Commonwealth v. Rosado, 150 A.3d 425

Frankie Rosado was convicted (2012) of indecent assault, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor and sentenced to an aggregate 33–69 months.
Appellate Counsel filed a preliminary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement preserving three claims, attached a post‑sentence motion (believing that would preserve additional claims), and obtained time to file a final 1925(b) but never did.
On appeal to the Superior Court, counsel abandoned the three preserved claims and raised only an unpreserved sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence claim in his brief; the Superior Court found the sufficiency claim waived and summarily affirmed.
Rosado sought PCRA relief, arguing appellate counsel was ineffective per se for abandoning preserved issues; the PCRA court and Superior Court denied relief, applying Strickland/Pierce analysis rather than finding Cronic/Cronic‑type per se ineffectiveness.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to decide whether filing a brief that abandons all preserved issues in favor of unpreserved ones constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se, and ultimately vacated and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rosado)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / lower courts)	Held
Whether filing an appellate brief that abandons all preserved issues for unpreserved ones is ineffective assistance of counsel per se	Such a brief is functionally equivalent to failing to file a brief or otherwise perfect an appeal; it results in complete forfeiture of merits review and thus warrants a presumption of prejudice under Cronic	Once necessary filings (notice of appeal, 1925(b)) are made, defects in a brief should be judged under Strickland/Pierce; Reed holds that a deficient brief does not automatically equate to per se ineffectiveness	Held for Rosado: abandoning all preserved issues for unpreserved ones that results in complete waiver of merits review constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se; Superior Court’s affirmance vacated and matter remanded
Whether Reed limits the per se rule to only failures to file procedural documents (vs. briefs that functionally foreclose review)	Rosado argues Reed does not save counsel who entirely forecloses appellate review by raising only waived issues	Lower courts read Reed as limiting Cronic‑type relief when required documents were filed and appeal was docketed	Court: Reed does not alter the Halley/Lantzy distinction; where counsel’s actions produce the same end (complete forfeiture of appellate review), per se relief applies

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice requirement)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1984) (circumstances where prejudice is presumed; per se ineffectiveness)
Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (failure to perfect a requested appeal can constitute constructive denial of counsel and per se prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (failure to file a requested petition for allowance of appeal is per se ineffective assistance)
Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005) (failure to file court‑ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, causing waiver of all claims, is per se ineffective assistance)
Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 2009) (filing a deficient appellate brief does not automatically warrant per se relief where the appeal was docketed and the court could, at least in part, review the issues)
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987) (adoption of the Strickland ineffective‑assistance framework in Pennsylvania)