Commonwealth v. Prendes
97 A.3d 337
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2014Background
- Dennis L. Prendes was charged with multiple sexual offenses for repeatedly assaulting his niece from ages ~5–13; after a week-long jury trial (15 witnesses), the jury began deliberating but had not reached verdicts on all counts.
- While the jury was deliberating, Prendes and the Commonwealth negotiated a plea: guilty to indecent assault of a person under 13, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors, with an agreed sentence of 30–60 months plus 36 months probation; the court accepted the plea and deferred sentencing for an SVP assessment.
- Prior to sentencing, Prendes moved to withdraw his guilty plea claiming factual innocence; the trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, applying the more stringent "manifest injustice" standard because the plea was entered after the Commonwealth had presented its case and Prendes knew the negotiated sentence.
- The court held an SVP (Sexually Violent Predator) hearing based on an SOAB assessment by Dr. Veronique Valliere, who did not interview Prendes but relied on records (e.g., police reports, affidavit, victim statements, CYF records); she testified that even the facts admitted in the guilty plea alone supported SVP classification.
- The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Prendes met the statutory SVP criteria (mental abnormality/pedophilia, predatory behavior, likelihood of reoffense) and sentenced him per the plea; Prendes appealed, raising (1) denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea and (2) admissibility/reliability of the SOAB expert’s reliance on out-of-court records.
Issues
| Issue | Prendes' Argument | Commonwealth / Trial Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Prendes’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea | Prendes argued the liberal pre-sentence "fair and just" standard should apply because he moved before sentencing and asserted innocence; the court should have warned that withdrawal would be difficult | Court/Com. argued plea was entered after trial presentation and with a negotiated, known sentence, so the "manifest injustice" standard applied and withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth because Prendes had a full preview of the case and jury reactions | Court affirmed: applied "manifest injustice" standard and denied withdrawal because defendant had seen the Commonwealth’s case and the plea could have been used to obtain a new jury or tailor strategy, thus causing substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth |
| Whether the SOAB expert improperly relied on "unproven allegations" (hearsay records) to support SVP designation | Prendes argued Dr. Valliere’s opinion relied on inadmissible/unproven allegations in police reports, affidavit, and other records not admitted at the SVP hearing; only facts in the guilty plea should count | Court/Com. argued experts may rely on facts or data reasonably relied upon in the field (Pa.R.E. 703); SOAB assessments are statutorily guided and records provisionally used by experts are appropriate; the guilty plea alone sufficed to support SVP findings anyway | Court affirmed: expert reliance on records was permissible under rules for expert testimony and SORNA/SOAB practice; any additional record reliance was unnecessary because guilty-plea admissions alone supported SVP status |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Santos, 301 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1973) (trial court may allow pre-sentence withdrawal of guilty plea in its discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973) (pre-sentence withdrawal should be liberally allowed; test is fairness and justice)
- Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983) (when defendant knows the only possible sentence, a pre-sentence motion to withdraw may be treated under the higher "manifest injustice" standard)
- Commonwealth v. Morales, 305 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1973) (withdrawing plea after presentation of Commonwealth’s case may substantially prejudice the Commonwealth because defendant had full preview)
- Commonwealth v. Whelan, 392 A.2d 1362 (Pa. 1978) (only compelling reasons permit withdrawal after Commonwealth’s case has commenced)
- Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2006) (statutory framework for SVP assessments makes expert testimony generally accepted; Frye not required)
- Commonwealth v. Killinger, 888 A.2d 592 (Pa. 2005) (SVP status decided by clear and convincing evidence; SVP hearing is not criminal punishment requiring beyond-a-reasonable-doubt proof)
- Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935 (Pa. Super. 2010) (an expert’s opinion rendered to a reasonable degree of certainty is itself evidence; experts may rely on otherwise inadmissible facts if those are the sorts of facts reasonably relied upon in the field)