*1 208 A.3d Pennsylvania, Appellant
COMMONWEALTH v. MARTINEZ, Appellee Gabriel J. Pennsylvania, Appellant Commonwealth
v. Grace, Appellee Adam Mackenzie Appellant Pennsylvania, Shower, Wayne Appellee Patrick 30 MAP 2015 No. MAP 2015 No. 32 No. 34 MAP 2015 Supreme Pennsylvania. 8, 2016
ARGUED: March September DECIDED: *5 Thomas L. Kearney III, Esq., Stephanie Elizabeth Lombar- do, Esq., Ramseur, Duane Esq., York County District Attor- ney’s Office, for Appellant.
Bruce Piersoll Blocher, Tambourino, Esq., Anthony J. Esq., York County Office, Public Defender’s for Appellee.
SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
OPINION JUSTICE BAER
In the three consolidated appeals presently before this Court, all of originated which the Court Common Pleas of County York judge, Superior before the same Hainesworth, applied its en banc decision in Commonwealth (Pa. 2013) (en banc), Super. A.3d and concluded that Appellees are specific entitled to of their performance ie., agreements, Appellees’ sexual offender re- quirements Law,1 governed by are which was in Megan’s Appellees effect when plea agreements, their entered (“SOR- by the Sex Notification Act Registration Offender NA”),2 superseded granted which We Megan’s Law. allowance appeal examine and its applicability Hainesworth Appellees’ Superior cases. Consistent with the Court’s decision Hainesworth, we hold that are entitled to the Appellees bargains benefit the Commonwealth struck with when agreements. the trial court accepted parties’ plea Accord- ingly, we affirm. (expired). §§
1. 42 Pa.C.S. 9791-9799.9 9799.10-9799,41. §§ 2. 42 Pa.C.S.
CM T*ri Background
I. (“Shower”) Wayne Appellee Patrick Shower A. *6 inde- charged aggravated Shower with The Commonwealth assault, 3125(a)(7), 18 § and indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. cent 3126(a)(7). and entered § The Commonwealth Shower Pa.C.S. guilty plea for exchange a Shower’s plea agreement. into aggravat- withdrew the assault, the Commonwealth indecent and recommended Shower charge ed-indecent-assault The imprisonment. of 11 ½ to 23 months of receive a sentence agreement and sentenced Shower accepted trial court 12, on 2006. June accepted the trial court law effect when
Megan’s was Law, an Megan’s aggravated- Under plea agreement. triggered registering a lifetime conviction indecent-assault 9795.1(b)(2) § How (expired). 42 Pa.C.S. as a sexual offender. charge and ever, withdrew the Commonwealth because assault,3 Megan’s Law re convicted indecent Shower was only a for ten sexual offender quired register Shower 9795.1(a)(1)(expired). § 42 years. Pa.C.S. (“Martinez”) Appellee
B. J. Martinez Gabriel one count each charged The Martinez with Commonwealth intercourse, 18 Pa.C.S. involuntary deviate sexual assault, 3122.1(a), § 3123(a)(7), sexual 18 statutory § Pa.C.S. 3126(a)(7). assault, § Martinez and indecent 18 Pa.C.S. and into a In ex- plea agreement. the Commonwealth entered assault, pleading guilty for indecent change Martinez charges of involun- agreed pros nolle statutory sexual assault sexual intercourse and tary deviate years that Martinez sentenced five recommended be and a judgment A of conviction follows a trial court's determination that 3. entering guilty plea knowingly voluntarily and defendant is and Com., Eisenberg plea. acceptance of the defendant's See court’s Dep't Welfare, 333, (Pa. 1986) favorably (quoting 516 A.2d 335 Pub. Ferguson, 626, (1910), Pa.Super. 628 for the Commonwealth v. 44 guilty judgment upon pleas proposition of conviction follows contendere). nolo and 215 probation. trial accepted court plea agreement sentenced Martinez accordingly August Megan’s was in law effect when the trial accepted plea agreement, pursuant Law, to Megan’s a conviction for involuntary deviate sexual obligated intercourse the of- register fender to life as a sexual offender. Pa.C.S. 9795.1(b)(2) § (expired). Because the Commonwealth nolle charge, Martinez’s prossed indecent-assault conviction required him to aas sexual only offender for ten (ex- years pursuant Megan’s 9795.1(a)(1) § Law. Pa.C.S. pired). (“Grace”) Appellee
C. Adam MacKenzie Grace charged The Commonwealth Grace with one count each of unlawful contact a minor, 6318(a)(1), § with corrup- Pa.C.S. minors, 6301(a)(1), § tion of assault, Pa.C.S. and indecent *7 3126(a)(8). § 18 Pa.C.S. The Commonwealth Grace en- and into plea agreement. tered a agreed Grace plead guilty of corruption minors and indecent assault. In for exchange guilty pleas, Grace’s prossed Commonwealth nolle charge unlawful-contact-with-a-minor an and recommended aggregate of three of years probation. 22, sentence On March 2011, accepted the trial court agreement and sen- tenced Grace. in effect trial
Megan’s law was when the court accepted parties’ plea agreement. Neither re- Grace’s convictions quired register him to as a Megan’s sexual offender under However, Law.4 had Grace been convicted of unlawful contact minor, a Megan’s with Law would have that he mandated Martinez Shower and were convicted of indecent under 18 assault 3126(a)(7). Generally, § statutory Pa.C.S. a violation of that subsection 3126(b)(3). graded first-degree § is a as misdemeanor. 18 Pa.C.S. Grace 3126(a)(8), pursuant § was convicted of indecent assault to 18 Pa.C.S. graded degree. which a misdemeanor of is the second 18 Pa.C.S. as 3126(b)(1). Megan’s ten-year registration § requirement a Law attached graded when to an indecent-assault conviction the offense was as a 9795.1(a)(1) (ex- first-degree higher. § or 42 misdemeanor Pa.C.S. Thus, Martinez, pired). unlike Shower and Grace’s indecent-assault require register him to under conviction did as a sexual offender Megan's Law. 216 42 Pa.C.S. years. sexual offender for ten
register as 9795.1(a)(1)(expired). §
II. SORNA parties’ plea agreements accepted After the trial Assembly passed SOR- Appellees, General and sentenced 20, 2011. SORNA 2011, signed December NA Act 111 as Megan’s of December Law as expiration for the provided on the same 2012, of SORNA 20, for effectiveness and unnecessary review SORNA comprehensive date. aWhile Court,5 it is appeals presently before purposes to the “added crimes list highlight that SORNA important to three- offenses, sexually violent and established defined corre such offenses and system for their classifying tiered Farabaugh, registration periods.” Commonwealth sponding 2015). (Pa. regis Tier require I offenses A.3d years for 15 Tier II offenses mandate years; tration obligate III an offender registration; Tier offenses and lifetime, (2), 9799.15(a)(1), § register for or Pa.C.S. his her (3), respectively. and criminals, SORNA
