Commonwealth v. Freeman
472 Mass. 503
Mass.2015Background
- In June 2013 Brian Freeman and Micah Martin (both 17) were arraigned in Boston Municipal Court on robbery and assault charges; on September 10, 2013 indictments were returned in Superior Court.
- On September 18, 2013 the Legislature enacted St. 2013, c. 84, expanding Juvenile Court jurisdiction to include most 17‑year‑olds and providing that criminal proceedings for offenses committed before age 18 must first proceed as delinquency matters in Juvenile Court.
- Defendants moved to dismiss in Superior Court, arguing the new Act stripped the Superior Court of jurisdiction over their pending charges and should apply retroactively to defendants arraigned before the Act's effective date.
- The Superior Court reported two questions of law: (1) whether the Act should apply retroactively to offenses committed before age 18 where prosecution commenced before the Act; and (2) whether a negative answer would violate equal protection (state and federal).
- This Court previously construed the Act in Watts v. Commonwealth, holding the Act does not apply retroactively to criminal cases begun and pending before September 18, 2013; Watts did not address constitutional claims.
- The defendants here pressed an equal protection challenge, contending prospective application discriminates against similarly situated 17‑year‑olds and deprives them of important juvenile procedural protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Should the Act be applied retroactively to defendants who committed offenses before 18 but whose criminal proceedings began before the Act's effective date? | Act should apply retroactively so 17‑year‑olds are treated as juveniles regardless of when arraigned. | Watts interpretation preventing retroactive application is wrong; defendants arraigned before the Act should nonetheless fall under Juvenile Court jurisdiction. | No. The Act does not apply retroactively to proceedings begun before Sept. 18, 2013. |
| Does prospective (nonretroactive) application violate federal and state equal protection guarantees? | Prospective application creates an arbitrary classification based on arraignment date and denies an important juvenile right to some 17‑year‑olds, warranting heightened scrutiny. | Legislative choice of an effective date and prospective application is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests (administration, staffing, services); no suspect class or fundamental right implicated. | No. Prospective application survives rational‑basis review; equal protection not violated. |
| Is heightened or strict scrutiny required because juveniles are a suspect class or because a fundamental right is burdened? | Juveniles are a distinct class entitled to heightened protection; denial of Juvenile Court access burdens important liberty interests. | The classification is by date of arraignment, not age; no suspect class and no precedent requiring strict scrutiny for such statutory start‑date distinctions. | No. The Court declined to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny and applied rational‑basis review. |
| Is prospective application justified by legislative findings about implementation burdens? | (Plaintiffs challenged) legislative practicalities insufficient to justify unequal treatment. | Legislature had rational basis: reports warned of staffing, services, and legal complexities if applied retroactively; prospective application allows orderly implementation. | Held valid: prospective application is a realistic, informed legislative response and rationally related to legitimate aims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49 (2014) (construing Act and holding it does not apply retroactively to pending criminal prosecutions)
- Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286 (2013) (presumption that new penal statutes are prospective)
- English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423 (1989) (standard for rational‑basis review under Massachusetts Constitution)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (recognition of juveniles' unique characteristics in constitutional analysis)
