Commonwealth v. Burno, J., Aplt.
154 A.3d 764
| Pa. | 2017Background
- April 13, 2003: Two men (Carlos Juarbe and Oscar Rosado) were shot dead in Allentown; investigation tied Terrance Bethea to the scene and later implicated Junius Burno.
- September 2003: Burno surrendered, retained counsel (Glennis Clark), and gave several statements: a September 24 unrecorded meeting during plea negotiations, a recorded September 24 statement (denying involvement), and September 26 interactions including a failed polygraph and two recorded statements (first without counsel present; second with counsel present).
- ADA Maria Dantos initially promised not to seek death if Burno told the truth and would testify against Bethea; when negotiations broke down Burno revoked cooperation and ADA Dantos sought the death penalty.
- Pretrial suppression rulings: trial court suppressed the first portion of the Sept. 26 tape (counsel absent) but admitted the later portion (counsel present); trial court relegated ADA Dantos to second chair; Superior Court reversed that order; litigation over jurisdictional appeal delayed trial ~1 year.
- Jury convicted Burno of two counts of first-degree murder; jury found one aggravator (conviction for another murder) and recommended death. Trial court later vacated sentence for ineffective assistance; the Commonwealth appealed; this Court ultimately affirmed the death sentences after reviewing multiple issues on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Burno's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Sept. 26 recorded statement (plea negotiations / Pa.R.E. 410) | Statement was made during ongoing plea negotiations and therefore inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 410(a)(4) | Negotiations had ended; any subsequent statements were not in furtherance of plea talks | Court: Statement was made during plea discussions; admission was error but harmless because identical admissions appeared on untainted jail phone calls |
| Whether Sept. 26 (second) statement was fruit of illegal first portion (attorney absent) | Second portion was tainted by the unlawfully-obtained first portion and should be suppressed | Attorney Clark later arrived and consented; Miranda warnings given; second confession was voluntary and insulated from the earlier taint | Court: Later presence/consent of counsel and circumstances purged the taint; second portion admissible |
| Voluntariness / coercion (including prosecutor and polygraph examiner conduct) | Statements were involuntary due to coercive post-polygraph comments by ADA and examiner while Burno was upset and represented | Burns received Miranda warnings multiple times, counsel consulted, interrogations were not coercive or lengthy; statements were voluntary | Court: Totality of circumstances shows voluntariness; confessions admissible |
| Probable cause for arrest (challenge to arrest affidavit) | Affidavit lacked probable cause; police misrepresented/omitted exculpatory statements; statements were fruit of poisonous tree | Affidavit showed a probability Burno participated (witness saw two men flee, vehicle match, Bethea implicated Burno, blood trail, no evidence of other perpetrators) | Court: Magistrate properly found probable cause; affidavit sufficient under totality of circumstances |
| Sufficiency: victims were "lives-in-being" | Commonwealth failed to prove victims were alive immediately before the incident (no witness saw them alive right before) | Circumstantial evidence (struggle noise, gunshots, blood trail, wounds showing struggle and shooting) proves lives-in-being | Court: Circumstantial evidence sufficient; element proven beyond reasonable doubt |
| Rule 600 speedy trial (delay ~1,248 days; appeal by Commonwealth) | Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal lacked jurisdiction (failed to certify collateral order) so delay was not excusable; Rule 600 dismissal required | Commonwealth timely sought review, reasonably believed appeal was collateral and acted with due diligence; appellate litigation time is excusable if Commonwealth diligent | Court: Commonwealth acted with due diligence; appellate delay excusable; Rule 600 denial affirmed |
| Admissibility of prior conspiracy-to-burglary conviction for 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9) aggravator | Conspiracy is non-violent and facts showed no risk of personal violence; conviction should not support (d)(9) | Burglary-related convictions have been treated as violent; precedent permits conspiracy convictions for (d)(9) | Court: Precedent allows use of conspiracy conviction; even if erroneous, admission harmless because jury did not find (d)(9) aggravator |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (warning requirements and custodial interrogation)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (totality-of-circumstances probable cause standard)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree / purging taint analysis)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (factors for determining if Miranda warnings purge prior illegality)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (false statements/omissions in warrants and Franks hearing principle)
- Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (insulation required where confessions occur in brief succession)
- Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 599 Pa. 617 (state court application—statements not protected under Pa.R.E. 410 absent Commonwealth participation in plea talks)
- Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 (standard of review for suppression/factual findings)
- Commonwealth v. Hill, 588 Pa. 716 (Rule 600 capital-defendant timing principles)