Regarding applicability its convicted pertinent part: provides, Pennsylva- with the following shall individuals (relating to
nia provided State sections 9799.15 Police as registra- to initial period registration), (relating 9799.19 tion) (relating to verification sexual offenders and 9799.25 Police) comply otherwise with Pennsylvania State of this provisions subchapter:
*$* *8 (2) who, An date or after effective individual violent section, sexually result a for a is, as a of conviction offense, county inmate in a State or correctional an Commonwealth, including community of this institution is facility, or a contract community corrections center being Pennsylvania Board Probation supervised by history thorough provided of SORNA’s and This Court review J.B., 1, (Pa. 2014). details in In re 107 3-9 A.3d
217 and Parole or county probation parole, subject or to a sentence of punishment intermediate or has supervision pursuant transferred to the Compact Interstate for Adult Supervision accordance with section 9799.19(g).
[***] (3) An individual who:
(i) required was to register with the Pennsylvania State pursuant Police to this subchapter prior December 20, 2012, who and not fulfilled had the individual’s period of registration 20, as of December 2012[.] § 42 Pa.C.S. 9799.13. SORNA “Sexually defines violent of- fense” as specified “[a]n offense in section (relating 9799.14 sexual offenses system) I, and tier as a Tier II III Tier or Tier 42 § sexual offense.” Pa.C.S. 9799.12.
Shower and Martinez were convicted indecent assault 3126(a)(7), § under 18 Pa.C.S. which SORNA classifies as a 9799.14(d)(8). Tier III 42 § offense. Pa.C.S. Tier III offenses require a lifetime of registration. sexual offender 42 Pa.C.S. 9799.15(a)(3). § already Shower and registered Martinez were as sexual offenders under Megan’s prior 20, Law to December not they and had fulfilled their periods registration by that date. Consequently, SORNA’s registration requirements facially them, 9799.13(3)(i), § would apply and Pa.C.S. obligate them to register life, would as sexual for offenders for years registration the ten they faced the time the trial court their accepted plea agreements.
Grace was violating convicted assault for indecent 3126(a)(8), § which Pa.C.S. SORNA classifies as a Tier II 9799.14(c)(1.3). § sexual offense. Tier II Pa.C.S. offenses require registration as a years. sexual offender for 25 9799.15(a)(2). § effective, Pa.C.S. When SORNA became had of a Grace been convicted sexual offense defined SORNA, still serving probationary he was his for term conviction. SORNA’s Accordingly, require- facially apply him, 9799.13(2), § ments would 42 Pa.C.S. would necessitate that he as a sexual offender ten *9 all, as was the case having register rather than years plea agreement. his accepted the trial court when Proceedings III. Trial Court A. Shower trial court a “Peti- 2013, 12, March Shower filed On or for a Writ Habeas Agreement to Enforce Plea tion plea his Therein, explained he entered Shower Corpus.” that he be re- agreement would understanding with an only years offender for ten register as sexual quired obligate him Because now would Megan’s under Law. SORNA life, asked the trial offender Shower register as a sexual plea agreement and to specifically parties’ to enforce court only for ten as a sexual offender register order he has accepted and his contemplated by agreement years guilty plea. law alluded to contract request, of this Shower support in- application that the SORNA’s and averred
principles to him requirements parties’ violates registration creased position appli- also took the plea agreement. Shower him Process and Con- cation of violates the Due SORNA Pennsylvania Constitu- tract Clauses of the United States and tions.6 31, 2013, hearing the trial held Shower’s May
On hearing offered at that was Show- petition. only The evidence that, into testimony. He testified when he entered er’s part agreement required agreement, he understood N.T., only years. him as a offender for ten sexual main 5/31/2013, at 4-5. further stated that the reason Shower with the Commonwealth agreement that he entered into the requirement Megan’s was to avoid the lifetime conviction, to an aggravated-indecent-assault Law attached part withdrew as ie., charge that the Commonwealth N.T., 5/31/2013, at 5-6. plea agreement. below, Opinion this Court's does not address For reasons we discuss 6. alleged Infra, n. 147 A.3d at constitutional violations. at 229 these n. B. Martinez day after petition, Shower filed his Martinez filed a nearly identical petition Shower, the trial court. Like SOR- *10 obligate NA would to register Martinez as a sexual offender life, for not for the years ten that Megan’s required Law’s when the trial court accepted plea agreement. his The trial court hearing held a regarding 21, Martinez’s on petition June 2013. No evidence was at hearing, offered the as the Common- wealth willing was to to stipulate the facts as stated in Martinez’s petition, N.T., 6/21/2013, which were 13-14, nearly identical to alleged the facts in petition. Shower’s
C. Grace day On the same the on hearing petition, as Martinez’s petition Grace filed the trial court. petition Grace’s was substantially similar to the petitions filed Shower Martinez. When the trial court accepted plea agree- Grace’s ment, not required he was to register a sexual offender. SORNA now would register mandate him to as a sexual for 25 years. offender For the same cited the reasons petitions Martinez, filed by Shower and the trial Grace asked court to issue an instructing order the Commonwealth to perform specifically the agreement, which Shower would mean that not required register he is as a sexual offender. Opinions
IV. Trial Court Orders and
19,
July
2013,
On
trial
separate
court entered
orders
granting
petitions
of
In
Shower and Martinez.
