*1
v.
Shawney PERRY, Appellee. Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Submitted Oct. 2010.
Decided Nov. *3 Burns, Jr., Hugh J. Philadelphia Office, District Attorney’s Philadelphia, for Commonwealth Pennsylvania. of Stein,
Gerald A. Stein, P.C., Law Offices of Gerald A. for Philadelphia, Shawney Perry. CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER,
BEFORE: TODD, McCAFFERY, MELVIN, ORIE JJ.
OPINION Justice TODD.
In this discretionary we appeal, consider whether the Supe- Court, rior in vacating sentence imposed upon Appellee Shawney for Perry a loaded firearm carrying without a license in (“UFA”), violation of the Uniform Firearms Act specifically, 6106(a),1 18 Pa.C.S.A. misapplied directives, this Court’s Act, Perry was convicted provid- under the 1995 version of the which ed: any person any any person who carries a firearm in vehicle or who carries a firearm person, except concealed on or about his in his business, place place of lawfully abode or fixed of a without valid and A.2d 957 v. 592 Pa. forth Commonwealth
set For (2007), review of sentences. concerning appellate below, failed we hold the Court to Superior set forth reasons imposition to the sufficient deference give we vacate the Court’s Accordingly, Superior of sentence. a and the matter order remand of consistent with Perry’s judgment reexamination this with our decision Walls. opinion relevant were summarized this previously The facts as follows: Court2 a.m., 8,1996, at 3:00 Javon Saturday approximately
On June Mahalati were Tracker to Bobby driving GEO Jones Illusions, time, Appellant club. At after-hours the same Perry was a white Lexus and was a driving Stewart] [Brett at Perry vehicle. had the Lexus passenger stopped on which was the corner from green light 7th Street around Perry club. were a lane of traffic blocking and Stewart were in while the men conversed with some women who Jones, behind the Tracker with the driving top car them. down, along light and windows side the Lexus as pulled remarked, red. turned Stewart turned Jones and “What f- you ignored at?” Jones Mahalati Stew- looking art. When the turned around the light green, Jones drove Lexus and in front of the entrance to stopped Illusions. Perry pulled along passenger the Lexus side Mahalati, Perry f— you Tracker. asked “What the looking times, you at?” then several do want repeated “What you do? Do to f— us?” “All responded, want Mahalati or right, Appellants What ever One both of the p — .” *4 chapter felony issued license under this a of the third commits degree. 6106(a) (1995). § 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section was last amended on April 1997. trial, Perry suppress 2. Prior to filed a motion to evidence discovered during driving. a warrantless search of the vehicle he was The trial motion, granted appealed. and Commonwealth The Superior granting suppression, Court the trial court's order reversed Court, Perry petition appeal filed a with which and allowance this granted. Ultimately, this affirmed the Court's decision. shouted, Do want to take care this” and “We you “What? Perry can take care of this around the corner.” and then drove to the end of the block and turned left Stewart 8th onto Street.
Perry positioned only Lexus on 8th Street so as to leave room for a vehicle to enough single pass. Jones and Lexus, past right. Mahalati drove it on the passing Perry Jones and Mahalati observed that both and Stewart were Mahalati threw back in an holding guns. his seat attempt protect attempted himself while Jones to speed away. rang feeling legs. Shots out and Mahalati lost in his Jones drove around the block in an effort to seek help. flagged Philadelphia Tyrone Jones down Police For- Officer rest, who was on duty outside of Illusions. Officer Forrest observed the bullet hole the side of the Tracker and ambulance, noted blood on the seat. summoning After Officer Forrest broadcasted an alert police over radio at a.m., 2:59 that a man stating had been shot and that his assailants were two black males who had driven southbound on 8th Street in a two-door white Lexus. 499, 500-01, v. Perry,
Commonwealth 568 Pa. 798 A.2d (2002)(editorial 697-98 omissions original).
A few alert, minutes after the broadcast officers police Lexus, observed Perry and Stewart in the white pursued them, and stopped vehicle. Jones was taken by police to the location of the stop, at which time he identified and Stewart as the two men with whom he and Mahalati had engaged vehicle, During confrontation. a search of the police officers uncovered a 9mm Helwan handgun containing mat, six bullets under the driver-side floor .22 Beretta under floor mat. passenger-side Ultimately, Perry were Stewart arrested and charged with murder,3 two counts of attempted two counts of aggravat- assault,4 ed criminal conspiracy,5 various UFA violations. § 3. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 901. §
4. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2702.
5. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
562 trial, a of one by jury was convicted joint Perry a
Following carry- one violation for assault and UFA aggravated count of all acquitted a license. Stewart a firearm without ing charges. 2004, 18, to 10 to Perry was sentenced
On November assault conviction and consecu years aggravated 20 for his conviction; for his both years 2$ tive term of to 5 UFA term of for imprisonment the maximum represented sentences the sentenc Perry’s sentencing hearing, At those offenses.6 the victim and the focused on the harm inflicted on ing court evidence, mitigation stating: lack of course, are. I guidelines knows what Of to that before and I was told it was 54 asked counsel about twelve.[7] [my ... And I know that 72 or minus plus and it’s a bit quite outside the guidelines sentence is] be, my it opinion, should guidelines outside 1103(1) (maximum imprisonment § term of for a 6. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 1104(1) (maxi- degree years); felony 20 18 Pa.C.S.A. of the first is degree imprisonment of the first is 5 mum term of for misdemeanor years). hearing, sentencing 7. At the the Commonwealth advised the court that sentencing guideline range Perry’s applicable for conviction for aggravated deadly weapon, gravity assault with a which had offense 11, months, Although plus 72 or minus 12 months. score of was 54 to Sentencing range this is the correct under the edition of fifth Guidelines, 8, 1996, Perry because committed his offense on June his sentencing guide- controlled the fourth edition of the sentence was lines, 12, 13, August through which was in effect from 1994 June 1997. 1198, Maneval, See, Pa.Super. e.g., v. 688 A.2d Commonwealth 455 (1997) (applicable sentencing guidelines are in effect at the 1200 those Nevertheless, issue, committed). party time offense was no raised this either before the lower courts or before this Court. We also note the guideline specifically did not on the record the state range Perry's required for UFA conviction. A court is not guideline sentencing range, long recite on the record the as the recognition applicable of the sentenc- record demonstrates range. ing range from that Common- and the deviation of sentence regard, Twitty, (Pa.Super.2005). In that wealth v. 876 A.2d argues record nor the now that "neither certified opinion indicates that the court was aware of the Appellee’s precise guidelines conviction." Brief [his UFA] However, Perry failed raise this issue in his motion for at 8. sentence, appeal Court. Ac- reconsideration of or on 302(a). cordingly, this claim is waived. Pa.R.A.P. light damage done to gentleman. this And the jury- heard all the evidence. They heard the evidence about the *6 self-defense; so-called rejected they They that. also heard the evidence good of character. Many people came in and testified about Mr. Perry’s good character. He is a good guy like a lot people of that are good guys and end at up one time or doing another bad things, they and when do bad things they have to account for them.
But I am taking this into I account. think that this man from, down, is paralyzed not the but from the chest [waist] down, as a result of one shot fired by Perry. Mr. He admitted he fired the shot. I see mitigation anywhere no from the that people testified and from Mr. Perry’s testimo- himself, ny and the jury didn’t see anything, why that’s they found him guilty of the aggravated assault.
N.T. Sentencing 11/18/04, Hearing, at 52-54. The sentencing court denied Perry’s motion subsequent for of reconsideration sentence.
