Commonwealth v. Philip J. Marquis
SJC-13562
Mass.Mar 11, 2025Background
- Philip J. Marquis, a New Hampshire resident, was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm after a car accident in Massachusetts and charged with unlawful possession under Massachusetts law.
- Marquis had not applied for a Massachusetts nonresident firearms license before being charged; he argued the Massachusetts nonresident firearm licensing scheme violated his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The trial court granted Marquis’s motion to dismiss, finding the scheme unconstitutional. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) granted direct appellate review.
- The relevant statutory regime (G.L. c. 140, § 131F) provides that a temporary firearm license "shall be issued" to a nonresident unless the applicant is a "prohibited person" or "determined unsuitable."
- The SJC was tasked with deciding whether this licensing scheme violates the Second Amendment (right to bear arms) or the Fourteenth Amendment (right to travel and equal protection).
- The SJC ultimately reversed the trial court, holding the scheme facially constitutional under both amendments.
Issues
| Issue | Marquis's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for As-Applied Challenge | Marquis argued that post-Bruen, he need not have applied for a license to challenge the law as applied to him. | Only those denied a license have standing to assert an as-applied challenge. | Marquis lacked standing; as-applied challenges require application and denial. |
| Meaning of §131F (Scope of "shall be issued") | §131F allows licenses to nonresidents only for firearms competition, not for self-defense. | License "shall be issued" to nonresidents for any purpose (not just competition) if not prohibited/unsuitable. | Court adopts Commonwealth's reading: nonresidents may apply for self-defense. |
| Constitutionality Under Second Amendment | Licensing scheme burdens the core Second Amendment right (especially after Bruen); improper discretionary delays and limitations. | The scheme is a "shall-issue" regime for public safety, consistent with the nation's historical tradition; nonresidents not unfairly singled out. | Upheld as a valid "shall-issue" regime; rationally related to historical tradition of disarming dangerous persons. |
| Constitutionality Under Fourteenth Amendment (Travel & Equal Protection) | Differences in process, duration, and grace period for nonresidents penalize the right to travel and deny equal protection. | Differences reflect legitimate state interest: verification is more difficult for nonresidents. No penalization or discrimination. | Differences rationally related to legitimate interests; scheme does not violate right to travel or equal protection. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess handguns for self-defense)
- McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (Second Amendment applies to the states)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (Second Amendment requires regulations to be consistent with historical tradition; "may-issue" regimes fail, "shall-issue" more likely okay)
- United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (Disarming individuals posing specific dangers fits within historical traditions)
- Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (Outlines basic aspects of the constitutional right to travel)
- Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (Rational basis review for non-suspect classifications)
- Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (Very deferential rational basis standard for classifications)
- McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (Distinctions in state law must be rationally related to legitimate ends)