the two
opinions
orders,
of
support
those
the court concluded that
application
of
such
persons
SORNA
as Shower and
Martinez violates the Ex Post
Clause of
Facto
both
United
Pennsylvania
States and
Constitutions.7 The
then exam-
whether
ined
of contract
law entitle Shower
principles
judge
previously,
7. As noted
the same trial court
from
Court of
petitions.
County
Appellees'
Common Pleas of York
all of
addressed
Further,
below,
dispose
as will be discussed
because we are
able to
grounds,
unnecessary
these matters
non-constitutional
it is
to ad-
any alleged
post
regarding
dress the trial court’s
ex
conclusions
facto
Infra,
violation.
at 229 n.
Pa.R.A.P. of its that in orders original opinions support issued Notably, and Martinez. how- petitions Shower granting ever, one section original opinions, in its the court named section, Contracts,” and it Bargains “Plea under plea agree- analysis parties’ a contract law provided Pennsylvania Generally speaking, the Contract Clauses of the 8. enacting Legislature from prohibit the laws United Constitutions States retroactively impair rights. Penn- See First Nat. Bank of contract 1987) sylvania Flanagan, (Pa. (explaining 528 A.2d Pennsylvania clauses of the United States and Constitu- contracts "[t]he freely parties to from protect them tions contracts arrived at Thus, abridgment”). subsequent legislative impairment unlike a or law, requires apply principles of contract claim a court to when Clauses, presented implicates the Contract court is with an issue that statute, parties enacted after have court must examine whether a contract, unconstitutionally infringes parties’ on the entered into a rights. opinions in court’s these matters contractual None of the trial unconstitutionally infringes upon the con- addressed whether SORNA rights Appellees. of the Commonwealth and tractual ments, concluding that Shower and Martinez are entitled to benefit their bargains. Trial Court Opinions, 7/19/2013, at 6-7. Apparently 1925(b) mislead by the Commonwealth’s statements, 1925(a) in its Pa.R.A.P. opinions, the court re- named the Bargains “Plea as Contracts” of its sections prior opinions 1925(a) as “Contract Clause.” Opinions, 10/2/2013 10/3/2013,at Despite changes, these title the court nonethe- less offered the same contract law analyses and conclusions in 1925(a) its opinions as it in did its original opinions.
Finally, with regard Grace, the trial court entered an order granting petition his and adopting the initial opinion it in authored Martinez’s case. The timely filed a and, notice appeal subsequently, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, exactly 1925(b) which was the same as the statements it filed in the cases of Shower and Martinez. The trial court responded by filing an opinion that tracked its 1925(a) previously issued Pa.R.A.P. opinions.
The Superior Court consolidated the
ap-
Commonwealth’s
peals regarding Martinez and Grace.9 Commonwealth v. Mar-
al.,
(Pa.
2014)
tinez et
Super.
(unpublished
A.3d
memorandum) (“Martinez/Grace
The court
Appeal”).
consid-
ered the
Appeal
from the Common-
separately
Martinez/Grace
wealth’s
in
appeal
However,
Shower’s case.
the same three-
judge panel of
Superior
Court decided the Martinez/Grace
Appeal and
appeal
the Shower’s case. Commonwealth v.
Shower,
(Pa.
