Commonwealth v. Far
46 A.3d 709
| Pa. | 2012Background
- This case addresses whether Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 or Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(4) governs prompt-trial timing when a case moves from Common Pleas to Municipal Court and then back to Common Pleas.
- Appellees Nasir Far, Regina Little, and Garnell Brown were arrested on Feb. 6, 2007, on multiple drug charges including PWID-PCP, with PCP analysis needed for a prima facie case.
- PCP laboratory reports were repeatedly not produced, leading to continuances and the withdrawal of the PWID-PCP charge; remaining charges were misdemeanors and the case was remanded to Municipal Court.
- Municipal Court sought to hold a jury trial; because Municipal Court did not conduct jury trials, the Commonwealth sought transfer back to the Court of Common Pleas for a jury trial.
- A preliminary hearing occurred on Dec. 7, 2007, and Appellees were held for trial in the Court of Common Pleas.
- In Feb. 2008, Appellees moved to dismiss under Rule 1013(A)(4); the Court of Common Pleas held Rule 1013(A)(4) controlled and dismissed the charges; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which prompt-trial rule applies when a case is transferred back to Common Pleas? | Commonwealth argues Rule 600 governs because Rule 1013(A)(4) does not cover the second transfer. | Far argues Rule 1013(A)(4) governs once the case was in Municipal Court, even if later returned to Common Pleas. | Rule 600 governs; Rule 1013(A)(4) does not apply after the case's back transfer. |
| How do Rule 1000's scope provisions affect which rule applies? | Rule 1000(B) makes statewide Rule 600 applicable when a Chapter 10 rule does not explicitly cover the situation. | Rule 1013(A)(4) should apply per Chapter 10 governing Municipal Court proceedings. | Because the scenario is not explicitly covered by Rule 1013(A)(4) or any Chapter 10 rule, Rule 600 applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 542 Pa. 22 (Pa. 1995) (establishes 365-day prompt-trial framework for statewide rule)
- Commonwealth v. Palmer, 384 Pa. Super. 379 (Pa. Super. 1989) (early promt-trial interpretation in appellate context)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 607 Pa. 597 (Pa. 2010) (interpretation of Rule 101(C) and statutory construction principles)
- Commonwealth v. Revtai, 516 Pa. 53 (Pa. 1987) (statutory construction principles in interpreting rules)
- Commonwealth v. Sloan, 589 Pa. 15 (Pa. 2006) (interpretation of procedural rules with interrelated provisions)
- Commonwealth v. Lockridge, 570 Pa. 510 (Pa. 2002) (consideration of committee comments and rule intent)
- Commonwealth v. Perry, 32 A.3d 232 (Pa. 2011) (de novo standard for statutory-rule interpretation in criminal procedure)
- Commonwealth v. Tharp, 562 Pa. 231 (Pa. 2000) (constitutional right to jury trial informing procedural rule interpretation)