Commonwealth v. Laird, 1004 Pa. 119

Background

Appellant Richard Laird participated in the December 14–15, 1987 Milano murder in Edgely Inn/Bristol Twp., with Frank Chester; Milano’s car ride ended in a woods confrontation where Milano was stabbed to death and his car later burned.
Chester and Appellant were tried together in 1988; both were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
Appellant later pursued PCRA relief; federal habeas relief vacated the first-degree murder conviction and death sentence but left kidnapping intact, leading to retrial in 2007.
At retrial, Appellant admitted participating in the murder but asserted diminished-capacity (lack of specific intent) as a defense.
Evidence showed Appellant’s alcohol consumption, brain injury, and childhood abuse; experts opined diminished capacity, while the Commonwealth emphasized he acted with specific intent.
PCRA court denied relief; Superior Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel’s conduct did not render representation ineffective under Strickland and related standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance for failure to renew venue motion	PCRA court found publicity excessive; renewal would have changed venue.	Counsel failed to renew a change-of-venue motion despite pretrial publicity indicators.	No reversible error; no prejudicial prejudice shown; venue denial affirmed.
Impeachment and cross-examination of intoxication witnesses	Counsel could have stronger cross-examined to emphasize extreme intoxication.	Counsel’s cross-examination strategy was reasonable; additional impeaching details were cumulative.	No ineffective assistance; strategy reasonable given record.
Admission of other bad acts and impact on penalty phase	Bad acts evidence (drinking to a minor, sexual remark) improperly tainted penalty phase.	Evidence was collateral/isolated; not material to specific-intent issue; trial court curative steps adequate.	No reversible error; not prejudicial under cumulative-review.
Failure to present alternative mitigators and brain-damage records	Additional mitigation (detailed life history, male sexual-abuse expert) could shift sentencing.	Existing experts provided substantial mitigation; further evidence would be cumulative and unlikely to alter the result.	No error; trial counsels’ mitigation strategy not constitutionally deficient.
Prosecutor’s penalty-phase references to Gardner due process claims	Partial question about other cases and curative instruction insufficient to protect Gardner due process rights.	Single improper question, immediately curative instruction; not pervasive evidence.	No due-process violation; Gardner-based claim rejected.

Key Cases Cited

Laird v. Horn, 605 Pa. 137, 988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010) (Pennsylvania capital-murder PCRA context; ineffective assistance standards applied)
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 25 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2011) (Ineffective assistance standards; substantial evidence of mitigation evaluated)
Commonwealth v. King, 618 Pa. 405, 57 A.3d 607 (Pa. 2012) (PCRA/ineffective assistance; Pennsylvania framework aligning with Strickland)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment guidance on punishment and prosecutorial conduct; due-process considerations)
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1977) (Gardner due-process principle: opportunity to deny/explain evidence used to procure death sentence)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1999) (Victim-impact evidence in capital sentencing; relevance to blameworthiness)
DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gardner-related due-process concerns; scrutiny of prosecutorial impact on mitigation evidence)