Commonwealth v. Owens
AC 14-P-1868
| Mass. App. Ct. | Sep 11, 2017Background
- Orchard Park police suspected 131 Eustis Street was being used as a house of prostitution based on neighbor complaints, prior investigations, and an informant who left the premises after visiting a sex worker.
- Officer McClay posed as a customer, arranged to meet a sex worker (“Cinnamon”), was let into the first-floor common hall, and signaled other officers when the sex worker accepted money.
- Officers arrested the owner (Ahmed) and the sex worker in the first-floor hallway; they observed other people had been entering the house and heard noise from the second floor.
- Officers decided to "freeze" the house while they sought a search warrant and performed a limited sweep upstairs; Officer Anjos opened a second-floor bedroom and found the defendant with a white powder, pipe, and open beer.
- The motion judge suppressed the evidence, finding the protective sweep and exigent-circumstances justification lacking; the Appeals Court majority reversed, holding the limited search to preserve evidence while a warrant was sought was permissible.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Owens's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing and expectation of privacy in the second-floor room | Defendant charged with possession lacks standing argument; police contend defendant lacked a reasonable expectation due to transient hourly rental | Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a current renter/occupant of a closed room | Held: Owens had standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented room |
| Protective sweep for officer safety | Sweep justified if officers had specific, articulable facts of danger | No specific facts of violence or threat supported a safety sweep | Held: Protective-sweep justification for officer safety failed |
| Exigent circumstances to prevent destruction/removal of evidence (warrantless entry upstairs) | Freezing the house from within was justified because officers were lawfully inside, heard people upstairs, and reasonably feared evidence (e.g., condoms) could be destroyed or removed while obtaining a warrant | Mere presence of people and generic fear of destruction did not supply specific information to establish an objectively reasonable belief evidence would be removed | Held: Limited entry/search to secure premises and prevent destruction of evidence while obtaining a warrant was permissible; suppression reversed |
| Whether police created the exigency by delaying warrant | Commonwealth: undercover sting was reasonable to obtain conclusive evidence before getting a warrant | Owens: police had probable cause earlier and could have obtained a warrant instead of creating exigency | Held: Majority found no manufactured exigency given investigative justification for the sting; dissent viewed issue as waived but skeptical of delay |
Key Cases Cited
- Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (protective sweep standard for officer safety)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (articulable facts requirement for protective sweeps)
- Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616 (limits on entering/securing dwelling to prevent destruction of evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Blake, 413 Mass. 823 (securing dwelling while obtaining warrant not necessarily unreasonable)
- Commonwealth v. Streeter, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 430 (exigent circumstances justified entry where sounds and smell indicated destruction risk)
- Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385 (standing and reasonable expectation of privacy analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702 (undercover stings as valid investigative technique prior to warrant)
- Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164 (privacy in rented motel rooms during rental period)
- Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (guest in rented room entitled to Fourth Amendment protection)