Commonwealth v. Resende
474 Mass. 455
| Mass. | 2016Background
- In 2006 Resende (age 19) was charged in a single prosecution with five counts of cocaine distribution (five different days) and one count of possession with intent; he pled guilty to the distribution counts in one plea proceeding and received concurrent house‑of‑correction sentences.
- On May 28, 2011 State troopers in Brockton observed Resende; after a brief encounter Trooper Telford perceived conduct consistent with someone concealing a weapon, directed Resende to another area of the parking lot, then recovered a handgun from Resende’s waistband; a search incident produced plastic bags of cocaine.
- In 2011 Resende was indicted on multiple firearms counts and a subsequent drug charge; each firearms count carried an enhancement under Massachusetts’s armed career criminal statute, G. L. c. 269, § 10G.
- A Superior Court judge denied Resende’s pretrial motions to suppress; at a bench trial Resende was convicted of several firearm offenses and, in a separate bench trial on enhancements, found to be an armed career criminal under § 10G(c) and sentenced to the mandatory minimum 15 years.
- On appeal Resende argued (1) the initial police encounter constituted an unconstitutional seizure so suppression should have been granted, and (2) his five prior drug convictions, all resulting from a single prosecution/plea, should count as a single predicate conviction under § 10G (thus qualifying only for the lower enhancement range).
- The court affirmed denial of the suppression motions but held that prior convictions that were part of a single prosecution count as a single predicate "incidence" under § 10G, vacated the § 10G(c) enhancement convictions, and remanded for resentencing consistent with § 10G(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were the officers’ actions a seizure requiring suppression? | Commonwealth: no seizure until Trooper directed Resende to another part of lot; actions were Terry‑reasonable | Resende: officers cut off his path, displayed weapons and badges — a seizure without reasonable suspicion | Denied suppression: initial approach was not a seizure; the later, limited seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion and subsequent actions were proportional and lawful under Terry v. Ohio |
| How to interpret “arising from separate incidences” in § 10G(c) for predicate convictions? | Commonwealth: each qualifying conviction counts separately regardless of whether convictions arose in same prosecution (akin to Federal ACCA) | Resende: where prior convictions resulted from a single prosecution/plea they should count as a single predicate offense; §10G(c) requires separate prosecutions | Held for Resende: “arising from separate incidences” means predicate convictions must arise from separate prosecutions/previous convictions; simultaneous convictions in one prosecution count as a single incidence, so §10G(c) did not apply; remand for sentencing under lower tier |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (constitutional standard for stop and frisk)
- Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367 (no seizure where police approached defendant; measuring intrusiveness at each phase)
- Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1 (approach from vehicle and questioning not a seizure)
- United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.) (Federal ACCA interpretation: prior convictions "occasions different" = separate criminal episodes)
- Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 583 Pa. 478 (Pa. 2005) (interpreting graduated recidivist statute to require sequential/procedural separation to reflect recidivist rationale)