118 A.3d 1175
Pa. Super. Ct.2015Background
- Dereck Michael Martz was charged in 2014 with multiple sexual-offense counts based on conduct alleged from 1996–2002; the victim reported abuse in 2013. Martz was born April 2, 1985. The Amended Information alleged acts beginning in 1996 (victim born 1990).
- Martz (pro se) raised the common-law infancy defense, arguing that acts committed before he turned 14 (April 2, 1999) are rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity.
- The trial court granted a partial dismissal: it dismissed counts to the extent they alleged acts before April 2, 1999, concluding the infancy presumption applied and the Commonwealth had not rebutted it; counts remained for acts after that date.
- The Commonwealth appealed, arguing (1) the Juvenile Act supersedes the infancy defense and (2) infancy is an affirmative diminished-capacity defense for trial, not a basis for pretrial dismissal, and the Commonwealth was improperly precluded from presenting rebuttal evidence.
- The Superior Court reviewed de novo, held the infancy common-law defense remains applicable in criminal proceedings for conduct before age 14, but found the Commonwealth was not given a fair opportunity to rebut the presumption and therefore reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Martz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Juvenile Act abrogates the common-law infancy defense in criminal proceedings | Juvenile Act established juvenile capacity and treatment scheme; infancy has been superseded and its continued application creates inequitable outcomes | Infancy remains viable in criminal cases; Juvenile Act abrogation was limited to juvenile-delinquency proceedings | Infancy defense survives in criminal prosecutions for conduct before age 14; Juvenile Act did not impliedly abrogate it |
| Whether infancy is an affirmative/diminished-capacity defense for trial (requiring admission of guilt) or a pretrial rebuttable presumption that can justify dismissal of counts | Infancy functions like diminished capacity and should be raised at trial after admission of criminal conduct; court erred by shifting burden to Commonwealth and dismissing pretrial | Infancy operates as a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for ages 7–14 and can be raised pretrial to test counts alleging conduct before 14 | Infancy is a rebuttable presumption (ages 7–14) applicable pretrial, but the Commonwealth must be given a fair opportunity to present rebuttal evidence; trial court erred by denying that opportunity and must allow rebuttal on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Green, 151 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1959) (articulates common-law infancy presumption: under 7 conclusively incapable; 7–14 rebuttable presumption; over 14 prima facie capable)
- Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 131 A. 229 (Pa. 1925) (noting special immunity/presumption of incapacity ceases at 14)
- Interest of G.T., 597 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. 1991) (held infancy defense irrelevant in juvenile-delinquency proceedings under Juvenile Act but preserved in criminal context)
- In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989) (history and factors governing infancy/capacity: age proximity, offense nature, mental capacity)
- In re Rodriguez, 900 A.2d 341 (Pa. 2003) (statutory abrogation of common law is disfavored; statutes must speak directly to abrogate common-law doctrines)
- Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Super. 2005) (juvenile jurisdiction ends when accused is over Juvenile Act age; adult criminal courts may prosecute those accused of acts committed as juveniles)