2014)
V. Hainesworth charged Hainesworth with three counts assault, 3122.1; of statutory § sexual 18 Pa.C.S. two counts of appeal 9. This consolidated appellants, included two other Shawn Pat- McGinnis, ("McGinnis”) ("Lasater”). rick Jr. and Christina J. Lasater granted When this Court petitions the Commonwealth's for allowance However, appeal, appellees. McGinnis and Lasater were named as subsequently McGinnis and Lasater filed to dismiss them motions from appeal, granted and this Court their motions. 222 3125(a)(8); assault, § three 18 Pa.C.S. indecent
aggravated 3126(a)(8); assault, § and two 18 Pa.C.S. counts of indecent facility, 18 Pa.C.S. criminal use of a communication counts of Hainesworth, Megan’s at 445. Law was § 82 A.3d 7512. only charges, If convicted of these at that time. effect to register Hainesworth required that would have convictions Law would have been Megan’s a sexual offender under as carried a assault, indecent which aggravated convictions for 9795.1(b)(2) § registration requirement. Pa.C.S. lifetime (expired). 27, 2009, Hainesworth and the Commonwealth February
On
Hainesworth
plea agreement pursuant
into a
which
entered
assault,
three
statutory
to three counts
sexual
pled guilty
of a
assault,
count of criminal use
counts of
and one
indecent
Hainesworth,
Thus,
More above, 3126(a)(8), which, § as mentioned violating 18 Pa.C.S. II as Tier sexual offense. 42 Pa.C.S. classifies a SORNA 9799.14(c)(1.3). § II require Tier sexual offenses 9799.15(a)(2). § for years. as a sexual offender Pa.C.S. effective, serving Hainesworth was SORNA became When as a result of a conviction that SORNA probation term of Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at sexually classifies as a offense. violent status, on his Consequently, probationary based SORNA Hainesworth, 42 Pa.C.S. ordinarily applied would have 9799.13(2), § have him to as obligated and would years, opposed non-registra- sexual offender agreement. contemplated by parties’ plea tion regis- new of the effective date SORNA’s anticipation a motion on Decem- tration Hainesworth filed requirements, After a 13, 2012, seeking probation. termination his ber however, petition; trial court denied the hearing, subject that Hainesworth was court’s order further stated *13 to SORNA’s In registration requirements. this regard, the posited court that the application to SORNA Hainesworth would violate process, fairness, due fundamental par- and the ties’ negotiated plea agreement. Id. at 446-47. The Common- Court, wealth to appealed Superior the which heard the matter en banc.
The court began Hainesworth its analysis by highlighting very the parties different manners which the characterized the issue before the court. Id. at 447. Hainesworth framed the it, ie., similarly issue the trial court how viewed whether the parties’ plea agreement included a term that Hainesworth does not a offender, so, have sexual if whether he is entitled the benefit of his bargain. On the hand, other the Commonwealth believed the issue a involved question of statutory application SORNA, which could be Consistently, avoided. argued that the Superior Court previously upheld had changes registra- tion requirements Megan’s applicable registrants Law who are under supervision, noting registra- correctional that tion requirements non-punitive are collateral consequences convictions, id., and that the court apply should the same The reasoning SORNA. Hainesworth court that determined trial court and properly Hainesworth framed the issue as one implicated case a contract analysis. law Id. Thereafter, the Hainesworth court rec- concluded Hainesworth, ord unambiguously demonstrated that the Com- monwealth, guilty plea court understood that a sexual registration was not requirement included as a term of plea agreement. Hainesworth’s Id. at According to the 447-48. court, the plea agreement appeared to have precisely been so that subjected structured Hainesworth would not to a be registration requirement. the court regard, Id. significant plea agreement found that the eliminat- completely only counts, ed the aggravated-indecent-assault the sole counts Hainesworth faced triggered would have Me- gan’s requirement. Law registration Id.
The Hainesworth court
trial court
next concluded
performance
did not err
by ordering specific
of the terms
rejecting
so
did
first
parties’ plea agreement.
that,
un-
contention
because
the Commonwealth’s
consequence
non-punitive
collateral
der
SORNA
conviction,
subject
*14
is
to SORNA’s
Hainesworth
Hainesworth’s
Instead,
the court determined
reporting requirements.
registration
sexual offender
is whether
dispositive question
The court
agreement.10
at 448-49
parties’
of
Id.
was a
term
in a
that,
agreement arises
plea
while a
further highlighted
and,
in nature
there-
context,
contractual
criminal
it remains
of
law. Id.
fore,
analyzed
principles
must
under
contract
be
of its
portion
court
this
decision
The Hainesworth
bolstered
by plea
of
disposed
all criminal cases are
by noting
nearly
Thus,
view, avoiding possible perver
in the court’s
bargains
(citing
plea bargaining system
of the
critical. Id.
sion
Fruehan,
(Pa.
Super.
557 A.2d
1989)).
view,
emphasized
this
the court
espousing
After
registration requirements,
serious nature
sexual offender
en
requirements
rigorously
out that
these
are so
pointing
9799.25(e),
that,
§
to 42
a
forced
Pa.C.S.
neither
pursuant
any
nor
other event
evacuation
requiring
natural disaster
of the
to
duty
relieves a sexual offender
residences
that,
court
a defen
under SORNA.11Id. The
observed
when
as a sexual
agrees
plead guilty
registering
dant
avoid
offender,
important
trades
such as the
rights,
defendant
trial,
in
to the
right
jury
exchange
being subjected
a
regis
offender
encompassed by
non-trivial restrictions
sexual
“[fjundamental
court,
requirements. According
tration
dictates that this
Id.
bargain
fairness
be enforced.”
posi-
for its
support
The
court found further
Hainesworth
in
Supreme
tion
the United States
Court’s decision
Santo-
determination,
upon
court did not
10. Based
this
the Hainesworth
con-
requirements
address whether SORNA’s
are collateral
Hainesworth,
sequences
qualifying
Additionally, the Hainesworth court analogized the circum
stances of Hainesworth’s case
presented
with the situation
*15
Zuber,
(Pa.
