Commonwealth v. Costa
33 N.E.3d 412
Mass.2015Background
- Defendant (16 at time) convicted in 1994 of two counts of first‑degree murder as a juvenile and sentenced to two consecutive life terms without parole.\
- At sentencing the judge exercised discretion and imposed consecutive rather than concurrent life‑without‑parole terms; defense had urged concurrency based on youth and rehabilitation potential.\
- After Diatchenko and Brown (Mass. SJC decisions applying Miller), the parole‑ineligibility provision was excised for juvenile offenders, converting former life‑without‑parole terms into life with parole eligibility after 15 years.\
- Because defendant had two consecutive sentences, parole eligibility under the modified scheme would occur after 30 years, not 15; defendant had served ~28 years.\
- Trial judge granted the defendant a resentencing hearing to consider whether the originally imposed consecutive terms should be converted to concurrent terms; Commonwealth sought review.\
- SJC held that resentencing is permissible and set parameters for the proceeding, including what factors the judge may consider.\
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may amend the original sentence under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a) to convert multiple consecutive juvenile life terms (originally without parole) into concurrent terms after Diatchenko/Brown | Resentencing unnecessary; Diatchenko already remedied parole ineligibility and defendant can apply directly to parole board | Resentencing required because the original judge exercised discretion to impose consecutive terms without knowledge they would affect parole eligibility post‑Diatchenko/Brown | Allowed: Judge may hold resentencing and may convert consecutive terms to concurrent when original discretion mattered and sentencing package is thus altered |
| What is the proper remedy when part of an integrated sentence is illegal? | Vacatur unnecessary where statutory fix makes new sentence mandatory (per Diatchenko) | Where judicial discretion affected the integrated package, resentencing is appropriate | Resentencing follows general rule: vacate and resentence when an illegal component influenced the integrated sentence |
| What factors should the trial court consider at resentencing? | Limit to standard sentencing considerations; parole board’s role should remain intact | Consider Miller factors, adolescent brain science, and post‑sentencing conduct in addition to standard factors | Held: Judge may consider standard sentencing factors plus (1) Miller factors, (2) evidence about defendant’s psychological state at offense, (3) post‑sentencing conduct (favorable or unfavorable) |
| Does consideration of post‑sentencing conduct usurp parole board authority? | Commonwealth argued resentencing consideration of post‑sentencing conduct encroaches on executive parole function | Defendant argued postsentencing rehabilitation is relevant to sentencing discretion | Court: Permissible to consider postsentencing conduct at resentencing; parole grant remains parole board’s discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; individualized consideration required)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Miller applies retroactively on collateral review; art. 26 bars LWOP for juveniles)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013) (remedy: excise parole‑ineligibility provision; transformed LWOP into life with parole eligibility after 15 years for juveniles)
- Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422 (2003) (vacatur and resentencing required where unlawful component influenced integrated sentencing package)
- Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318 (2014) (when part of an integrated sentence is illegal, vacate and remand for resentencing)