560 S.W.3d 873
Ky. Ct. App.2018Background
- December 26, 2014: Brown crashed near Hardinsburg; passenger died and Brown was seriously injured and airlifted to a trauma center.
- Trooper John Adams waited for medical clearance, spoke with Brown while she was on a backboard, smelled alcohol, read the KSP implied-consent warning, and asked for permission to draw blood.
- Brown twice/three times indicated she understood the warning and responded that drawing blood was "fine." Adams oversaw a blood draw at ~11:46 PM (KSP kit); lab result .125 BAC.
- Hospital drew a second treatment-related blood sample at ~12:23 AM (result .164); the Commonwealth later subpoenaed that record.
- Brown was indicted months later for manslaughter, aggravated DUI, and driving without a license; she moved to suppress blood test results claiming lack of consent and statutory/warrant defects; trial court granted suppression.
- Commonwealth appealed; appellate court reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown gave voluntary, express consent to blood draw | Adams obtained valid, voluntary consent after medical clearance; Brown affirmed understanding and agreed | Brown was too injured/intoxicated and did not understand, so consent was not knowing or voluntary | Consent was voluntary; trial court's contrary factual finding was clear error; blood test admissible |
| Whether Kentucky's implied-consent/penalty scheme (doubling minimum jail on refusal) is coercive under Birchfield | Kentucky's scheme imposes only evidentiary/administrative consequences and an enhanced sentence contingent on conviction, so not coercive like criminalizing refusal | The enhanced criminal penalty for refusal in fatal crashes is coercive and violates Birchfield | Birchfield inapplicable here; Kentucky's penalty scheme is not the same coercive scheme condemned in Birchfield; no Fourth Amendment violation |
| Whether KRS 189A.105(2)(b) required a warrant for blood draw in a fatal-crash context | Even if KRS 189A.105 addresses warrants for fatal crashes, that statute does not apply before a charging decision; alternatively, express consent obviates need for a warrant | KRS 189A.105(2)(b) mandated a warrant regardless of consent because the crash was fatal | Court held Morriss controls: statute does not apply when no charge yet; and express consent alone negated any need for a warrant |
Key Cases Cited
- Greer v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. App. 2017) (standard of review for suppression rulings: factual findings clear error; legal conclusions de novo)
- Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1992) (consent voluntariness assessed by objective review of surrounding circumstances)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (implied-consent laws may impose civil/administrative penalties but criminalizing refusal to submit to intrusive blood test raises Fourth Amendment concerns)
- Speers v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1992) (KRS implied-consent provisions create a presumption that testing is lawful)
- Helton v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 555 (Ky. 2009) (drivers consent to BAC testing by virtue of operating a vehicle; explicit refusal withdraws implied consent)
- Morriss, Commonwealth v., 70 S.W.3d 419 (Ky. 2002) (KRS 189A.105(2)(b) does not apply before charges are filed; traditional Fourth Amendment rules apply)