56 N.E.3d 153
Mass.2016Background
- Defendant was tried for armed robbery while masked after his thumbprint was found on a robbery note; a police witness testified the palm mark on the note suggested the writer was left-handed.
- During the Commonwealth's closing, prosecutor commented the defendant took notes left‑handed; defense objected because left‑handedness had not been introduced as evidence.
- The trial judge struck the remark, gave curative instructions, and the defense moved for a mistrial; the judge took the motion under advisement rather than ruling immediately.
- The jury deliberated and returned a guilty verdict; only then did the judge hold a nonevidentiary hearing, grant the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and order a retrial.
- The Commonwealth sought to appeal the judge's postverdict order, arguing it was in substance postverdict relief (and thus appealable under G. L. c. 278, § 28E); the judge denied a stay and the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Brangan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Commonwealth may appeal the judge's order granting a mistrial after the jury returned a guilty verdict | The postverdict grant and briefing converted the mistrial into postverdict relief (akin to a new trial), making it appealable under G. L. c. 278, § 28E | The motion was a pre‑verdict mistrial motion taken under advisement; its postverdict grant did not change its character and is not appealable by the Commonwealth | Court held the order was a mistrial in substance, not postverdict relief, and therefore not appealable by the Commonwealth |
| Whether the judge's practice of deferring ruling until after verdict affects appealability | Postverdict grant plus briefing makes it appealable | Taking motions under advisement is permissible and does not convert the motion's character | Court upheld the judge's discretion to defer and rejected conversion into appealable postverdict relief |
| Whether double jeopardy bars retrial because of prosecutorial misconduct | Commonwealth argued retrial permissible; judge found misconduct prejudicial but not dismissal‑level | Brangan argued retrial should be barred; he sought sufficiency review under Berry | Court declined to review double jeopardy sufficiency because defendant did not timely challenge or appeal that ruling; issue not before the Court |
| Whether exceptional supervisory review is available | Commonwealth sought review via appeal route | Defendant relied on ordinary rules foreclosing appeal | Court noted supervisory powers remain for egregious error but found none here; no appeal allowed |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Curtis, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 636 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (distinguishes final judicial action from routine mistrial orders)
- Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301 (Mass. 1984) (mistrial granting with contemporaneous new trial not appealable)
- Commonwealth v. Murchison, 392 Mass. 273 (Mass. 1984) (approving deferral of mistrial rulings until after verdict in appropriate cases)
- Commonwealth v. Powers, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 570 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (postverdict motion labeled mistrial treated as new‑trial motion and appealable)
- Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793 (Mass. 1985) (double jeopardy analysis and sufficiency review to bar retrial)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978) (principle that reversal for insufficient evidence bars retrial)
