33 Mass. L. Rptr. 658
Mass. Super. Ct.2016Background
- In 2005 John Powell was convicted of second-degree murder, assault with intent to kill, weapons/ammunition offenses; convictions mostly affirmed on appeal; a post-conviction new-trial motion was denied.
- Powell seeks post-conviction DNA testing under G.L.c. 278A of blood on a baseball bat found near the victim; the bat had been used earlier by the victim to vandalize property and to chase two unidentified men.
- Powell contends third-party DNA on the bat could identify an alternate suspect (someone the victim had struck), supplying motive for a revenge killing.
- The Commonwealth opposes, arguing testing cannot produce evidence "material" to identity of the perpetrator under G.L.c. 278A §7(b)(4).
- The court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing (parties consented) and focused on statutory interpretation of "material" in §7(b)(4).
- The court allowed the motion, construing "material" broadly (akin to relevance), finding the requested testing could produce evidence bearing on identification of an alternate culprit and that Powell met the remaining §7(b) factors.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Powell's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DNA testing is permissible under G.L.c. 278A §7(b)(4) when testing would show evidence of third-party motive rather than direct physical contact | Materiality requires a direct link to the crime; motive-only evidence is insufficient | Material should be read broadly (like evidentiary relevance); third‑party DNA could identify an alternate perpetrator and show motive | Allowed. "Material" construed broadly as having some logical connection to identification; testing could produce evidence relevant to an alternate culprit |
| Whether prior Chapter 278A decisions require a direct physical link for materiality | Prior cases show materiality where testing could show physical presence or contact; should be limited | Those cases do not define "material" to exclude motive evidence; statute should be construed generously | Court declines to narrow §7(b)(4) to only direct physical-link evidence; motive evidence can satisfy materiality |
| Whether court should apply a new-trial standard when adjudicating a §278A motion | Testing should be limited to cases that would likely warrant a new trial | Chapter 278A is separate and more permissive; legislature intended easier access to testing | Court follows SJC precedent: do not impose new-trial standard at §278A stage; interpret statute generously |
| Whether evidentiary hearing was required to resolve §7(b) factors | Commonwealth implied hearing needed for contested factors | Parties stipulated a non‑evidentiary hearing was sufficient | Court accepted parties’ stipulation and resolved materiality question on the papers/hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496 (explains Chapter 278A framework and separation from new-trial standard)
- Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54 (reaffirms §278A procedures; discusses nonadversarial threshold inquiry)
- Commonwealth v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37 (describes §3 threshold requirements for §278A motions)
- Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120 (permitted testing where evidence could show physical contact; refused testing for unrelated items lacking link)
- Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 686 (chapter construed liberally; addresses admissibility and potential evidence standard)
- Commonwealth v. Lyons, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 485 (discusses the meaning of "potential" in §7(b))