Thereafter, Perry Court, appealed to the Superior alia, alleging, inter that the in erred sentenc him ing “outside of the guidelines on solely the basis of the serious injury to the in disregard [victim] of all of the defense character, evidence regarding defendant’s excellent reputation, history, work prior victimization lack of crimi nal record and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”8 Statement of Matters Complained 4/20/05, of on Appeal, at 2. Thereafter, Court, the Superior in an unpublished memoran dum opinion, affirmed Perry’s assault, sentence for aggravated but vacated his judgment of sentence on the UFA conviction and remanded for resentencing, concluding imposition of a consecutive maximum sentence for the UFA conviction was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 2005, Perry, 228 EDA 947 7, A.2d 831 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. challenge As this issue discretionary aspects was of his sentence, review, right did not have an appellate absolute to challenge regard properly his in this petition was viewed as a for 9781(b); appeal. allowance § See 42 Pa.C.S.A. Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 508, 510, 17, (1987). 513 Pa. 522 A.2d 18 dissented; that opined she 2008).9 Bowes Mary Jane Judge of review standard apply proper majority failed 9781(c)(3). that, pursuant Noting § in 42 Pa.C.S.A. set forth courts supra, decision this Court’s based on guidelines outside the to sentence have discretion stat- criminal contemplated specifically factors not relevant record reflects as the long concluded “as utes, Bowes Judge an individualized imposed trial court that the articulated in the factors light not unreasonable 2005, 228 EDA 9781(d), Perry, affirm.” we must Pa.C.S. at 6. dissenting opinion allowance of petition filed a
The Commonwealth
review, limited
and,
granted
this Court
May
on
appeal,
Court,
vacating Perry’s
of whether the
to the issue
conviction,
proper
apply
failed to
his
sentence for
UFA
*7
this issue
As
review as set forth Walls.10
standard of
law,
of review is
scope
plenary
our
a
of
presents
question
Chase,
v.
de novo. Commonwealth
of review is
our standard
(2008).
80, 88,
108, 112
A.2d
599 Pa.
960
of review
“the
standard
proper
It well settled that
is
court’s
sentencing
the
whether to affirm
considering
when
Walls,
Pa. at
592
an abuse of discretion.”
is
determination
a
“is more than
564,
An abuse of discretion
(c) appeal. Determination on appellate court shall —The vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing purported to sentence -withinthe but guidelines, applied guidelines the erroneous- ly;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the clearly be unreasonable the would guidelines
application or
(3) the sentenced outside sentencing the is unreasonable. guidelines and the sentence affirm the the court shall appellate In all other cases court. by the imposed sentence added). Thus, 9781(c) appellate the (emphasis § 42 Pa.C.S.A. the guide- review a sentence outside specifically court must for reasonableness. lines (d) considered in forth the factors be
Subsection sets the is guidelines outside of whether determining unreasonable:
(d) reviewing appel- Review of record. —In the record have for: regard late court shall (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and and characteristics of the defendant. history (2) court to observe opportunity The defendant, including any presentence investigation. (3) The which the sentence was based. findings upon (4) The commission. guidelines promulgated 9781(d). 42 Pa.C.S.A. above, Perry’s affirmed Superior judg-
As noted Court conviction. In aggravated ment of sentence his assault so, because “there a wide doing court reasoned is spectrum satisfy aggravat- of conduct that can the elements of others, assault, far than ... ed some more serious the [sen- justified in the indi- tencing] certainly considering court was vidual facts of the case to determine where on that present imposing case fell when sentence.” spectrum present EDA at 23. Perry, Specifically, threatening injuries, noted the assault inflicted life and that fortuity, “but for the victim could have suffered mortal ... [Perry] facing wound and could have been a conviction for actions, In there is third-degree [Perry’s] murder. terms of no real difference for the outcome.” Id. at 24. except *9 However, with regard judgment of sentence for conviction, Perry’s UFA the Superior Court held “the same rationale does analytically not a maximum support sentence.” Id. at 25. The court opined: assault,
Unlike the crime aggravated carrying a firearm without a license a contemplates relatively limited range of conduct, course, being, carrying a without a weapon license. The purpose for which the weapon was carried is and, such, not an not, element of the offense as is logically a speaking, relevant consideration in sentence. imposing is, That had the vehicle [Perry] was been occupying stopped a for routine traffic offense and [Perry] had been found in possession he weapon, just would have been guilty as he was under the facts found here. In the same vein, the result of carrying weapon is also irrelevant as that result is dealt with by imposition of a sentence on another crime when the result of carrying the firearm itself Here, is a criminal act. the net effect of [Perry’s] decision to carry a firearm was the commission of an aggravated assault for which will [Perry] now pay maximum possi- ble punishment.
Id. at 25-26.
The Court reasoned “even if intent in carry- ing factor, was a weapon legitimate there is no evidence that [Perry] carried a weapon with the intent to shoot some- one on that or to night employ the weapon criminally,” stating:
Rather, in an unfortunate commentary on the state of our society, it appears that too many young individuals believe that when they leave home an urban environment it is necessary to carry weapon. More poignantly, the facts of present case demonstrate the danger of pervasive pos- session of weapons.
