Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730

Leggett was convicted in 1997 on four counts: gun possession without a license, receipt of a firearm with defaced serial number, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and armed assault with intent to murder.
Original sentences totaled nineteen to twenty years for armed assault with intent to murder, nine to ten years for the dangerous-weapon assault, four years eleven months to five years for unlawful firearm possession, and one to two years for the defaced-serial-number receipt, with some terms run concurrently.
In 2000 the Appellate Division revised the scheme to run three lesser terms concurrently within nineteen-to-twenty years total.
In 2005 Leggett moved for resentencing based on alleged improper comments; the trial judge denied, and on remand the sentence was resentenced by a different judge in 2009 to a sixteenth-year term for armed assault with intent to murder, with five years’ probation for that count and two years’ probation for the other count, concurrent with the first.
Leggett argued in 2010 that his remaining lesser-conviction sentences had been fully served and that the new probation terms constituted unlawful multiple punishment; the trial judge denied.
Leggett appeals, contending the resentencing violates double jeopardy and due process; the court affirms, finding no double jeopardy or due process violation and noting the judge used a “clean slate” approach within statutory limits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the resentencing violated double jeopardy by imposing more punishment for same offenses	Leggett contends the revised scheme imposes punitive terms for counts already served.	Leggett argues the integrated package justifies reconstruction without increasing total punishment.	No double jeopardy violation; fair, reconceived package permitted.
Whether resentencing violated finality expectations or due process	Leggett asserts fully served counts cannot be reopened or replaced.	The State argues the clean-slate approach and probation substitution are fair within finality limits.	Due process and finality expectations were not violated.
Whether the judge’s reconstruction of the sentencing package was permissible under Massachusetts/Federal doctrine	Leggett claims integrated-package theory improperly enlarges aggregate punishment.	The majority endorses integrated-package approach as a legitimate, interdependent restructuring.	Permissible to reconstruct within statutory limits; not a forbidden enlargement.

Commonwealth v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969) (double jeopardy limits on multiple punishment; finality considerations)
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969) (reaffirmation of finality and new punishment after retrial)
Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260 (Mass. 1982) (framework for multiple punishment and finality in Massachusetts)
Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass. 340 (Mass. 2002) (sentencing fairness and reconstruction principles)
Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422 (Mass. 2003) (integrated package concept in CPSL context; validity concerns)
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161 (Mass. 2005) (partial CPSL invalidation; impact on integrated sentencing analysis)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (U.S. 1980) (double jeopardy and finality under federal law)
United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 1996) (finality of sentences and non-enhancement after full service)
United States v. Martenson, 178 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1999) (rebundling of sanctions within aggregate intent; district court affirmed)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1995) (limitations on mandatory firearm-enhancement interplay with other penalties)