Commonwealth v. Foust
180 A.3d 416
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2018Background
- In 1993, 17‑year‑old Michael Foust shot and killed two victims; he was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder and originally sentenced to two consecutive life‑without‑parole (LWOP) terms.
- After U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Miller, Montgomery) changed juvenile‑sentencing law, Foust obtained collateral relief and was resentenced in 2016 to 30 years-to-life for each murder, to run consecutive (aggregate 60 years‑to‑life).
- Foust challenged (1) whether Miller invalidated the statutory framework so that only third‑degree murder sentencing applied, and (2) whether the consecutive 60‑year term is an unconstitutional de facto LWOP absent a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he is irreparably incorrigible.
- The trial court found Foust capable of rehabilitation and imposed consecutive 30‑to‑life terms, explaining it treated each victim’s life independently.
- The Superior Court reviewed (a) whether de facto LWOP terms are barred by Miller/Graham and (b) whether the aggregate or individual sentences control for that analysis, and (c) discretionary‑sentencing abuse.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Foust) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Miller invalidated first/second‑degree murder statutory sentencing so only third‑degree sentencing applied | Miller made pre‑existing mandatory life statutes void; thus Foust should be sentenced under third‑degree maximum (20 years) | Batts II and statutory law permit life maximum for pre‑2012 convictions; trial court had authority to impose life | Denied. Batts II controls: trial court may impose life maximum for pre‑2012 first‑degree murder convictions. |
| 2. Whether a term‑of‑years that exceeds life expectancy is a de facto LWOP and thus unconstitutional without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of permanent incorrigibility | The aggregate 60‑year term functionally equals LWOP and is unlawful absent Miller/Batts II finding beyond a reasonable doubt | Must evaluate each sentence separately; individual 30‑to‑life terms here are not de facto LWOP | Denied. Court holds de facto LWOP terms are unconstitutional absent the required finding, but analysis must assess individual sentences; 30‑to‑life is not de facto LWOP here. |
| 3. Whether aggregate or individual sentences govern the de facto LWOP inquiry | Aggregate (60 years) should be used to determine de facto LWOP status | Individual sentences (each count) should be evaluated separately | Held: evaluate each individual sentence separately; aggregate length does not convert constitutional individual sentences into de facto LWOP. |
| 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive 30‑to‑life terms | Consecutive sentences produce an excessive, effectively life sentence and are unreasonable | Consecutive sentences are within sentencing discretion to reflect distinct victims and gravity | Denied. Trial court did not abuse discretion; it sufficiently articulated reasons for consecutive sentences. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment unless sentencer finds permanent incorrigibility)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical bar on LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; must provide meaningful opportunity for release)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional)
- Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile capital punishment)
- Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (addressed death penalty for 16–17‑year‑olds; later abrogated by Roper)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II) (Pennsylvania procedure: presumption against juvenile LWOP; Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt incapacity for rehabilitation; trial courts retain authority to impose life maximum for pre‑2012 convictions)