that under art. because both on the reasonableness of Boston, the conduct. O’Connors. Police Comm’r 329- (1990) (“We highly unlikely Legislature think that it that the intended to substantially or seri provide right person of action to whose with, so”). ously reasonably persuaded by We are not the deci interfered improved law of and seizure will be sions in these three States our search by viewing through prism privacy. the of a these searches Mexico, and a Oregon, Appeals the Court of of New Supreme The Court of recognize apparent the Superior Court in Delaware have also refused Devonshire, v.v. authority doctrine under their State Constitutions. See State Ct., (Jan. 2004) (unpublished opinion); State Super. Del. No. 0307010804 aR, search was justified that the warrantless 5. concluded Having nor to the search actual to consent neither Brown’s by so, seized the to do the firearm her apparent the as “fruit of poisonous the search must be during suppressed States, 371 U.S. 487-488 Sun v. United Wong tree.” See be the must also (1963). sup- statement to was “made that the statement While the found judge pressed. direct and not in response questioning spontaneously the room immediately was made outside statement police,” following was arrested and handcuffed after the juvenile result, in the room. As a the statement was seizure of the firearm search, and was not so distant in time the “fruit” of the unlawful the unlawful as tо the taint aris- or location from search dissipate Fredette, from the search. Commonwealth v. ing obtaining of arrest to (temporal proximity evidence one factor whether connection determining “[i]n between the evidence and the conduct has become so improper taint”). attenuated as to See Commonwealth v. Con- dissipate (1974) (“Since Ct. there was mani- way, App. fest a causal between the finding relationship [incriminat- defendant, and the statements of the the statements ing evidence] should have been suppressed”).

Conclusion. The decision the motion to judge’s allowing sup- is affirmed. The case is remanded to the Juvenile Court press for further consistent with this proceedings opinion.

So ordered. J., J. (dissenting, with whom I Spina, joins). respect- Cowin, Carsey, Wright, (1995); State v. N.M. v. Or. (1983). Delaware Appeals Superior The Court of of New Mexico and the Court in Supreme rejection rest their refusal on their State Court’s under their State rule in United “good exclusionary exception Constitutions of faith” Leon, Devonshire, supra-, States State See State v.s. Court, Wright, supra Oregon Supreme prior at 564. The to the United States Rodriguez, Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 497 U.S. 177 held “is, effect, that the to consent no consent of withоut actual “good “irrelevant” consent at all” and that the faith” of the officers is because a warrantless search without is unreasonable under Fourth Carsey, supra why Amendment. State We have earlier discussed supra. analyses consider of these to be flawed. See we both P., Porter dissent based fully on conclusion that the my juvenile has no reasonable “constitutionally protected expectation privacy.” Montanez, Commonwealth (1991). I with the agree well-reasoned analysis Court in Appeals See v. Porter this regard. Ct. App. It follows that the director of the Roxbury Center, Inc., Multi-Service (shelter) House Shelter Family acted well within her rights admitting and of the firearm and the suppression juvenile’s statements was not justified. The with the problem court’s view is that it the situa- ignores — —

tion “on the ground” fails to put differently acknowledge what the and the shelter is circumstances of its operation. shelter services a transient It makes available a tem- population. return, to live off the In porary space streets. and for obvious reasons, the shelter that its residents surrender a requires consider- able freedom. to the fiction degree personal Contrary in which the court this is neither a hotel nor a indulges, An dormitory. shеlter, examination of the life at characteristics of in my view, to rest that a resident could puts premise conceivably harbor a reasonable that his or her would expectation privacy limit the action of the shelter authorities in this case. shelter,

Before a room at the all obtaining residents receive (manual). shelter’s “Resident’s Manual” This manual copy sets forth the rules residents are to follow while liv- expected A rules the main- ing facility. major these purpose tenance of order and in the shelter. Like members of all safety famihes that move into the building, his mother juvenile received and reviewed the manual at the of their beginning stay at the shelter. The motion found that judge family “[t]he to review and on the manual before required sign-off taking residence at the shelter.” An intake worker the roles to explained them and noted the of manual on an intake form. delivery By shelter, the mother and moving into residents (including here) their assent to the rules. juvenile signify By agreeing rules, these residents a substantial amount of forgo personal other services exchange housing temporary the shelter provides.1 abrogating suggest that the could form a contract with a minor

