Commonwealth v. Paquette
475 Mass. 793
| Mass. | 2016Background
- On May 3–4, 2014 a fight at a party the defendant hosted resulted in serious injury; the defendant told an injured guest not to say he was there.
- State troopers interviewed the defendant twice: ~10 hours after the fight (May 4) and again on May 29 after other witnesses had been interviewed and a suspect (Bousquet) charged.
- At the first interview the defendant said he was outside picking up cans and identified only limited attendees; troopers found that account not credible.
- At the second interview the defendant added some names but continued to deny being present, claimed blackout intoxication, and was warned repeatedly he could face liability for misleading investigators.
- Grand jury returned two indictments (one per interview) charging violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B (willfully misleading a police officer with intent to impede a criminal investigation).
- Trial jury convicted on both counts; on direct appellate review the SJC concluded the jury instruction on "mislead[ing]" was erroneous and the evidence supported only the first but not the second conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper definition of "mislead" under § 13B | Any knowingly false statement or material omission to police can be "misleading" and violates § 13B when made with the requisite intent | Jury instruction was too broad; "mislead" should require the statement reasonably could lead police to pursue a materially different course of investigation | Jury instruction was erroneous: "mislead" requires that, given what police knew then, the statement reasonably could have led investigators materially astray |
| Required mens rea (intent to impede) | Commonwealth: proving specific intent can rest on circumstantial evidence and words/actions | Paquette: simple denials may be exculpatory rather than evidence of intent to interfere | No reversible error in refusing defendant's proposed limiting language; jury properly instructed that intent may be inferred from words/circumstances |
| Sufficiency of evidence for first interview | Commonwealth: lies/omissions at early stage could have influenced investigation; circumstantial evidence supports intent | Paquette: statements were mere self-exculpation; not shown to have misled police | Viewing evidence favorably to Commonwealth, a properly instructed jury could convict for the first interview |
| Sufficiency of evidence for second interview | Commonwealth: repeated false statements and warnings could show intent and misleading effect | Paquette: by second interview police already had extensive information and a suspect charged, so statements could not reasonably mislead investigation | Evidence insufficient for second interview; required finding of not guilty entered for that count |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365 (2013) (adopted working definition of "misleading conduct" analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3))
- Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360 (2014) (short exculpatory denial did not constitute "misleading" under § 13B)
- Commonwealth v. Fortuna, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 45 (2011) (false statements to initial officer sufficient to mislead a reasonable person in officer's position)
- Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8 (1999) (review standard for unpreserved jury-charge objections: miscarriage-of-justice inquiry)
- Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review)
- Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815 (2015) (applies Latimore sufficiency standard)