Commonwealth v. Hicks, M., Aplt.
208 A.3d 916
| Pa. | 2019Background
- In June 2014 police received a camera operator's report that Michael Hicks had a firearm at a convenience store; officers stopped his car, drew weapons, removed a handgun from his waistband, handcuffed him, and later discovered marijuana and alcohol odor.
- Hicks held a valid Pennsylvania license to carry a concealed firearm; he was not charged for the firearm conduct but was convicted of DUI at trial after denial of his suppression motion.
- Lower courts relied on Commonwealth v. Robinson, which held that public possession of a concealed firearm alone creates reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate licensing status (the "Robinson rule").
- Hicks appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to resolve whether Robinson’s per se rule is consistent with Terry stop jurisprudence and the Fourth Amendment.
- The Supreme Court overruled Robinson, held that mere lawful possession of a concealed firearm does not, by itself, justify an investigative detention, and concluded Hicks’s seizure lacked reasonable suspicion so suppression was required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hicks) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mere possession of a concealed firearm in public provides reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop | Mere possession is lawful when licensed and not indicia of criminality; a Terry stop requires particularized suspicion of criminal activity | Possession can be suspicious; common sense and public safety justify briefly detaining to check licensing (Robinson approach) | Rejected the Robinson per se rule; possession alone (where legal) is insufficient to justify a stop under Terry |
| Whether Pennsylvania should apply an element-or-defense test (nonlicensure as element vs. licensure as affirmative defense) | Element test supports that nonlicensure is an element and therefore possession alone cannot supply suspicion; Hicks argued Terry’s predicate controls | Commonwealth and concurrence urged deference to statutory design where licensure is an affirmative defense in some jurisdictions | Majority declined to adopt an element-or-defense rule as a categorical Fourth Amendment test; refused to let statute labeling supplant individualized suspicion analysis |
| Whether the facts (showed/brandished, time, high-crime area) justified reasonable suspicion in this case | Only showed/covered firearm on video, no threatening or criminal conduct; dispatch did not use "brandishing"; no particularized suspicious behavior | The camera report and dispatch, late hour, and high-crime area collectively supported reasonable suspicion | Court examined the record (video/audio) and held the evidence did not show brandishing or other criminal behavior; seizure was unsupported by reasonable suspicion |
| Remedy for convictions tainted by a Robinson-based stop | Suppress derivative evidence and vacate conviction | Affirm conviction relying on Robinson and alternative factual grounds | Court vacated judgment of sentence, remanded for proceedings consistent with suppression of evidence derived from unlawful stop |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (establishes stop-and-frisk framework requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and additional suspicion to frisk)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (Sup. Ct.) (clarifies stop and frisk: lawful stop requires suspicion of criminal activity; frisk requires suspicion person is armed and dangerous)
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (Sup. Ct.) (random stops to check driver license/registration without individualized suspicion are unreasonable)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (Sup. Ct.) (rejects a per se 'firearm exception' to the Terry analysis in the anonymous-tip context)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (Sup. Ct.) (totality-of-the-circumstances standard for reasonable suspicion)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (Sup. Ct.) (contextual factors may inform suspicion but presence in high-crime area alone insufficient)
- United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531 (4th Cir.) (in jurisdictions permitting public carry, mere lawful possession cannot justify a stop)
- United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir.) (observation of a firearm in a permissive-carry jurisdiction does not alone justify an investigative detention)
- United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir.) (accurate tip of lawful firearm possession did not supply reasonable suspicion of criminal activity)
- United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir.) (distinguishes where licensure is an affirmative defense under state law; applied element-or-defense reasoning)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir.) (applies element-or-defense reasoning but acknowledges Prouse limits on random stops)