Commonwealth v. Morganti
467 Mass. 96
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Defendant Morganti was convicted of first-degree murder in 2003; during jury empanelment the Brockton Superior Court courtroom was closed to the public for 79 minutes, excluding several family members.
- Defendant did not object at trial or raise the closure on direct appeal (appeal decided 2009).
- After Commonwealth v. Cohen (2010) and Owens (1st Cir. 2007) establishing that the Sixth Amendment public-trial right extends to jury selection, Morganti moved for a new trial claiming structural error from the closure.
- At an evidentiary hearing the trial judge found the courtroom closed for the entire empanelment; trial counsel Reddington and two other experienced Brockton defense lawyers testified that closing during empanelment was routine practice and they had not objected.
- The motion judge denied the new-trial motion, ruling the closure was de minimis; the Appeals Court (Cordy, J.) agreed the closure was not de minimis but affirmed on waiver and ineffective-assistance grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Morganti's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exclusion of the public during jury empanelment violated the Sixth Amendment public-trial right | 79-minute closure of courtroom during entire voir dire was structural error requiring automatic reversal | Closure was de minimis and not reversible; alternatively, claim waived for lack of timely objection | Closure was not de minimis, but claim was waived because counsel knew of and did not object; conviction affirmed |
| Whether waiver by counsel can forfeit the structural right to a public trial | Waiver in absence of express client consent is not effective to surrender a structural right | Trial counsel may waive the right by failing to object; procedural waiver applies | Counsel’s awareness and failure to object constituted waiver of the right to a public empanelment |
| Whether counsel’s failure to object was ineffective assistance | Failure to object was per se ineffective because it allowed structural error to stand | Counsel’s conduct must be measured against contemporaneous professional norms; counsel acted within reasonable professional judgment given local practice | Counsel was not ineffective under Saferian/Strickland because the local culture of acquiescence made nonobjection objectively reasonable |
| Whether, if counsel was ineffective, prejudice must be presumed for public-trial violations | Morganti argued prejudice is structural and presumed (Owens) | Commonwealth argued waiver and reasonableness of counsel’s conduct preclude relief; if conduct not ineffective, no need to reach prejudice | Court did not reach prejudice because it found counsel’s performance not ineffective |
Key Cases Cited
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (establishes test and standards for permissible courtroom closures affecting Sixth Amendment public-trial right)
- Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (public-trial right extends to jury selection)
- Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94 (2010) (Mass. decision recognizing public-trial right applies to empanelment)
- Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83 (2013) (defense counsel may waive public-trial right by inaction)
- United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010) (violation of public-trial right is structural error)
- Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007) (public-trial right applies to jury empanelment; failure to preserve claim subjects it to ineffective-assistance review)
- United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682 (2012) (excluding public for entire voir dire without justification is not trivial)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (standard for ineffective assistance in Massachusetts)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (objective reasonableness standard for counsel performance)