Commonwealth v. Lopez, AC 15-P-1207

Defendant was operating a two-wheeled motorized vehicle (moped) while his driver's license was suspended.
The factual dispute at trial was whether the vehicle qualified as a "motorized bicycle" (defendant) or a "motorcycle"/motor vehicle (Commonwealth).
The trial judge accepted that the vehicle met the statutory definition of a motorized bicycle; the Commonwealth abandoned contesting that classification on appeal.
Defendant was charged under G. L. c. 90, § 23 (operating a motor vehicle while license suspended) as a subsequent offense; after a bench trial he was found guilty of the underlying offense and pleaded guilty to the subsequent offense portion and was sentenced to 90 days.
Section 1B of G. L. c. 90 governs motorized bicycles, prescribes specific low-level fines for operating without a license, and states that motorized bicycle operators "shall be subject to the traffic laws and regulations of the [C]ommonwealth."
The legal question was whether § 23 (which by its terms applies to "motor vehicles") also applies to motorized bicycles via § 1B's cross-reference to traffic laws and regulations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether operating a motorized bicycle while licensed suspended violates G. L. c. 90, § 23	§ 1B makes motorized-bicycle operators "subject to the traffic laws," so § 23 applies	§ 23 applies only to "motor vehicles" and § 1B expressly criminalizes operating a motorized bicycle while unlicensed with its own penalties, so § 23 does not apply	Court held § 23 does not apply to motorized bicycles in this context; conviction under § 23 reversed

Commonwealth v. Griswold, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 461 (1984) (held motorized-bicycle operators subject to traffic laws including DUI statutes)
Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676 (2012) (rule of lenity when criminal statutes are ambiguous)
Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 (1992) (rule of lenity principles applied)
Commonwealth v. Tynes, 400 Mass. 369 (1987) (DUI statute requires proof alcohol affected capacity to drive)
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 404 Mass. 282 (1989) (prosecutorial discretion when conduct is criminalized under multiple statutes)
Commonwealth v. Ceria, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 (1982) (discussed scope of applying traffic laws to motorized-bicycle operators; dicta on licensing-related arrests)
Worcester Vocational Teachers Assn. v. Worcester, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (1982) (statutory construction should effectuate purpose and common sense)
Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 386 Mass. 528 (1982) (legislature is proper forum to change statutory scheme)