in
Court
Commonwealth
VI. same four issues the presented the The Commonwealth The Appeal. it in the Shower Appeal as did Martinez/Grace upon the issue disposed appeals of based Superior Court both trial court erred phrased as: the the Commonwealth whether application the SORNA’s concluding and state Con- violates the federal requirements Appellees the the arguments The court tract Clauses. construed chal- of this issue as a support presented are entitled Appellees trial court’s conclusion that lenge with the they negotiated of the bargains the benefit (quoting at 6 Appeal Commonwealth.13 Martinez/Grace brief); Appeal at 2-3 Superior Commonwealth’s Court Shower (same). then Haines- Superior panel summarized holding that the therein controlled worth and determined Subsequently, cases. Appellees’ outcome each light individual circumstances Appellees’ examined holding. Hainesworth’s Shower, that the Superior Court concluded
Regarding plea collo- record, transcript guilty specifically Shower’s agree- the nature of the clearly parties’ demonstrated quy, colloquy, parties Appeal During at 6-7. ment. Shower withdrawing be that: the Commonwealth would discussed (which would have indecent assault charge aggravated for life under as a sexual offender required Shower *16 to Law); guilty indecent Megan’s pleading Shower would be Law, assault; an indecent-assault convic- and, Megan’s under for register criminal to as a sexual offender required tion the testimony of from years. (citing ten Id. to the notes Shower’s out that Superior pointed The Court guilty plea colloquy). Appeal, Superior opinion in the Shower the 13. In its memorandum proceedings apparent confusion the trial court Court noted the analyses. Appeal concerning Shower contract law and Contract Clause contract law The court concluded that a non-constitutional at 11-12 n.4. analysis appropriate resolve the issue before the court. |d. was to to subjecting Shower lifetime-registration require- SORNA’s 3126(a)(7) ment for a Subsection indecent assault conviction would have placed in the same position Shower that he was in when he began plea the process—facing a lifetime of sexual registration Thus, offender requirements. Id. at 7. the court that found a term of the parties’ plea agreement contemplated that Shower would have to register as a sexual only offender for years. ten Martinez,
As to that, the Court Superior observed at the hearing regarding to petition plea Martinez’s enforce his agreement, the to stipulated the facts as set forth in petition. the Appeal at 10. Because the Martinez/Grace alia, petition alleged, that inter Martinez entered into the agreement with the that agreement required regis- he was ter as a sexual for only (quoting offender ten id. years, Martinez’s Petition to Plea Agreement Enforce or for a Writ ¶ 3/13/2013, 1), Habeas at Corpus, the Court Superior that a parties’ plea concluded term of the agreement was Martinez would register only have sexual offender ten years. Grace,
Concerning Superior highlighted par- Court stipulation facts, alia, ties’ they specified, wherein inter plea agreement upon plead was based having Grace charges him require register would as a sexual Appeal offender. at 10-11 (quoting Stipulation Martinez/Grace ¶ Facts, 4).14 7/30/2013, upon at Based stipulation, Superior parties’ plea agreement Court determined that the require did not as a Grace sexual offender. Superior rejected Court the Commonwealth’s various attempts to distinguish Appellees’ cases from Hainesworth that, Appellees’ plea agreements held because contained status, conditions regarding their sexual offender they Hainesworth mandates that receive benefit their facts, quoting parties' stipulation Superior After paragraph supposedly cited five of an to Grace’s exhibit attached petition. Appeal 10-11. The certified record before Martinez/Grace parties stipulation this Court indicates filed their facts 30, 2013, July separately petition, paragraph from Grace’s and that the quoted paragraph stipulated the court was four of the facts. *17 Superior to the Court’s pursuant bargains. Consequently, of- registration as sexual rationale, and Shower’s Martinez’s contemplated by period for the ten year would be fenders to required not be and Grace would plea agreements, their of offender, his the terms per as a sexual agreement. Arguments to this Court The Parties’
VIL of a for allowance petition The filed Commonwealth petitions the granted in all cases. This Court appeal three to Hainesworth and the matters order evaluate consolidated in these cases The issues cases. application Appellees’ its law, of all our questions of law. As with implicate questions novo, of is de scope and our review standard review Crawley, (Pa. 612, 614 924 A.2d plenary. 2007). Court,15
In to this the Commonwealth continues its briefs Clauses and refer a constitutional Contract invoke However, previously, nei- of those clauses. noted violation disposed Appel- Superior trial court nor the ther the analysis. of a Clause constitutional by way lees’ cases Contract gen- clearly applied courts Rather, trial and intermediate should receive the deciding Appellees eral contract law bargains. their benefit Com this weakness
Appellees have identified Indeed, significant por dedicate Appellees monwealth’s briefs. dismiss the Court should arguing tions of their briefs “the Commonwealth seeks appeals, primarily basis ruling below[.]” not the of claim was basis review omitted). decline (capitalization Brief We Martinez/Grace procedural matter on invitation to dismiss this Appellees’ grounds. cases, in their various Appellees, inception
