Commonwealth v. Mathis, D., Aplt., 35 MAP 2016

Background

Parole agents Welsh and Bruner visited parolee Gary Waters’ approved residence for a routine home visit and encountered private citizen Darrin Mathis in the house.
The agents detected marijuana odor and burnt "roaches" in an ashtray; Mathis appeared nervous.
Agents directed Mathis to gather his belongings and move to another room and then frisked him; evidence discovered as a result formed the basis for criminal charges.
The trial court credited the agents’ testimony; the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Justice Wecht (dissent) contests the Majority’s recognition of any statutory “ancillary” authority over non-parolees and analyzes the encounter under constitutional state-action/Fourth Amendment principles.

Issues

Issue	Mathis' Argument	Commonwealth/Agents' Argument	Held (dissenting view)
Whether parole agents possess statutory "ancillary" authority over third parties present during visits	No statutory basis; Parole Code grants authority only over parolees	Majority: agents have ancillary statutory authority to detain/frisk non-parolees during duties	Dissent: No statutory ancillary authority exists; court cannot judicially create it
Whether parole agents’ interaction with Mathis constituted state action subject to Fourth Amendment	Interaction was state action and thus constrained by constitutional reasonableness	Agents acted as state actors but relied on statutory supervisory context to justify acts	Dissent: Agents were state actors and constitutional standards (reasonable suspicion/Terry) apply
Whether the detention/frisk met Terry’s requirements (reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; reasonable belief person armed and dangerous)	Detention/frisk lacked individualized reasonable suspicion; odor and nervousness alone insufficient	Agents relied on marijuana odor, burnt roaches, and nervousness to justify stop and frisk	Dissent: Insufficient individualized reasonable suspicion; detention unlawful and resulting evidence should be suppressed
Whether evidence from the frisk should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful detention	Suppress under Wong Sun and Pennsylvania precedent	Evidence admissible because officers had authority and/or reasonable suspicion per Majority	Dissent: Suppression required because frisk flowed from an unconstitutional detention

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (established standard for investigatory stop and frisk: reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and belief person is armed and dangerous)
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness test in context of government searches/seizures)
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (constitutional constraints on state officers’ searches and seizures)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 417 (1963) (fruits of an unlawful seizure must be suppressed)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (scope of protective sweeps and limits on bypassing Terry’s requirements)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (applying Terry standards when officers lawfully detain vehicle occupants)
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (Fourth Amendment standards not coextensive with state statutory rules)
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness independent of state statutory protections)
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992) (stop-and-frisk standard under Pennsylvania law)
Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977) (totality of circumstances test for detention/seizure analysis)
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 2007) (suppression principles for evidence derived from unlawful police conduct)
Commonwealth v. Price, 672 A.2d 280 (Pa. 1996) (official display of authority can render conduct attributable to the state)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1997) (followed Terry in Pennsylvania stop-and-frisk cases)
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068 (Pa. 1997) (Pennsylvania summary of reasonable-suspicion and frisk requirements)