Commonwealth v. Demora
149 A.3d 330
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 1996 Tyson Demora pled guilty to aggravated indecent assault and was sentenced to 2–5 years; at the time the conviction carried a 10-year registration requirement under Megan’s Law I/II.
- Demora completed his sentence, reported to the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) without recorded violations, and was not on parole or probation when he filed suit.
- In 2012 the PSP notified Demora he was a Tier III offender under SORNA and subject to lifetime registration.
- In October 2015 Demora petitioned the Lancaster County Court seeking relief from the PSP’s SORNA registration requirement, arguing it violated his plea agreement.
- The trial court denied relief, finding Demora had not shown the registration requirement was a material term of his plea; Demora appealed.
- The Superior Court held the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Demora failed to name the PSP—an indispensable party—so the petition could not proceed against the county district attorney alone.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had jurisdiction to decide plea-agreement challenge to SORNA registration | Demora: court may enforce plea terms to prevent PSP-imposed lifetime registration | DA: County court can address plea-agreement claims; DA represented Commonwealth interests | Court: No jurisdiction because PSP, the agency enforcing SORNA, is an indispensable party and was not joined |
| Whether SORNA registration is a collateral civil consequence or punitive | Demora: registration conflicts with plea and is enforceable term | Commonwealth: registration is a collateral civil consequence and administered by PSP | Court: Generally SORNA registration is collateral civil consequence (not punitive); challenge targets PSP action and thus requires PSP as party |
| Proper procedural vehicle and parties for relief from SORNA registration | Demora: petition in county court against DA suffices to declare plea terms | Commonwealth/authority: relief against PSP should be sought by declaratory/injunctive action naming PSP | Court: Appropriate remedy is declaratory/injunctive relief against PSP; DA alone may not adequately represent PSP’s interests |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Pennsylvania State Police, 132 A.3d 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (characterizes SORNA claims as actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against agency)
- Giannantonio v. Pennsylvania State Police, 114 A.3d 429 (Pa. Super. 2015) (discusses SORNA as civil collateral consequence)
- Deaner v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 779 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 2001) (jurisdictional basis for certain petitions tied to statutory relief)
- Hainesworth v. Pennsylvania State Police, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (addresses plea-agreement challenge to SORNA registration)
- Partee v. Pennsylvania State Police, 86 A.3d 245 (Pa. Super. 2014) (examines procedural posture when petitioner is incarcerated)
- Orman v. Mortgage I.T., 118 A.3d 403 (Pa. Super. 2015) (failure to join indispensable party implicates subject-matter jurisdiction)
- CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 640 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1994) (defines indispensable party principle)
- Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988) (explains when a party is necessary/indispensable)