Id. at
Finally, the Superior Court concluded: indications, here, From all the imposition of a maximum carrying a weapon without a license simply a way of increasing [Perry’s] punishment for the aggravated or, [Perry’s] punish- increasing possibly,
assault conviction *10 Because a whole. viewed as episode criminal for the ment charge, assault aggravated on the “maxed out” [Perry] was discretion, and an abuse of constitutes believe this we the sentence justify rationale used the general because offense, the sentence must deem we to this apply does not as set forth “unreasonable” this count as on imposed Walls. 27-28.
Id. at Court argues Superior first
The Commonwealth the elements of analysis of relief based on its erred in granting that the appeal on argue did not Perry 6106 because Section a mechanical confined itself “to have sentencing court should Brief at Commonwealth’s [UFA].” of the elements review Perry complained Rather, asserts the Commonwealth harsh and that unduly was his overall sentence that rehabilita focused more on his court should have sentencing character, severity of the instead tive needs and excellent additionally Id. The Commonwealth injuries. the victim’s with only conflicts not decision Superior contends the Court’s binding but with “decades of holding in this Court’s have due that an requires appellate which precedent” alia, for, public” “protection regard inter on the victim impact in relation to the of the offense “gravity omitted). In at 15-16 community.” (emphasis Id. Perry emphasizes respect, this Commonwealth proceed without a license and guns two illegally purchased three cars that he of them in and out of to transfer both ed urban area over the highly through populated drove Therefore, offense was his [UFA] of several hours. course an enhanced have merited serious and would exceptionally viewed in total isolation (improperly) if it were even penalty, his other criminal conduct. from original). (emphasis Id. at 16 reiterates the Commonwealth
Finally, that the sentencing guidelines, not bound court is its sentences consecutive- impose permitted trial court Commonwealth, in ly. vacating to the the sentence According conviction, Perry’s court for imposed by UFA its view for Superior “impermissibly Court substituted that of the trial what constituted suitable judge concerning [a] Id. at 19. punishment.” response arguments, Perry
In to the Commonwealth’s as- interpret serts the Commonwealth seeks to “impermissibly provide Walls so as to ‘near limitless discretion’ for courts.” Brief at 13. maintains the Appellee’s Superior Court’s decision the instant case did not conflict with this Walls; Perry points Court’s decision out unlike in Walls, the in this case deference gave proper discretion, judgment and as evi- *11 denced of Perry’s its affirmance sentence on his conviction assault. Id. at 22. aggravated Perry further avers the the in properly considered factors listed Sec- 9781(d), tion and that “a careful review of the [Superior opinion reveals that the ... did not negate Court’s] [Court] factors,” either intent or result as relevant sentencing [UFA] but found there simply [Perry] was “no evidence that carried a with weapon the intent to shoot someone on that or to night the employ weapon criminally.” Id. at 25-26 omit- (emphasis ted). that,
Perry further contends while dispositive, not the trial court’s failure to specifically acknowledge on the record or in its written opinion the applicable sentencing guidelines for his UFA conviction militates against finding that the sentence was reasonable. Id. at 15. Finally, Perry echoes the Superior Court’s suggestion that his sentence was an attempt by the sentencing court to “rectify” jury’s failure to return a murder, that, verdict of in attempted Perry alleges impos- a sentence in ing excess of the sentencing guidelines, essentially “nullified” the jury’s decision to him of acquit attempted murder. Id. at 17. consideration,
After careful we find vacating judgment Perry’s of sentence for UFA conviction, the Superior Court failed to adhere to the dictates Walls, of In this Court’s decision Walls. the defendant granddaughter on several sexually seven-year-old molested his night grandparents’ at her spent occasions when the child of a victim guilty rape to one count of pled house. Walls thirteen; involuntary of deviate one count age under the (“IDSI”) age with a victim under the intercourse sexual to thirteen; of incest. was sentenced and one count Walls years rape terms of 10 to 20 each for IDSI consecutive offenses, to ten on the years and a consecutive term of one minimum sentence for the mandatory incest offense. The each, years was 5 and the standard rape and IDSI offenses months, with an sentence for each offense was 60 to 66 range thus, months; sentence of 66 to 78 Walls’ aggravated range offenses, of 10 to 20 for these which constitut- years sentences maximum, was well outside the statutory ed guidelines.11 In appealed judgment opinion
Walls his of sentence. its 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P. pursuant written (1) offered the reasons for its sentence: Walls was in following victim; of trust and for the position responsibility caring (2) only years the fact that the victim was seven old at the abuse; (3) victim time of the sexual was Walls’ grand- (4) his acts to be “accidents” as daughter; perceived Walls Pa. at opposed deliberate conduct. 926 A.2d at 960.
