Commonwealth v. Giulian v. Aplt.
141 A.3d 1262
Pa.2016Background
- Victoria C. Giulian (arrested 1997) pleaded guilty to summary offenses: public drunkenness and harassment; also pleaded to underage drinking (later expunged) and had a withdrawn misdemeanor charge. She later (1998) pleaded guilty to summary criminal mischief.
- No arrests since 1998; she petitioned in 2013 under 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i) to expunge the 1997 summary convictions, asserting she has been arrest-free for over 16 years.
- The Commonwealth did not oppose expungement of the underage drinking and withdrawn charge; trial court granted expungement for the 1998 criminal mischief but denied expungement of the 1997 convictions as a matter of law.
- Superior Court affirmed, interpreting § 9122(b)(3)(i) to require that the petitioner be free of arrest or prosecution for the five years immediately following the conviction sought to be expunged.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review and held the statutory language ambiguous, ruled Giulian eligible to seek expungement of the 1997 convictions, reversed and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion considering relevant factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Giulian) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 9122(b)(3)(i) requires the five arrest-free years to be the five years immediately following the conviction | The statute permits any five-year arrest-free period following the conviction; present perfect tense (“has been”) and omission of words like "the" or "immediately" support a non‑immediate reading | The statute is plain: petitioner must be free of arrest/prosecution for the five years immediately following the conviction for the offense to be eligible | Ambiguous statutory language; Court adopts Giulian’s interpretation: any five-year arrest-free period following conviction suffices; remanded for discretionary consideration |
| Whether courts may add limiting words (e.g., “the”, “immediately”) to § 9122(b)(3)(i) when construing it | Adding “any” clarifies the statute without narrowing intent; courts should avoid importing limiting terms not included by Legislature | Adding “the” and “immediately” is consistent with the statute’s plain meaning and proper to avoid surplusage | Court rejects importing limiting words; declines to construe statute to require the immediate five-year window |
| Whether ambiguity must be resolved in petitioner’s favor (penal vs remedial construction) | Even if penal, rule of lenity or remedial construction favors petitioner; ambiguities resolved for accused and to effectuate humanitarian aims | If statute is unambiguous, lenity does not apply; if ambiguous Commonwealth argues its reading is the plain one | Court finds ambiguity and resolves it in petitioner’s favor; notes remedial purpose of expungement scheme supports liberal construction |
| Whether trial court’s denial was discretionary or a legal eligibility ruling | Giulian contends trial court erred by concluding she was ineligible as a matter of law | Commonwealth defends denial as proper under its reading of eligibility requirement | Court holds trial court ruled eligibility as a matter of law in error; remands for exercise of discretion under the statute’s factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Giulian, 122 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2015) (this Court’s opinion resolving § 9122(b)(3)(i) ambiguity)
- Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2011) (statutory limits on expungement when convicted)
- Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2014) (expungement is discretionary; balancing interests)
- Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981) (factors for discretionary expungement consideration)
- Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66 (Pa. 2008) (rule of lenity applies to ambiguous penal statutes)
- Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 A.3d 977 (Pa. 2016) (contextual statutory interpretation; resolving ambiguity)
- King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (U.S. 2015) (read statutory language in context to determine plain meaning)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (U.S. 2015) (statutory meaning depends on context; words may mean different things in different contexts)