At these of contract injected principles the issue whether petitions, jointly Grace parties filed four briefs in this Court. Martinez and brief; brief, separate Commonwealth filed Shower filed a filed addressing and a different brief of Martinez and Grace a brief cases regarding Shower's case. require specific performance law of the parties’ plea agree- ments. addition finding that the application of SORNA Appellees post violation, constitutes an ex the trial court facto principles determined that of contract law Ap- mandate that *18 pellees receive the benefit of their bargains. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s solely orders on the basis of contract principles. law Moreover, throughout this litigation, parties provided have adequate argument on these non- constitutional principles, including the in its Commonwealth briefs to this Court. Consequently, we now will consider the solely cases under common law contract principles.16 Ultimately, the Commonwealth reject asks this Court Hainesworth Appellees’ for remand cases further consid- eration. At the core its argument is the Commonwealth’s belief that registration SORNA’s requirements, Megan’s like Law’s registration requirements, constitute collateral conse- quences of Appellees’ convictions.17According to the Common- wealth, it when enters into a plea defendant, with a agreement parties are by any collateral consequences bound exist at the time sentencing, Assembly unless the General changes those by collateral consequences subsequently enact- ing legislation. upon Based this position, that the Legislature contends the terms of the various altered Court, alternative, 16. In Appellees their briefs to this offer constitution grounds support affirming Superior al Court’s orders. To the issues, extent that Court could reach those constitutional we this so, decline to do as the can be issue this case decided non- Pennsylvania grounds. constitutional See P.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm'n, (Pa. 1999) ("When 723 A.2d 176 a case raises both a issue, constitutional and a non-constitutional a court should not reach properly the constitutional issue if the case can be decided on non- grounds.”). constitutional regard upon 17. The Commonwealth’s belief based in this this Court’s previous registration requirements we decisions where found that the but, Megan’s punishment various versions of Law did constitute rather, consequences qualifying amounted to collateral criminal E.g., Williams, (Pa. 2003). convictions. A.2d 962 Commonwealth v. It, however, open question remains an whether SORNA’s requirements punishment purposes. In constitute for constitutional deed, recently granted question. to consider Court allocatur Reed, (Pa. 2016). event, any Commonwealth v. 135 A.3d below, registration requirements reasons we discuss whether SORNA’s consequences impact constitute collateral has no on this matter. thus, SORNA, by enacting agreements herein the terms longer no be bound Commonwealth should Brief agreements. those See Commonwealth’s Martinez/Grace (“The the Commonwealth decision binds at 13 Hainesworth of that contract, though enforcement fixed terms of even Legislature longer legally possible no because contract is terms.”); Brief changed has said Commonwealth’s Shower (same). contend that Haines- succinctly, Appellees primarily Stated correctly Superior and that worth was decided they are concluding Hainesworth properly applied bargains—Martinez of their and Shower to the entitled benefit for ten and Grace years, as a sexual offender register have As to the as a sexual not have to offender. does collateral nature regarding alleged Commonwealth’s belief Appellees take the registration requirements, of SORNA’s *19 rejected the properly that the Hainesworth court position not non-registration of be en- promise claim that “a should is ‘collateral’ to the sentence.” registration forced because Indeed, 39; Shower’s Brief at 26. Brief Martinez/Grace that, the Hainesworth court’s determination Appellees echo analysis parties’ plea a contractual purposes a convicted question regarding agreement, dispositive status is whether sexual registration offender criminal’s sexual of the parties’ agreement, was a term offender For the was, if it that term must be enforced. and then follow, agree Appellees. with reasons we Discussion
VIII. matter, court accurately an initial the Hainesworth As in the plea agreements play the critical role that described fact, long recognized courts have justice system. criminal agreements compo are essential plea negotiations e.g., Santobello, See, 404 justice system. criminal nents of the of criminal (explaining disposition “[t]he at 260 U.S. ac and the charges by agreement prosecutor between the is an essen cused, loosely ‘plea bargaining,’ called sometimes justice”). In this of the administration component tial
231
Commonwealth,
upon
we look
the practice
plea
bargaining
Zuber,
with favor.
We that the of a plea agreement as a contract is not a perfect instance, one. For unlike a typical contract, plea a agreement does not on binding become the parties upon terms; their rather, consent a plea agree ment is not binding valid and until it is and accepted evaluated by a party, ie., 590(A)(3) third a trial court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. (stating that a judge may refuse to accept plea guilty or nolo judge contendere and that the shall accept plea not unless the judge determines after inquiry the defendant tendered). voluntarily is and understanding^
Nonetheless, Hainesworth court recognized, plea agreements clearly are contractual nature. See Puckett States, (2009) v. United (stating that, U.S. “[ajlthough analogy may not hold all respects, plea contracts”). bargains are essentially For all pur intents and poses, agree parties point. this See Commonwealth’s (“A contract.”); Brief at 13 guilty plea is a Martinez/Grace (same); Commonwealth’s Shower Brief at 13 Martinez/Grace (“Specific Brief at 30 of plea enforcement is agreement also law, distinction.”) supported by contract but with a significant (footnote omitted); (same). Shower’s Brief at 20 parties’ agreement on point surprising, as this utilizes concepts closely associated with evaluating contract law when issues involving plea agreements.
By way
example
pertinent
cases,
Appellees’
Spence,
(Pa.
1993),
Commonwealth v.
