Commonwealth v. Cole
468 Mass. 294
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Casey Cole, a level-two sex offender, pleaded guilty in District Court (2011) to failing to notify authorities of a change of address; the judge sentenced him to six months' supervised probation and community parole supervision for life (CPSL).
- CPSL places an offender under lifetime supervision by the Parole Board with statutorily defined mandatory conditions and additional Board-imposed conditions; after fifteen years a petitioner may seek termination to the Board.
- Under G. L. c. 127, § 133D(c), if a CPSL supervisee violates a condition after serving the original sentence, the Parole Board must increase the original term: 30 days (first), 180 days (second), one year (third+), to be served in a house of correction.
- Cole moved to correct his sentence arguing, inter alia, that CPSL violates separation of powers by delegating to the executive (Parole Board) the judicial power to impose additional imprisonment; the District Court denied the motion without addressing the constitutional claim.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review and held that § 133D(c) impermissibly delegates a quintessential judicial power (imposition of sentences) to the executive, violating art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; Cole’s CPSL sentence was vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CPSL § 133D(c) violates art. 30 (separation of powers) by delegating sentencing to the Parole Board | Cole: § 133D(c) grants the Parole Board the power to impose new mandatory terms of imprisonment, a quintessential judicial power, violating art. 30 | Commonwealth: The mandatory increments are part of the original sentence (suspended sentences) imposed by the judge, not new judicial power | Held: § 133D(c) impermissibly delegates judicial sentencing to the executive and violates art. 30; CPSL sentences vacated |
| If § 133D(c) is unconstitutional, whether it is severable from the remainder of § 133D | Cole/Commonwealth: Implicitly, severability contested | Commonwealth: May have argued for preserving monitoring provisions | Held: Subsection (c) is so entwined with § 133D(a) (monitoring, control, enforcement) that the statute must be struck in its entirety; CPSL sentences vacated |
| Whether the Parole Board’s fact-finding to trigger imprisonment violates judicial fact-finding doctrines (Apprendi line) | Cole: Parole Board fact-finding aggravates punishment without jury or guilty plea admission, raising Apprendi/Alleyne concerns | Commonwealth: Did not prevail on this alternative; argued original-sentence theory | Held: Court did not decide Apprendi/Alleyne issue because separation-of-powers ground was dispositive |
| Procedural protections for CPSL supervisees compared to probationers — constitutionality of entrusting revocation/punishment to executive | Cole: CPSL supervisees lack probation-like procedural protections (appointed counsel, public hearing, appellate review) while facing mandatory imprisonment imposed by executive | Commonwealth: Emphasized CPSL as parole-like supervision | Held: The scheme’s transfer of adjudicatory/sentencing power to the Parole Board is unconstitutional in light of judicial sentencing function and differing procedures; this supports invalidation |
Key Cases Cited
- Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 441 Mass. 188 (discussing judicial review of presumptively constitutional statutes)
- Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342 (describing separation of legislative, judicial, executive functions in criminal law)
- Gray v. Commissioner of Revenue, 422 Mass. 666 (statute cannot restrict or abolish a court’s inherent powers)
- Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61 (judicial determination required for probation revocation facts)
- Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256 (power to sentence is a quintessential judicial power)
- Pagan, 445 Mass. 161 (procedural limits on CPSL in other contexts)
- Cumming, 466 Mass. 467 (resentencing after vacatur of CPSL and double jeopardy limits)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (any fact that increases prescribed penalty must be found beyond reasonable doubt or admitted)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (fact-finding that increases mandatory minimum must be submitted to jury)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (limits on assigning judicial functions to the executive)