114 N.E.3d 569
Mass.2019Background
- On July 29, 2008, John Marshall was found stabbed to death in a Dale Street parking lot in Roxbury; he died from an eight-inch stab wound to the heart.
- Defendant David Copeland left a Regent Street apartment (short of money and crack), returned sweaty, bloody, shirtless, and later admitted leaving once; blood matching the victim was on the defendant and on a knife found wrapped in a white T‑shirt in the apartment.
- Surveillance and witness testimony placed a man in a white shirt fighting the victim around the time of the killing; a hat with the defendant’s DNA was found in the victim’s vehicle and crack cocaine was recovered from that vehicle.
- Defendant conceded stabbing the victim but claimed PTSD from a prior sexual assault caused a spontaneous killing and denied intending to rob the victim; defense presented a psychiatrist.
- Jury was instructed on first‑degree murder (premeditation and felony‑murder with armed robbery as predicate), second‑degree murder (malice), manslaughter, and armed robbery; convicted of felony‑murder in the first degree and armed robbery.
- On appeal defendant challenged prosecutor statements, sufficiency of evidence (felony‑murder and premeditation), refusal to charge felony‑murder in second degree (larceny from person), closing argument, and ineffective assistance; defendant sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Copeland's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for felony‑murder (armed robbery predicate) | Circumstantial evidence—defendant left apartment to meet someone after running out of money/crack; returned with bloody money/drugs; physical and forensic links to scene—supports intent to steal and robbery | Insufficient proof of a taking, force/threat, or intent to steal; robbery was an afterthought to the killing | Affirmed: evidence (circumstantial + consciousness of guilt) sufficient to support armed robbery and thus felony‑murder |
| Failure to instruct on felony‑murder in second degree (larceny from person) | No rational basis to instruct on larceny from person where force/peril pervaded confrontation and property was linked to victim | Requested instruction because taking could be construed as larceny rather than robbery | Affirmed: judge properly declined second‑degree felony‑murder instruction; evidence indicated force/robbery, not mere larceny |
| Prosecutor’s improper comments in opening/closing (paid expert, assault doubt, barter/market assumptions) | Many comments were fair attacks on credibility and grounded in cross‑examination/evidence; one isolated improper suggestion (“paid expert”) but harmless with instructions | Mischaracterizations and impermissible references to facts not in evidence and to expert as hired gun prejudiced jury | No reversible error: only isolated improper remark about expert; judge’s instructions and overall record show no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel for not moving at close of Commonwealth’s case and not objecting to closing | Even assuming omissions, no prejudice because (1) felony‑murder sufficiency was adequate; (2) closing argument error harmless | Counsel’s failures deprived defendant of a fair trial | Denied: no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; prior rulings on sufficiency and harmlessness defeat claim |
| Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E | Record does not warrant reduction of verdict or new trial | Requests for reduced verdict/new trial under § 33E | Denied: after full review court declines to reduce or order new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472 (discusses standard for reviewing prosecutorial argument and sufficiency)
- Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686 (elements of armed robbery)
- Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552 (distinguishes robbery from larceny from the person)
- Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508 (when second‑degree felony‑murder instruction is required)
- Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93 (insufficiency where only motive, means, unexplained funds, consciousness of guilt exist)
- Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1 (standards for considering motions for required findings at different stages)
- Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291 (circumstantial evidence and consciousness of guilt principles)
- Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514 (jury instructions can mitigate closing‑argument prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586 (improper to call opposing expert a ‘hired gun’ absent evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22 (premeditation can occur in seconds)