A.2d
Spence
*20
argued
by
the trial court erred
to
an
refusing
enforce
oral
plea agreement allegedly
by
reached
the Commonwealth and
Spence,
Spence
to his trial.
prior
rejecting
In this
or
a
any significant degree
promise
on
a
rests
plea
“when
part
so that it can
said to be
the
be
agreement
prosecutor,
consideration,
promise
such
must be
or
of the inducement
Santobello,
IX. Conclusion a question When as to arises whether a convicted criminal entitled specific is of a of his performance term plea agreement, the is term, focus not the nature of the e.g., whether the term is a collateral of consequence addressed Rather, the quite defendant’s conviction.19 simply, the convict ed criminal is entitled to of his bargain the benefit through specific of performance of plea agreement. the terms the A,2d Santobello, Spence, 262; at Thus, 404 U.S. at 1184. alleged must determine whether an term is the part parties’ plea agreement. If answer to inquiry the that affirmative, then the convicted criminal is to specific entitled performance of the term. regard cases, to Appellees’
With Court Superior accurately reported the Commonwealth stipulated facts as set forth Martinez’s petition. Ap Martinez/Graee 10; N.T., peal 6/21/2013, petition, at 13-14. Martinez alleged, alia, that into plea agreement inter he entered “pursuant to agreement an understanding [he] was required register years.” offender only sexual ten Martinez’s Agreement Petition Plea or for a Enforce Writ ¶ 3/13/2013, fact, Corpus, By Habeas at 1. this stipulating to the that the parties’ plea agreement confirmed requiring contained a term Martinez to as a sexual for ten years. Thus, offender Martinez is entitled to the bargain. benefit
Concerning Grace, he Commonwealth entered into a stipulation plea facts “The facts. Those included: agreement negotiated [Grace’s with Common- counsel] Indeed, despite agreed-upon the unenforceable nature of the sen- Zuber, tence in this Court determined that Zuber was entitled to the words, bargain. In simply benefit of his other the Zuber not Court did bargained-for conclude that Zuber was to the not entitled sentence Instead, because the sentence was unenforceable. the Court examined parties' agreement agreement, found that the the unen- included sentence, forceable and held Zuber that sentence. was entitled to clear, concluding To be that Zuber was entitled to the sentence for bargained, which he modified the to make it sentence Zuber, compliant plea agreement. parties' with the law and the A.2d at 446. charges having on Mr. Grace was
wealth based Law in effect Megan’s registration under require would which ¶ 7/30/2014, Facts, at 4. plea.” Stipulation time at the *22 admitted fact, the Commonwealth to this By stipulating term which contem- contained a agreement parties’ plea the aas sexual register not have to would plated Grace of his to the benefit entitled Consequently, offender. Grace bargain. case, concluding that the rec
Regarding Shower’s agreement, parties’ plea of the the nature ord demonstrated accurately recounted the discussion Superior Court the at Appeal 6-7. plea colloquy. at Shower place took Shower’s stating that Shower counsel That included Shower’s discussion under registration Megan’s subject years to ten would be Thus, held that N.T., 3/6/2006, Superior at 5. the Law. to the that Shower was entitled record demonstrated as a sexual registering bargain—ten years of his benefit fails to convince us that offender. The Commonwealth fact, fails regard. in this the Commonwealth court erred Moreover, Court. in its brief this address this conclusion court credited recognize that the trial Commonwealth does not hearing petition at the on his offered testimony Shower N.T., 5/31/2013, According at 8. plea agreement.20 his enforce determi Superior Court’s ly, we have no reason disturb register as a sexual offender only nation need that Shower years. ten reasons, Superior we affirm the orders
For these Court. not Eakin Donohue did
Former Justice and Justice or this case. the consideration decision participate join opinion. Todd, Dougherty and Wecht Justices that, above, hearing, when Shower testified 20. As we discussed part of the agreement, understood that he entered into the he years register for ten agreement required him as a sexual offender agreement avoid he was to the main reason entered into and that Megan’s requirement Law attached to an the lifetime N.T., 5/31/2013, at 4-6. aggravated-indecent-assault conviction. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.
Justice a concurring opinion. Wecht files Chief Justice Saylor, concurring I agree with much of the majority’s reason contract-based ing and its conclusion that are appellees entitled to the benefit of their bargains. However, relief, I am circumspect that such exempting appellees from requirements, SORNA’s may be effectuated absent constitutional basis. See Commonwealth (“We v. Killinger, 92, 106, (2005) 585 Pa. 888 A.2d will any interfere more than the constitution requires with the Legislature’s deliberative process refining the treatment sexual offenders to protect best the citizens of Common wealth.”); 9799.23(b)(2) (“[T]he § see also 42 Pa.C.S. shall no authority have to relieve a sexual from the offender duty subchapter under or to modify the requirements of this subchapter they relate to the sexual *23 offender.”).
The Zuber
majority
case—which the
on as
appears
rely
authority for
grant
the
of
specific performance premised
contract principles
a plea agreement
alone—involved
contain
ing terms that
law.
existing
Majority Opinion,
violated
See
at
n.19,
233
147
at
(discussing
A.3d
532 n.19
Commonwealth
Zuber,
(1976)).
