OPINION BY
¶ 1 Pаul P. Monaco appeals from the February 6, 2004 order denying PCRA relief. We affirm.
¶ 2 The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history as follows:
On September 17, 2002, Trooper Colleen J. Young, a member of the Pennsylvania State Police Criminal Investigatiоn Unit, received a referral from Montgomery County Children and Youth Services regarding a report of alleged sexual abuse perpetrated by the [defendant upon two underage females. A police investigation ensued in response to the aforementioned referral, revealing a third victim, also a minor, and, in November, 2002. Trooper Young interviewed the three victims, who related various incidents of abuse an/or assault perpetrated upon them by the Defendant, primarily within a bedroom in one of the victim’s homе [sic] at 4 Mine Hill Road, Lower Frederick Township, Montgomery County. (Affidavit of Probable Cause, November 18, 2002).
The first victim related that the [defendant had sexual intercourse with her frequently from approximately July of 1995 through May of 1998, beginning when she was ten years of age and the [defendant fifteen years old, their birth-dates falling, respectively, on November*1028 22, 1984, and April 14, 1980. The incidents with respect to the second victim occurred in approximately May 1998, when she was eight years old, and continued through January 2002. The third of Mr. Monaco’s victims, born October 21, 1985, was also approximately eight years of age when she was first assaulted by the [djefendant, whose abuse of this particular child reportedly continued through June of 1996.
It was, however, not until November 18, 2002, that a criminal complaint was issued, charging the [djefendant with the offеnses which he had reportedly perpetrated upon his three young female victims. At the time of the complaint’s issuance and his subsequent arrest, the [djefendant was twenty-two years of age, and neither his status as an adult offender nor the jurisdiction of the trial court wаs thereafter brought into question until the filing of Mr. Monaco’s Amended PCRA Petition on November 28, 2003, approximately seven (7) months following the entry of his negotiated guilty plea.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/04, at 3-4.
¶ 3 On April 24, 2003, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to attempted rape of a pеrson less than thirteen years old and two counts of corruption of a minor. Sentencing occurred immediately thereafter, and pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed a five-to-ten-year term of imprisonment for attempted rape and two consecutive five-year terms of probation. Appellant did not appeal from the judgment of sentence. Instead, on August 26, 2003, he filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Appointed counsel then filed an amended petition. After a hearing, the PCRA court denied rеlief on February 6, 2004. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 4 Appellant raises the following issues.
I. Did the Trial Court err by ruling that it had jurisdiction to try and sentence Appellant as an adult for crimes that he committed as a juvenile?
II. Did the Trial Court err by not ruling that conferring adult jurisdiction and imposing a five year prison sentencе upon an individual for crimes committed while the individual was a juvenile violated the Equal Protection, Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitution, and that all counsel who failed to make these argument[s] were ineffectivе to the extent they failed to do so?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
¶ 5 Our standard of review of an order denying post-conviction relief is whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Allen,
¶ 6 First, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was less than eighteen years old when the crimes to which he pled guilty were committed. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to transfer the case to juvenile court pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seg.
¶ 8 We addressed a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Anderson,
¶ 9 For the following reasons, we sustain the PCRA court’s decision to apply Anderson to the facts of this casе and deny Appellant’s PCRA petition. The right to be treated as a juvenile offender is statutory rather than constitutional. See Commonwealth v. Cotto,
¶ 10 We note that the case sub judice differs from Anderson to the extent that Appellant was not responsible for the delay in his prosecution. However, the delay in this case cannot be attributed to the Commonwealth either; the Commonwealth initiated the criminal proceedings approximately two months after the date it first received notice of the allegations against Appellant. Absent some improper motivation for the delay, we conclude that Anderson is applicable. Accord U.S. v. Hoo,
¶ 11 We further note that since the Juvenile Act is tailored to a child’s special needs, the purpose of the Act cannot be extended to adult offenders. The Act’s goals of providing “care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and physicаl development of children who fall within its jurisdiction,” clearly are inapplicable. Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/04, at 8 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)). Indeed, our Supreme Court recognized this dichotomy in Commonwealth v. Iafrate,
¶ 12 Next, we address Appellant’s contention that all previous сounsel erred in failing to level a claim that the court’s decision to prosecute Appellant in criminal court and impose a five-year term of imprisonment violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Apрellant’s constitutional challenges all relate to the trial court’s purported lack of jurisdiction to prosecute and sentence Appellant in criminal court.
¶ 13 At the outset, we state the relevant standard of review.
When a petitioner allegеs trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in a PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel “which, in the circumstances of the particular сase, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(h). We have interpreted this provision in the PCRA to mean that the petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of counsel’s ineffeсtiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and (3) that the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner — i.e., that there is a reason*1031 able probability that, but for the error of counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Kimball,555 Pa. 299 ,724 A.2d 326 , 383 (1999). We presume that counsel is effective, and it is the burden of Appellant to show otherwise. Commonwealth v. Stevens,559 Pa. 171 ,739 A.2d 507 , 512 (1999); see Commonwealth v. Pierce,567 Pa. 186 ,786 A.2d 203 , 213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Legg,551 Pa. 437 ,711 A.2d 430 , 432-33 (1998).
Commonwealth v. duPont,
¶ 14 Instantly, Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is without arguable merit. Appellant asserts that since the trial court lacked jurisdiction over a crime he committed as a juvenile, he was denied the basic elements of procedural due process. However, as noted supra, Appellant’s age at the time the criminal matter was initiated precluded the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; instead, Appellant was within the criminal court’s jurisdiction. See Anderson, supra (defendant tried as adult where his age at date of arrest was beyond Juvenile Act’s jurisdictional definition of child). Since prior counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for fаiling to assert a meritless claim, no relief is due. See Commonwealth v. Nolan,
¶ 15 Appellant’s second challenge to trial counsel’s stewardship also is merit-less. Appellant contends that he should have been treated as any other juvenile who committed a crime prior to his eighteеnth birthday and argues that trial counsel failed to object to the court’s denial of his constitutional right to equal protection. However, in light of the Act’s definition of a child, it is clear that the relevant determination is not limited to the offender’s age at the date the crime is committed; jurisdiction also is determined by the actor’s age when the proceedings commence. See Anderson, supra; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(2) (child is individual under age twenty-one who committed delinquent act before reaching age of eighteen). Hence, as Appellant propеrly was treated as an adult, he was not denied equal protection of the law. Therefore, his ineffectiveness claim is meritless.
¶ 16 Finally, considering the heinous nature of the sexual offenses and the fact that the maximum legal sentence for attempted raрe is twenty years imprisonment, we conclude that Appellant’s assertion that his negotiated, five-to-ten-year term of imprisonment for attempted rape constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is meritless. Since counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, no relief is due. Nolan, supra.
¶ 17 As the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error, we affirm the order denying post-conviction relief.
¶ 18 Order affirmed.
Notes
. The Juvenile Act defines child as ‘‘[a]n individual who:
(1) is under the age of 18 years;
(2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years; or
*1029 (3) was adjudicated dependent before reaching the age of 18 years and who, while engaged in a course of instruction or treatment, requests the court to retain jurisdiction until the course has been completed, but in no event shall a child remain in a course of instruction or treatment past the age of 21 years.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.
. Appellant failed to cite a single case that challenges the PCRA court's rationale or supports the position that a defendant’s current age is not rеlevant to the Act’s jurisdictional scope. Our independent research also failed to reveal authority that supports Appellant's argument. Indeed, our research of the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act disclosed the contrary position. See, e.g., U.S. v. Doe,