142 N.E.3d 1
Mass.2020Background
- Defendant charged in July 2015; at arraignment the court ordered as conditions of pretrial release that he stay out of Boston and wear a GPS monitoring device.
- Defendant signed a form stating GPS coordinates and location data "are recorded and may be shared" with court, probation, parole, attorneys, and law enforcement.
- After an August 10, 2015 armed home invasion in Medford, police queried the probation electronic monitoring program (ELMO) without a warrant; ELMO produced stored GPS data placing the defendant at the scene and near an Everett address used as the basis for a search warrant.
- Evidence recovered from the Everett search and a witness identification led to indictment on armed-robbery and related charges; defendant moved to suppress the GPS data and its fruits.
- The motion judge granted suppression, finding consent was not voluntary and police needed probable cause; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the suppression on the separate ground that the initial imposition of GPS monitoring as a pretrial condition violated art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether imposition of GPS monitoring as a pretrial condition is a constitutional search | GPS monitoring is permissible as a bail condition to assure appearance and protect the public/witnesses under G. L. c. 276, § 58 | GPS monitoring is a search that intrudes on pretrial privacy; pretrial detainees have greater privacy than probationers | Imposition is a search under art. 14; pretrial expectation of privacy is greater than a probationer’s, so heightened scrutiny applies |
| Whether the defendant voluntarily consented to GPS monitoring by signing the form | Signed form indicates consent to monitoring and sharing of GPS data | Signature was coerced by the alternative of pretrial detention; not free and voluntary | Signature did not establish free, voluntary consent; coercive context defeats waiver |
| Whether GPS monitoring here was justified by legitimate statutory interests to make a warrantless search reasonable | GPS monitoring furthers statutory goals (assuring court appearance; preventing misconduct) and can be tailored as a release condition | G. L. c. 276, § 58 authorizes conditions only to assure appearance and protect the integrity of proceedings; GPS here did not advance those aims | GPS monitoring imposed at arraignment did not further the statutory purposes (assuring appearance or protecting witnesses); intrusion outweighed any asserted interests => unconstitutional under art. 14; suppression affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710 (2019) (GPS monitoring is a search; probationer’s diminished privacy affects balancing)
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (individuals have reasonable privacy in whole of their physical movements)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (attaching a tracking device implicates Fourth Amendment)
- Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306 (2015) (attaching device to person without consent for tracking is a search)
- Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689 (2019) (contractual signing of probation conditions does not establish voluntary consent to searches)
- Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014) (reasonable expectation of privacy framework and GPS/location data concerns)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search occurs when government intrudes on reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Commonwealth v. Moore, 473 Mass. 481 (2016) (standard of review for suppression and balancing test for reasonableness)
- Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861 (2018) (Commonwealth bears burden to prove consent was free and voluntary)
- Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789 (1988) (coercive context of avoiding incarceration makes waiver principles inapplicable)