Commonwealth v. Hill, 42 A.3d 1085

Hill, age 17 at the time, was identified after a 1998 home invasion and rapes; his involvement led to police interrogation beginning April 21, 1998 with Hill’s parents present.
Detective Kelly read Hill his Miranda rights and Hill and his parents agreed to an interview; Hill did not sign waivers, but verbal consent to interview without counsel was testified to by police.
On April 25, 1998, Hill underwent a polygraph exam; Attorney Goldstein was present initially but left before its completion; a post-polygraph interrogation followed by Detective Kelly yielded incriminating statements.
Hill was convicted in November 1998; PCRA proceedings followed decades later, culminating in a December 27, 2006 denial, which Hill challenged as ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court addressed whether Hill validly waived Sixth Amendment counsel for the post-polygraph interrogation, applying Lean-Delfis factors to determine the scope of waiver.
The majority held Hill did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the post-polygraph interrogation, finding merit to Hill’s ineffective assistance claim and remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hill waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for post-polygraph interrogation.	Hill's waiver was limited to the polygraph; no evidence showed awareness of post-polygraph questioning.	Waiver prior to polygraph extended to related interrogations; post-polygraph questioning was within the polygraph process.	Waiver did not extend to post-polygraph interrogation; ineffective assistance established.
Whether trial counsel's failure to file suppression of post-polygraph statements was ineffective assistance.	Counsel should have moved to suppress given improper waiver scope and potential Sixth Amendment violation.	Post-polygraph statements were admissible; suppression would be meritless.	Merit to Hill’s claim; failure to suppress was prejudicial; remand for further proceedings.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (established the Miranda warnings and right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (totality of the circumstances governs waivers of rights post-polygraph)
Gillyard, 726 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejects per se rule; factors for post-polygraph waiver content)
Johnson, 816 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1987) (selective waiver concepts for post-polygraph interrogation)
León-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2000) (multifactor test for whether waiver covers post-polygraph questioning)
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (waiver of Sixth Amendment right must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent)
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) (Miranda warnings can inform waiver of Sixth Amendment rights)
Commonwealth v. Schneider, 386 Pa. Super. 202, 562 A.2d 868 (1989) (polygraph-related voluntariness considerations in Pennsylvania)
Commonwealth v. Watts, 319 Pa. Super. 179, 465 A.2d 1288 (1983) (polygraph-related admissibility of statements in PA)