453,
466 Pa.
441
Critically,
353
the Zuber
A.2d
Court, in enforcing
agreement,
the plea
required that
sentence be modified in such a
as
comply
manner so
with
pertinent provisions
Zuber,
of the law. See
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu United States 1, Constitution, tion Pennsylvania and Article Section 9 of the coextensive, which have been interpreted generally guaran as protections tee the process. due See Commonwealth v. Sims, 506, (2007). n.6, 931, 591 Pa. 523 919 A.2d 941 n.6 Court has previously process inquiry, related due “[t]he general form, its most an entails assessment to whether
236 some principle or conduct offends proceeding challenged people our and conscience of justice rooted the traditions so communi and that defines the as fundamental as to ranked be v. Krat decency.” and play sense of fair ty’s (2001) marks, 36, 49, 20, (quote 27 sas, 764 A.2d 664 Pa. omitted); State Bd. see also Khan v. citations, alterations and 936, Exam’rs, 166, 183, A.2d 946 Pa. 842 677 Auctioneer (2004) (“Substantive concept inter is the esoteric process due fundamen judicial guarantee our framework to within woven ” (internal quotes justice .... and substantial tal fairness omitted)). citation majority protection,
As relates to this constitutional component an “essential plea bargaining develops 230, Majority Opinion, at 147 justice,” the administration York, 257, 404 New U.S. (quoting at 631 Santobello v. A.3d 495, (1971)), that the Commonwealth has 260, 92 498 S.Ct. plea agree- of the duty the terms affirmative abide an Zuber, 532 466 Pa. at ment, 232, (citing at see id. A.3d (“Our courts have demanded strict 458-59, 353 A.2d at any possible perversion in order to avoid compliance ... that a defen- evidencing concern bargaining system, plea fraudulently or induced bargain coerced into a might dant be guarantees constitutional attendant give up very valued right by jury.”)). to trial justice in our bargaining’s role my Prom perspective, exchanged waiver system, with the defendant’s combined of fundamental mandates consideration rights, constitutional See State v. process protections. attendant due fairness and (N.C. 1999) Blackwell, (“By App. Ct. S.E.2d rights, constitutional guilty, many a defendant waives pleading *24 right trial. No other right jury of which is his the least zealously guarded years over the has so of the individual been .... in our deeply system jurisprudence so embedded any plea such, process strict adherence As due mandates omitted)), re- marks and citations (quotation agreement.” (N.C. 2000) {per 929 538 S.E.2d grounds, on other manded curiam,).1 process bargains pursuant to due plea must be enforced The view that garner among many federal principles appears support state and
237 It seems from evident this Court’s and jurisdictions’ other precedents that the of plea enforcement bargains is rooted See, fundamental e.g., fairness. Sluss, Commonwealth v. 419 (Va. 263, 1992) (“[T]o S.E.2d 265 Ct. App. govern- allow the ment to receive the bargain benefit of its providing without the reciprocal benefit contracted for the defendant would do more than violate the private rights contractual parties—it would offend all notions of fairness in the related criminal proceedings, protected which are by constitutional process.”). due Accordingly, since parties stipulated in these cases that the registration conditions express were terms of appellees’ plea agreements, I appellees believe are entitled the benefit for bargained which they a matter of due process.
Justice Wecht, concurring join
I the learned Majority full. The plea bargain engine that justice drives our criminal system. Without that generally engine, the system grind would a halt. See Frye, Missouri (2012). v. 1399,1407-08 132 S.Ct.
Beyond practical reality, larger there is a still reason that our compliance law demands strict of plea with the terms into bargains openly fairly. entered Plea are bargains indeed Yet they contracts. significantly differ from the ordi- nary A offer-consideration-acceptance contract. criminal 'de- See, Cate, 884, 879,
jurisdictions. e.g., Cuero v. 827 F.3d 2016 WL 3563660, (9th 2016) that, (indicating at *3 plea Cir. where a term in a agreement plead guilty, functions as an inducement for the defendant right the defendant obtains a vested Process under the Due Clause to it); Lara-Ruiz, 914, (8th enforce United States v. 681 F.3d 919 Cir. 2012); Al-Arian, 1184, (11th 2008); United States v. 514 F.3d 1190 Cir. 243, Altro, 2000); (6th Randolph, United States v. 230 F.3d 249 Cir. In re 372, (2d 1999); Ingram, 180 F.3d 375 Cir. v. United States 979 F.2d 1179, (7th 1992); 179, Villalobos, (Cal. People 1184 Cir. 277 P.3d 182 2012); State, 1215, (Nev. 1986); Van Buskirk v. 720 P.2d State v. 403, (Tenn. 1995); Howington, 907 S.W.2d Commonwealth v. 492, (Va. 1999). Kuchenreuther, Sandy, 509 S.E.2d But see State v. (Iowa 1974) 218 N.W.2d (requiring to honor the state its agreement, concluding adjudicated by but "applica that Santobello was " standard,’ may ‘fair-play tion what be termed a rather than consti principles). tutional *25 rights an of constitutional array the court with fendant enters upon guilty. See pleading or she must surrender that he (1969). Boykin Alabama, person a When v. U.S. recognize that our and state Constitutions yields rights federal fundamental, required prosecu- is the performance strict as law, in the change of a regardless subsequent tion. This is so a collat- change only such affects of whether irrespective and plea. In Commonwealth guilty of the consequence eral (en banc), 2013) Hainesworth, (Pa. Super. 82 A.3d in upon performance strict correctly insisted Superior circumstances, so in the Majority wisely does such judice. cases sub conclusion, of the application Majority reaches
Once the straightforward. is in these three cases appellees rule to the beyond peradventure in each case demonstrates The record either predicated, part, least bargain was entirely upon limiting or avoiding Megan’s Law upon of for the years to ten instead offend- provision’s application ones, nor is are as patent all cases these er’s lifetime. Not Often, the particulars so always the record demonstrative. official appear negotiations will the out-of-court record, or does appear the certified what transcripts or will not be clear. record instances, court in the upon it incumbent the trial
In such the facts and circumstances order to consider first instance terms, if in the actual any, included to determine which were presented to the parties agreement reached all, Much, if not of the and confusion complexity approval. To easily can avoided. that can in these situations be arise they bargained, that for parties receive which that both ensure are not without rights that constitutional waived and to ensure consequences pleading guilty, understanding full recitation their present complete should parties rejects accepts or on the record before the court agreement unnecessarily jeopardizes good so Failure do plea. parties negotiated. that the have bargain faith