Commonwealth v. Ritz
153 A.3d 336
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 2005 Ritz pled guilty to one count of indecent assault; the Commonwealth nolle prossed related charges. At sentencing the Commonwealth stated a 10-year Megan’s Law registration was “part of [its] plea agreement.”
- Megan’s Law (in effect at the time) required a 10-year registration for Ritz’s offense; lifetime registration was not applicable under the law as charged or as bargained.
- SORNA was enacted in 2011 (effective Dec. 20, 2012) and reclassified indecent assault as a Tier III offense carrying lifetime registration; it applied to pre-SORNA registrants who had not completed their registration periods.
- In 2015 the Pennsylvania State Police notified Ritz he must register for life under SORNA; Ritz filed to enforce his original plea agreement limiting registration to 10 years.
- The trial court granted Ritz’s petition; the Commonwealth appealed. The Superior Court, relying on Commonwealth v. Martinez, upheld enforcement of the plea-term limiting registration to 10 years and also held SORNA violated Ritz’s due process and Contract Clause protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Ritz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the plea term limiting registration to 10 years is an enforceable part of the plea | Commonwealth: No clear plea-colloquy mention; thus no bargained term to enforce | Ritz: Prosecutor’s on-the-record statement at sentencing made 10-year registration a bargained term; enforceable as contract | Court: Enforceable—plea agreements are contractual; parties placed the term on the record and Ritz is entitled to his bargain (per Martinez/Hainesworth) |
| 2) Whether omission of defendant’s motive or colloquy specifics defeats enforcement | Commonwealth: Absence of explicit defendant statement or plea colloquy on motive means no specific bargain | Ritz: Motive unnecessary; clear terms on the record suffice as consideration and binding promise | Court: Motive need not be stated; clear on-record terms are binding |
| 3) Whether the legislature can lawfully modify plea agreements retroactively via SORNA under the Contract Clauses | Commonwealth: SORNA is a valid exercise of police power; Contract Clauses permit modification for public safety | Ritz: Contract Clauses bar retroactive impairment of plea bargains; SORNA cannot abrogate the plea term | Court: SORNA substantially impairs the contract; although enacted for legitimate public purpose, impairment is unreasonable here because it violates due process—thus Contract Clause challenge succeeds |
| 4) Whether SORNA violates due process by depriving defendants of bargained plea benefits | Commonwealth: Public-safety objective justifies SORNA; no due process violation | Ritz: Deprives defendants of fundamental fairness in plea enforcement; plea bargains warrant due process protection | Court: Agrees with Chief Justice Saylor’s concurrence in Martinez—SORNA violates due process by allowing retroactive abrogation of plea terms; therefore invalid as applied to Ritz |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016) (plea bargains treated as contracts; specific performance of plea terms enforceable)
- Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Superior Court precedent enforcing plea-term limits against retroactive SORNA application)
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutorial promises underlying a plea must be fulfilled)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plea bargains are essentially contractual)
- Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (three-part Contract Clause test for impairment)
- U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (heightened scrutiny where the state is a contracting party; impairment must be reasonable and necessary)