1I do not shelter (2010) 456 Mass. 254 juvenile. Porter in the can be residents рresent rules dictate when

Shelter a.m. until from 9 building be out of the Residents must building. the shelter by speci and must be in they weekdays, on p.m. or leave residents enter Each time evening. curfew time each fied desk. Residents or out at the front must sign the facility, Hour” from Quiet Time to observe “Family are also required time, “there is minimal this evening. During each 8:30 9:30 p.m. homework, noise,” over are to “go[] read[] and parents expected book, their children. with family games” or play[] their rooms. residents’ use of regulates the shelter Additionally, to enter another not allowed access or permitted Residents “are time,” meet with outside they may room at and any resident’s locations in the stated times at during designated visitors only residents from rear- rules even forbid The shelter’s building. rooms, of limit the number suitcases the furniture in their ranging member,” and . . . family in the room to “two per present the windowsills.” residents from items “on prohibit placing as are facility, Alcohol and firearms are forbidden strictly together). sexual activities between residents (except “coupled” rooms, In addition to the use of residents’ regulating their conduct. Residents shelter restricts many aspects personal week actively must “a minimum of hours twenty per spend search, training skills/educational engаged job employment, their save cent of thirty and search.” must housing They per banking and staff with their income shelter monthly provide Furthermore, attend of same. residents must records as proof order to maintain service In meetings social weekly providers. weekly the shelter residents perform premises, requires housekeep- and clean their rooms to enumerated according chores ing standards. eliminating concern for pres-

The manual reveals special forbids in the shelter. The shelter possession ence of weapons “any defines a as weapon kind.” The manual any “weapons Newton, (2002) See Sharon privacy. minor’s within (contract age majority or voidable before minor reaches minor Instead, thereafter). rely I on the fact time reasonable Ortiz, on his behalf. See can mother room). may consent to search of child’s (parent encourage spend is to residents purpose requirement 2The stated of this or training, searching employment working, attending job or this time housing. P, item that can be used to threaten or cause physical damage harm.”

Shelter staff may enforce these rules random by “perform[ing] room checks and routine room ... time.” inspections Such sеarches are authorized for investigating violations of any rule, from the rules prohibiting possession drugs weapons rules housekeeping requiring “[c]lathing is put away are neatly,” made daily,” are . . . “[djiaper pails “[b]eds emptied every morning.” rules are enforced an through internal discipline system consisting of for initial warnings violations and termination of the viola- residency repeated tions. Residents ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍who commit a violation that threatens the safety staff, of other residents or including of a possession weapon, face immediate termination.

The reasonableness of the juvenile’s expectation privacy must be evaluated in of all the light circumstances surrounding his at the residency shelter. Where the shelter director can enter will, any resident’s room there essentially is no objectively reasonable expectation the room. See Common- Welch, wealth v. (1995) (whether area searched is freely accessible to others is relevant to reasonable- Pina, ness of expectation privacy); cert, 540, 545, denied, (1990) (defendant’s U.S. control over area searched is relevant to reasonableness of Looked at expectation from a different privacy). persрective, the shelter director sufficient common possessed over to consent to a premises search. See Commonwealth Considine, students (by prohibiting on field from hotel trip rooms occupying during day, chaperones retained search). sufficient control to authorize The staff’s plenary circumstances, to conduct including right unannounced differentiates the shelter inspections, meaningfully hotels, from dormitories. apartments, university The court does not that the conditions of manual dispute shelter grant staff to enter residents’ rooms to contraband, search for but it holds this does not power extend to consent to the to do the granting same. ante at 264. This is an unwarranted and entirely impractical distinction, that the shelter staff resort to requiring self-help P., a on fire- of the prohibition enforcement order to obtain prompt guns people trained in dealing staff are not arms. Shelter those in possession cannot arrest armed with guns, of the manual reading provisions A commonsense weapons. staff, at its that shelter communicates regarding weapons plainly their reserved in undertaking seek assistance choosing, may sum, no basis objective In there was to control the premises. may that the juvenile circumstances for any expectation in these from the kind of entry room would be immune have had that his that occurred.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. PORTER P.

Court Name: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Date Published: Mar 11, 2010

Citation: 923 N.E.2d 36

Docket Number: SJC-10383

Court Abbreviation: Mass.