Commonwealth v. Mulgrave
472 Mass. 170
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Defendant Craig Mulgrave stabbed and killed his wife; jury convicted him of first-degree murder on extreme atrocity/cruelty theory; acquitted of premeditation.
- Victim sent a text to her son six minutes before calling 911: “He is threatening to kill me I am scared he said if I pick up the phone he will kill me.” Police arrived minutes after 911; defendant was found bloody holding a knife and said, “I just killed my wife.”
- Autopsy showed multiple stab/incise wounds; knife had victim’s blood and defendant’s fingerprints.
- Defense conceded second-degree murder but presented expert testimony diagnosing major depressive disorder and opining diminished capacity and that prior-night conduct was a suicide attempt; Commonwealth rebutted with an expert characterizing the depression as situational.
- Pretrial suppression granted for defendant’s postbooking statements; trial judge ruled content of those statements inadmissible but allowed limited evidence of defendant’s communicative ability for impeachment if defense opened that door.
- Trial court excluded an additional defense expert (emergency physician) as cumulative/limited relevance/confusing; jury received diminished-capacity instructions consistent with Commonwealth v. Rutkowski; convictions affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth’s Argument | Mulgrave’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of victim’s text as spontaneous utterance | Text was a contemporaneous, spontaneous reaction to an ongoing emergency and thus admissible under the excited utterance exception; not testimonial | Text was hearsay, not spontaneous, insufficiently authenticated, and testimonial under Confrontation Clause | Text admissible as spontaneous utterance; not testimonial in the circumstances; no error in admission |
| Use of suppressed postbooking statements evidence for impeachment of claim of noncommunicativeness | Court may permit limited inquiry into defendant’s ability to communicate (number, manner of answers) without admitting content to rebut claim of noncommunication | Any use of involuntary/suppressed statements is barred by due process and the exclusionary rule; cannot be used to impeach experts | Judge properly limited use to noncontent communicative evidence; voluntariness findings supported; permitted for impeachment of defendant’s claim of silence; no constitutional error |
| Exclusion of defense expert (effects of Celexa + alcohol, suicide attempt testimony) | Testimony was cumulative, of limited relevance to defendant’s mental state at time of killing, risked confusing timeframe and undue prejudice | Exclusion infringed defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and call witnesses | Exclusion was within trial court’s discretion as cumulative and potentially confusing/prejudicial; no abuse of discretion |
| Jury instruction on diminished capacity relative to extreme atrocity/cruelty | Model instruction properly framed and court followed Rutkowski; allowed consideration of mental impairment for deliberation/cruelty | Court should have given Gould-form instruction specifically as requested to address diminished capacity on extreme atrocity/cruelty | Instruction satisfied Rutkowski and model language was adequate; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233 (explains heightened reliability scrutiny for written statements as spontaneous utterances)
- Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600 (spontaneous utterance and Confrontation Clause analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280 (factors for spontaneity: timing, tone, circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Nunes, 430 Mass. 1 (statement itself may prove the exciting event)
- James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (limits on impeachment exception to exclusionary rule)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial statement framework under the Sixth Amendment)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (distinguishing testimonial statements in ongoing emergencies)