Commonwealth v. Carriere
18 N.E.3d 326
Mass.2014Background
- Victim (defendant's wife) was found stabbed to death in Bourne on Jan. 3, 1980; defendant was in Florida with his daughter when body discovered. Defendant and victim were in a bitter divorce.
- Commonwealth alleged a murder-for-hire: defendant solicited Richard Grebauski, who recruited Steven Stewart to kill the wife; Stewart later pleaded guilty to manslaughter and testified for the Commonwealth.
- Trial (May 2012) relied heavily on out-of-court statements by alleged co-venturers (mostly through Stewart) and by neighbors/friends; defendant convicted of first-degree murder (premeditation and extreme atrocity).
- On appeal defendant challenged admission of co-venturer hearsay (joint venture exception), admission of prior-bad-act/propensity evidence, exclusion of an alleged statement against penal interest by a deceased co-venturer, and portions of prosecutor’s closing argument.
- Supreme Judicial Court affirmed conviction, finding (1) sufficient independent evidence of a joint venture with Grebauski and Stewart so many co-venturer statements were admissible, (2) some prior-act testimony should not have been admitted but was harmless, (3) exclusion of the proffered penal-interest statement was erroneous but harmless, and (4) prosecutor’s closing did not create a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of co-venturer out-of-court statements (joint venture exception) | Commonwealth: independent evidence proved a joint venture with Grebauski and Stewart; statements in furtherance admissible | Carriere: Commonwealth failed to establish joint venture; many statements were hearsay/testimonial under Crawford | Court: Sufficient independent proof of joint venture with Grebauski and Stewart; statements admissible; joint-venturer statements deemed non‑testimonial here under Crawford analysis |
| Temporal scope of co-venturer statements | Commonwealth: pre- and post‑events were in furtherance or part of continuing venture (formation/cover-up) | Carriere: Some statements predated or postdated the venture and were out of scope | Court: Many challenged statements were within scope (formation or concealment); some (e.g., Phinney telephone line issues) were inadmissible but cumulative/harmless |
| Admission of prior bad acts / propensity evidence (e.g., lumber theft; statements about wanting son killed) | Commonwealth: admissible to show motive, intent, pattern, or plan | Carriere: Evidence was unfairly prejudicial and used to show bad character/propensity | Court: Lumber-theft and evidence about killing son should not have been admitted as joint-venture or motive evidence; but admission was harmless given overwhelming other evidence |
| Exclusion of statement against penal interest by a third party (Mello testifying about Grebauski confession) | Commonwealth: judge excluded for lack of corroboration/trustworthiness | Carriere: exclusion violated right to present defense; statement should have been admitted | Court: Admission should have been allowed under penal-interest principles but exclusion harmless because it would not have materially undermined Commonwealth’s theory |
| Prosecutor’s closing argument (burden shifting & inflammatory rhetoric) | Commonwealth: argument urged inferences from evidence; burden instructions to jury sufficed | Carriere: prosecutor misstated law, shifted burden, and used inflammatory character attacks | Court: Some remarks questionable but overall not prejudicial; jury instructions cured any risk and no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527 (2009) (discusses joint-venture hearsay and limits on admitting certain co‑venturer statements)
- Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55 (2007) (Crawford analysis for co‑venturer statements; distinguishes testimonial vs. nontestimonial statements)
- Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421 (2012) (describes standards for admitting co‑venturer statements and judge’s role in determining independent proof)
- Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838 (2000) (Commonwealth must establish joint venture by preponderance independent of hearsay)
- Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241 (2000) (statements predating conspiracy may be admissible when probative of formation)
- Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316 (2007) (statements in furtherance or to conceal a joint enterprise may be admissible post‑offense)
- Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65 (1986) (statement against penal interest rule and corroboration/trustworthiness factors)
- Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510 (2001) (judges should err on the side of admitting statements against penal interest and leave weight to the jury)