106 N.E.3d 620
Mass.2018Background
- In 2000, then-17-year-old Fernando Perez committed two armed robberies and attempted a third; during the third incident he shot off-duty Detective Carlo D'Amato, who suffered catastrophic, permanent injuries. Perez was the principal actor and had been shuttled between crimes by his uncle, Tito Abrante.
- Perez was convicted of armed robbery, armed assault with intent to rob, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and firearms offenses; he received an aggregate sentence with parole eligibility after 27.5 years.
- In Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677 (2017) (Perez I), the SJC held that a juvenile’s aggregate sentence for nonhomicide offenses that yields parole eligibility later than for juvenile murderers is presumptively disproportionate under art. 26, and remanded for a Miller-style hearing to determine whether “extraordinary circumstances” justified the longer parole-ineligibility period.
- On remand a different Superior Court judge (the hearing judge) reviewed the record (no live testimony) and found the crimes and some personal circumstances, ultimately concluding extraordinary circumstances existed and denying resentencing.
- On appeal, the SJC reviewed the record de novo on constitutional application, accepted most subsidiary facts from the hearing judge, but concluded the crimes met the “extraordinary” requirement while Perez’s personal/family characteristics did not; therefore resentencing was required to make his parole eligibility conform to that applicable to juvenile murderers (fifteen years for sentences imposed when Perez was sentenced).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juvenile’s aggregate nonhomicide sentence producing parole eligibility later than juvenile murderers is presumptively disproportionate under art. 26 | Commonwealth: extraordinary circumstances (crime + defendant traits) justified longer parole ineligibility | Perez: sentence presumptively disproportionate; resentence to match juvenile-murder parole eligibility | Court: Such aggregate nonhomicide sentences are presumptively disproportionate; remand/hearing required to prove extraordinary circumstances |
| What must the Commonwealth prove at the Miller hearing to justify a longer parole-ineligibility period for a juvenile nonhomicide offender | Commonwealth: focused on the viciousness of the crimes and role of aggravating influences | Perez: must show both crime and individual/family circumstances are extraordinary; his personal traits do not meet that standard | Court: Both the criminal conduct and the juvenile’s personal/family characteristics must be extraordinary; crime alone is insufficient |
| Whether the hearing judge properly found Perez’s personal/family attributes extraordinary | Commonwealth: Abrante’s influence, violent upbringing, low IQ, mental health diagnoses justified conclusion | Perez: limited prior record, mitigating family history, mental health issues show possibility of rehabilitation | Held: Hearing judge erred; Perez’s personal/family characteristics do not establish no reasonable possibility of rehabilitation within juvenile-murder parole period |
| Appropriate remedy when extraordinary circumstances not shown | Commonwealth: maintain longer parole ineligibility | Perez: convert parole eligibility to that of juvenile murderers without reducing aggregate sentence | Held: Vacate denial of resentencing; order parole eligibility reset to that applicable to juvenile murderers (fifteen years in this context); aggregate sentence need not be shortened |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677 (Mass. 2017) (earlier decision remanding for Miller-style hearing)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (Mass. 2013) (juvenile murderers effectively receive parole eligibility after fifteen years under art. 26)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (juveniles require individualized sentencing inquiry; youth-related mitigating factors must be considered)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (limitations on life-without-parole for juveniles)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for punishment purposes)
- Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139 (Mass. 2015) (post-Diatchenko sentencing regime and statutory parole-minimum framework for juvenile murderers)