Commonwealth v. Freeman
128 A.3d 1231
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- On May 5, 2013, Charles Freeman drove co-defendants to ahome-invasion/robbery of Kareem Borowy; Borowy escaped the vehicle and was shot and later died. Freeman was charged with homicide, kidnapping, robbery, related conspiracies, and other offenses.
- Detectives brought Freeman from his residence to the police station for questioning; they told him he was not under arrest and he voluntarily left and later returned briefly. Freeman answered questions and signed a transcript of his statement denying involvement.
- At Freeman’s residence, Detective Richard obtained written consent from Freeman’s girlfriend (Janae Nixon) to search; hearing a ringing phone in a kitchen trash can, Richard recovered two cell phones belonging to Freeman and later obtained warrants to search the home, the phones, and phone contents.
- Freeman’s vehicle was found parked with doors open and an unknown man cleaning it; police towed it to preserve evidence and obtained a warrant to search it.
- Pretrial, Freeman sought suppression of his stationhouse statement (Miranda), suppression of phones and phone-data, suppression of the car search/seizure, and severance from co-defendants; the trial court denied suppression and severance. At a joint trial, co-defendant Teel and a redacted confession of Miller were admitted. Freeman was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracies and sentenced to life. Freeman appealed raising multiple claims; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Freeman's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Freeman's May 10 stationhouse statement should be suppressed under Miranda because he was "in custody" | Freeman: He was effectively in custody during stationhouse questioning so Miranda warnings were required | Commonwealth: Freeman voluntarily accompanied detectives, was told he was not under arrest, not restrained, and free to leave; totality shows no custody | Court: Not custodial; Miranda not triggered, statement admissible |
| Legality of search and seizure of cell phones recovered from kitchen garbage after Nixon's consent | Freeman: Consent was tainted by police trickery and search exceeded Nixon’s consent | Commonwealth: Nixon gave voluntary written consent; officers reasonably recovered phones; Freeman waived other theories by not raising them below | Court: Claims were waived where not raised specifically; recovery upheld as consensual search |
| Probable cause for warrant to search cell-phone contents (relying on Teel’s statements) | Freeman: Affidavit relied solely on uncorroborated co-defendant Teel, so no probable cause | Commonwealth: Affidavit included Teel’s narrative plus corroborating facts (phones found in trash, Freeman’s false account), giving fair probability evidence would be on phones | Court: Magistrate had substantial basis for probable cause; warrant valid |
| Whether admission of Miller’s redacted confession and denial of severance violated Confrontation Clause (Bruton) | Freeman: Redaction ineffective (phrase "the second guy" used many times), jury could infer it referred to him; severance required | Commonwealth: Redactions substituted neutral terms; jury instructed limiting use; Richardson/Cannon allow redactions that omit defendant references | Court: Redaction and limiting instruction sufficient; no Bruton violation; severance denial not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda custodial-interrogation rules)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (defining interrogation and functional equivalent)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (inadmissibility of non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that incriminates defendant)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (redaction that eliminates defendant’s reference can cure Bruton error)
- Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (probable cause standard is practical probability, not proof beyond reasonable doubt)
- California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (automobile search principles cited in automobile-exception discussion)
- Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (no exigency beyond vehicle mobility required for warrantless vehicle searches when probable cause exists)
- Commonwealth v. Cannon, 22 A.3d 210 (Pa. 2011) (discussing Bruton, Richardson, and permissive redactions)
- Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27 (Frye hearing warranted only when articulable grounds that expert used non-accepted methods)
- Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (sufficiency standard: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)