Commonwealth v. Jordan
125 A.3d 55
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Police used two confidential informants (CI‑1 and CI‑2) to conduct controlled buys near 2737 Judson Way; CI‑1 conducted buys on Sept. 7–8, 2010; CI‑2 conducted a buy on Sept. 10, 2010 and reported that James Lofton — not Appellee — sold the drugs inside the house.
- A search warrant for 2737 Judson Way was obtained Sept. 10, 2010; officers executed it and recovered incriminating items and observed conduct the Commonwealth said supported a conspiracy charge involving Appellee and Lofton.
- Appellee moved to compel disclosure of the CI identities; the trial court denied disclosure of CI‑1 but ordered disclosure of CI‑2’s identity as material to defense.
- The Commonwealth amended the delivery charge to eliminate reliance on the Sept. 10 controlled buy and stipulated that CI‑2 told police Lofton (not Appellee) sold the drugs; it nevertheless refused to reveal CI‑2’s identity to protect the CI.
- The trial court found the Commonwealth in contempt for refusing to disclose CI‑2 and sanctioned it by precluding all evidence obtained Sept. 10, 2010 (including search‑warrant evidence); the Commonwealth appealed the sanction order.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Appellee's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in ordering disclosure of CI‑2 after the Commonwealth stipulated to CI‑2’s statements and amended the charge | Disclosure was unnecessary because the Commonwealth provided CI‑2’s statements via stipulation and removed the Sept. 10 buy from the delivery charge; identity would endanger CI | Identity was material and reasonable to prepare defense and to permit interrogation/calling of CI as witness for conspiracy defense | Disclosure order was improper after stipulation/amendment — identity was not material once statements and charge amendment were provided |
| Whether the Commonwealth’s refusal justified the trial court’s sanction precluding Sept. 10 evidence | The Commonwealth did not violate Rule 573 because the disclosure order was improper; it removed the fruits of the buy and stipulated, so sanction was overbroad | Refusal was willful contempt; exclusion was appropriate to prevent prosecutor from benefiting and to vindicate court authority | Trial court abused discretion in excluding all Sept. 10 evidence; sanction was overbroad and reversed |
| Whether the appellate court can review the disclosure order though it was interlocutory | The Commonwealth properly appealed the sanction order under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); review of the sanction requires review of the prior discovery order | Same | Review is permitted: sanction appeal lets the court examine the prior interlocutory disclosure order |
| Whether Brady/constitutional due‑process required disclosure of CI identity | Brady requires disclosure of favorable, material information, but here the favorable statements were provided and identity itself was not exculpatory | Identity is part of material evidence preparation — defendant may need to locate/call CI; identity could yield additional exculpatory info | Brady did not require identity disclosure once the Commonwealth stipulated to CI‑2’s statements and removed the charge tied to that buy |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (recognizes prosecutor duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (informant‑identity disclosure requires balancing public interest vs. defendant’s right to prepare defense)
- Commonwealth v. Bing, 551 Pa. 659 (Pa. 1998) (adopts Roviaro framework and requires materiality/reasonableness under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573)
- Commonwealth v. Shearer, 584 Pa. 134 (Pa. 2005) (limits Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeals under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) to orders that actually suppress/prohibit Commonwealth evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Jackson, 409 Pa.Super. 568 (Pa. Super. 1991) (sanction appeal permits review of prior interlocutory disclosure order when sanction correctness depends on it)
- In re York County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 15 A.3d 70 (Pa. Super. 2010) (remedy for prosecutor discovery violation limited to denying prosecution the fruits; prosecutor may nolle prosse rather than disclose)