Commonwealth v. Ross
140 A.3d 55
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Samuel T. Ross pleaded guilty (open plea) to third-degree murder on January 21, 1997, and was sentenced to 30–60 years on May 19, 1997.
- Ross filed a timely direct appeal; the Superior Court affirmed on January 20, 1998. He did not seek allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
- Ross filed multiple PCRA petitions over the years; his first timely PCRA petition was denied in 1999. Subsequent petitions were dismissed as untimely.
- Ross filed the instant PCRA petition (docketed Nov. 8, 2013; mailbox rule deems it filed Nov. 5, 2013) asserting, among other things, that Peugh v. United States created a new constitutional right entitling him to relief.
- The PCRA court dismissed the 2013 petition as untimely; Ross appealed pro se. The Superior Court reviewed timeliness, statutory exceptions, and retroactivity doctrines.
Issues
| Issue | Ross's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2013 PCRA petition was timely | Ross contended his petition is timely under the Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception based on Peugh | The Commonwealth argued the petition was facially untimely (judgment final in 1998) and no applicable retroactive right exists | Petition is untimely; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Peugh announced a "new" constitutional right under §9545(b)(1)(iii) | Ross argued Peugh announced a newly-recognized constitutional rule invalidating sentences based on later Guidelines | The Commonwealth argued Peugh is not a new retroactive constitutional right for collateral review | Court held Peugh did not constitute a newly-recognized constitutional right under §9545(b)(1)(iii) |
| Whether Peugh applies retroactively under Teague framework | Ross urged retroactivity (relief on collateral review) based on Peugh and Teague analysis | Commonwealth maintained Peugh announces a procedural rule that is neither substantive nor a watershed procedural rule, so it is not retroactive | Court held Peugh is procedural (not substantive) and not a watershed rule; thus not retroactive |
| Whether ineffective assistance of appellate counsel saves otherwise untimely petition | Ross claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to file allowance of appeal | Commonwealth relied on precedent that IAC claims do not circumvent timeliness requirements | Court noted Fahy: ineffective assistance does not make an untimely petition timely |
Key Cases Cited
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (held Ex Post Facto Clause can be violated when defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after offense that increase sentencing exposure)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules from procedural rules for retroactivity; defines watershed rule standard)
- Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007) (interpreting §9545(b)(1)(iii): right must have been held retroactive by the issuing court before petition filing)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (ineffective assistance of counsel does not rescue an otherwise untimely PCRA petition)
- Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003) (courts lack jurisdiction to hear untimely PCRA petitions)