The Superior judgment Court vacated Walls’ of sentence. so, In doing opined court first that a sentence should be *12 length based on the minimum of confinement consistent with offense, the need for gravity public protection, and the defendant’s need for rehabilitation. v. Commonwealth Walls, 152, 846 A.2d 157-58 The court fur- (Pa.Super.2004). ther reasoned because the “were sentencing guidelines to create and implemented greater consistency rationality is, sentencing,” the creation of a “norm”—that a standard range of which to measure the of an punishment by gravity — that “strongly implies offense deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts about the crime that also deviate from offense, relating norm for the or facts to the offender’s range. 11. Walls’ sentence for incest was within the standard character or criminal that history from the norm and [deviate] must be as not within the regarded guidelines contemplation.” Id. at 158. Applying case, its to the facts of reasoning Superior Court that opined sentencing court in Walls “focused to an extreme end ... upon retribution/vengeance protecting public.” Id. at 160. The court further posited the fact that Walls held a of trust position responsible for caring for the victim was not uncommon in cases involving children, the sexual assault of and noted that the tender age of the victim was a factor in the contemplated (cid:127) crimes Thus, themselves. Id. at 161. the Superior Court concluded none of the factors cited the sentencing court justified the imposition the statutory maximum sentence. Id.
This
granted
Court
the Commonwealth’s petition for allow-
ance of appeal, and ultimately reversed the Superior Court’s
decision,
concluding
Superior Court exceeded its applica-
ble standard of
In
review.
so doing, we first emphasized the
deferential standard of review an appellate court should em-
ploy when reviewing a judgment of sentence —abuse of discre-
Furthermore,
tion.
thereto,
and related
we reiterated “the
guidelines have
effect,
no binding
create no
presumption
sentencing,
predominate
and do not
over other sentencing
are
they
advisory guideposts
valuable,
that are
may
factors —
provide
essential starting point, and that must be respected
considered;
recommend,
they
however, rather than re-
quire
a particular sentence.”
Next, we reviewed the four factors set forth in Section 9781(d), and determined that the properly considered the nature offense, and circumstances of
572 Id. at of the defendant. characteristics history and well as the sentencing we noted the Specifically, A.2d at 967. 926 findings number of additional relied on a properly guide- from the upward departure of its support of trust and Wall’s lines, age, position the victim’s including victim, the Walls and between relationship the responsibility, “accidents,” and as of the assaults characterization and Walls’ stated: rely on permitted court was the
we find that
the
As noted
sentence.
justify
factors to
Walls’
these
Court,
of
precise age
the
the Superior
Commonwealth
seven-years-
i.e.,
only
victim was
victim,
the fact that the
abuse,
of
was not an element
of the sexual
at the time
old
old and
years
than thirteen
of a victim less
or IDSI
rape
Supe-
While the
above-guideline
sentence.
justify
could
justify the
factor could not
found that
this
rior Court
of
case,
standard
of the deferential
light
in this
with the Com-
review,
agree
we
disagree. Additionally,
we
no
basis
legitimate
that
has offered
monwealth
Walls
factors,
entrusted to
being
the victim
that these
presume
are subsumed with-
granddaughter,
care and was his
Walls’
Thus,
that
we conclude
sentencing guidelines.
in the
were legally
sentence was based
which Walls’
findings upon
permissible.
