116 N.E.3d 575
Mass.2019Background
- Early morning August 2, 2009, an altercation at a Boston bar escalated; defendant and codefendant became involved with victim Jovany Eason and others; surveillance video captured much of the events.
- The codefendant brandished a .45 caliber handgun outside the bar; the defendant took the gun, fired toward Eason, missed, and a stray round shattered the bar window and fatally struck employee Manuel Monteiro.
- The defendant chased and then shot Eason multiple times; Eason later died from gunshot wounds to the torso.
- Later on Jerome Street the defendant exchanged gunfire with Timothy Santos (who shot at the defendant); Santos was wounded but survived.
- At trial the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder (deliberate premeditation) for the deaths of Eason and Monteiro. He appealed, raising claims concerning jury instructions (accident, manslaughter, transferred-intent self-defense), erroneous handling of peremptory challenges, identification testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue intoxication evidence.
- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s claims and declining to adopt transferred-intent self-defense on these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Pina's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an accident instruction regarding Eason's death was required | No; evidence showed intentional firing at Eason before later firefight | Accident might explain Eason's death as stray fire during later exchange/self-defense | Denied: no evidence of an unintentional discharge; intentional multiple shots precluded accident instruction |
| Whether transferred-intent self-defense excuses killing of bystander Monteiro | Not necessary/applicable here; transferred-intent self-defense not recognized and facts don’t support it | Should be applied to excuse bystander death when defendant lawfully fires in self-defense and misses | Court declined to adopt transferred-intent self-defense here; facts did not support applying it (defendant fired earlier at Eason) |
| Whether jury should have been instructed on involuntary or voluntary manslaughter for Monteiro/Eason deaths | No; evidence showed shots were intentionally fired at persons creating a plain and strong likelihood of death | Wanted involuntary manslaughter for reckless/wanton conduct or voluntary manslaughter for excessive self-defense | Denied: involuntary manslaughter not supported (shots aimed at person, not into air); voluntary manslaughter not preserved and, on merits, no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice |
| Whether deprivation of two peremptory challenges requires new trial | Commonwealth: no reversible prejudice shown; defendant didn’t object or show he would have used them to exclude seated jurors | Court’s miscount deprived defendant of two challenges causing prejudice | Denied: defendant failed to show he would have used challenges or that seated jurors were biased; no prejudice shown |
| Admissibility/prejudice of identification evidence (officer ID; five-photo array; witness nickname) | Identification supported by multiple eyewitnesses and surveillance; any procedural lapses not prejudicial | Officer ID, incomplete array, and nickname knowledge tainted identifications | Denied: other witnesses independently identified defendant from video; five-photo mistake inadvertent and not prejudicial; voir dire denial not abused |
| Ineffective assistance for not presenting intoxication witnesses/new trial | Trial counsel made a reasoned tactical choice after investigating; evidence was not newly discovered | Counsel failed to investigate/present intoxication defense; affidavits show intoxication | Denied: counsel’s choice was informed and not manifestly unreasonable; affidavits were not newly discovered evidence sufficient to mandate new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Millyan, 399 Mass. 171 (Mass. 1987) (accident instruction requires evidence of unintentional discharge)
- Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786 (Mass. 1980) (accidental discharge can negate intent)
- Commonwealth v. Barton, 367 Mass. 515 (Mass. 1975) (self-defense and accident are mutually exclusive but both may be charged if independently supported)
- Commonwealth v. Zaccagnini, 383 Mass. 615 (Mass. 1981) (testimony that gun “went off” can raise accidental-shooting doubt)
- Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440 (Mass. 2013) (involuntary manslaughter instruction where firing toward occupied area without evidence of occupants may allow view as reckless rather than malicious)
- Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719 (Mass. 2002) (firing into occupied vehicle supported intent to kill, not mere recklessness)
- Commonwealth v. Bockman, 442 Mass. 757 (Mass. 2004) (erroneous denial of peremptory challenges reversible only if defendant shows injury unless seated jurors posed no risk of bias)
- Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590 (Mass. 2011) (police should not use photographic arrays with fewer than five fillers absent exigent circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425 (Mass. 2014) (lay witness may identify person in photo/video when witness has superior familiarity to jurors)
- Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357 (Mass. 1995) (witness identification from surveillance still admissible when properly founded)