574,
Id. at court Walls out that Finally, pointed we in that sentencing, for standards general took into account well as public “clearly protection considered the it life on the impact the offense as it relates gravity Furthermore, it community. apparent is the victim and the the rehabil- factored into its decision sentencing court that the Id. at for Walls.” of rehabilitation prospects itative needs or A.2d at 967-68. its likewise exceeded stan- We conclude that, at Initially, we note in the instant case. dard of review court indicated Perry’s sentencing, time of the offenses of range guideline it was aware of the addition, sentencing In Perry was convicted. which *14 at hearing Perry’s post-trial prior stated its on motion to sentence, imposing Perry’s it read and the pre- considered which included report, Perry’s employment history evidence of his a criminal age and and lack of record. N.T. 1/4/05, at 10. The Hearing, sentencing court also indicated it Perry’s that took into account own and the testimony, testimony family of his and friends as character witnesses. Id. at 43. The court also considered the gravity offense, the the fact that was in of two possession firearms, the of the protection public, Perry’s and need for rehabilitation, modify and refused to his sentence: just
I don’t make it a habit of out throwing numbers and in giving people jail. time And I hate to time in give people I jail. any way think of I can not to it. give Mahalati, Mr. unless miracle of something happens, some science, is not going get to better. I took all of that into account. I took into account the prior record score of the defendant, but I also took protection into account the public. In these of things kind we have these things —and happen every don’t mean day people nobody. to shoot — they But then come in after the is done and come to damage court I say, didn’t mean to I’m sorry. do it. I didn’t think it was to going happen. you When have a gun, you pull that trigger, something comes out the front of that gun at 750 miles per hour and in the direction of somebody, going it’s to hurt somebody. going It’s to hurt if it somebody somebody. hits
And that’s what it did in this case. I took all of that into account. Maybe [Perry] doesn’t have to be rehabilitated to the extent of some of the people jail other that sit in that records, have that have murders and robberies on them. But we know he has to be rehabilitated to some extent because we know he has to learn not to not carry gun, carry guns, two not to in go shooting out the middle of the street. That may somebody.... hurt my [I]t’s recollection of the testimony that the bullet direction was from the back of the car toward the front. And there testimony time, trying he was away at the so moving
this car was get away. the sentenc- above, it is clear that on the
Id. at 40—41. Based circumstances of the nature and considered properly ing offense, impact of the offense and gravity including victim; and the public; protection on the life of the characteristics, Perry, needs of history, and rehabilitative its sentence. imposing
Nevertheless, concluded sen Superior Court unreasonable conviction was imposed Perry’s tence UFA sentence, im because, its imposing (1) Perry’s carrying weap considered intent properly *15 First, (2) ons; injuries to the victim. severity the of the for its provide any legal support the failed to Superior Court that, of the Code conclusion because Section 6106 Crimes “relatively range carrying the limited of conduct” prohibits license, weapon the for which the purpose a firearm without a crime, neither of which is an was carried and the result offense, determining element of the are irrelevant Indeed, sentence. such a conclusion is inconsis appropriate Walls, with wherein we held that factors holding tent our bemay that are not elements of offense considered specific by imposing Specifical court in its sentence.12 Walls, we held that ly, properly only years the fact that the victim was seven old considered the victim and the defendant in relationship and the between sentence, factors were not though its even these imposing charged. elements of the offenses specific Further, suggested to the extent the Court Superior for Per- the maximum sentence imposed a ry’s way increasing punishment UFA offense as recognize opined if intent was 12. We even relevant, weapon with there was no evidence to indicate carried a However, employ criminally. holding by the intent to it this alternative court, theory supported only brief on "the state of our its 26, society,” Perry, opposed EDA at as to citations to the not, view, record, Superior Court's does in our render harmless the give imposition deference to the court’s failure to sufficient of sentence. conviction, aggravated his assault or for the criminal episode whole, conjecture Court, this is mere by the Superior unsupported by any reference to the record. reasons,
For all of these we find the Superior Court failed to give proper deference to the sentencing court when it determined that the sentencing imposition of a sen- tence, outside of although the sentencing guidelines, was un- reasonable. Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court’s or- der and remand the matter to the Superior Court for a reexamination of Perry’s judgment of sentence consistent with Walls, this opinion and with our decision in supra. CASTILLE,
Chief EAKIN, BAER, Justice Justices McCAFFERY, join and ORIE MELVIN opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files dissenting opinion. SAYLOR,
Justice
dissenting.
The General
has
Assembly
tasked our Superior Court col-
leagues with finally reviewing the discretionary aspects of
and,
so,
sentences
in doing
has sharply limited this Court’s
jurisdiction in
9781(f).
field. See 42 Pa.C.S.
While I
supported a limited prerogative
correction
Commonwealth
v.
592 Pa.
(2007),