Commonwealth v. Bomar, A., Aplt
104 A.3d 1179
| Pa. | 2014Background
- Victim Aimee Willard was kidnapped, raped, and bludgeoned to death in June 1996; forensic evidence (sperm in victim, victim’s blood in Bomar’s car, matching tire impressions) and witness statements linked Arthur Bomar to the crime.
- Bomar was tried, convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses in 1998, and sentenced to death after the jury found three aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance.
- Postconviction proceedings: Bomar’s direct appeal was resolved in 2003 (Bomar I); multiple counsel changes followed and a PCRA petition was litigated with extensive hearings; the PCRA court denied relief in 2012.
- On PCRA appeal Bomar raised 22 claims (9 presented here) including Brady/Napue claims about cooperating jailhouse witnesses, competency at trial, ineffective assistance of counsel (guilt and penalty phases), DNA evidence reliability, juror misconduct/extraneous influence, and alleged Massiah-type Sixth Amendment violations.
- The PCRA court made extensive credibility findings (rejecting some inmate-witness claims and expert opinions) and concluded most claims were waived, lacked merit, or failed to show prejudice; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of PCRA relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bomar) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / PCRA court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Brady/Napue re: cooperating inmates (O’Donald, Williams) | Prosecutors had undisclosed understandings/promises of leniency with inmate witnesses; nondisclosure and uncorrected false testimony deprived Bomar of impeachment evidence | Prosecutors did not make enforceable promises; any understanding was either disclosed or immaterial given corroborating physical evidence; testimony was challenged at trial | Court: No Brady/Napue relief — either no actionable agreement or no prejudice in light of strong other evidence; claim waived in part but considered on merits and denied |
| 2. Competency at trial | Bomar was incompetent during trial due to mental disorders and prison behavior; post-trial experts say incompetence existed | Contemporaneous competency evaluations (pretrial and near trial) and trial-court hearing found Bomar competent; later (years-after) evaluations are unreliable to show incompetency at trial | Court: Claim rejected — Bomar failed to prove incompetency at time of trial; after-the-fact expert opinions insufficient |
| 3. Ineffective assistance at penalty phase (mitigation investigation) | Counsel failed to develop/explain abundant mitigating evidence (abusive childhood, mental illness); appellate counsel ineffective for not raising it | Penalty counsel conducted reasonable investigation but was impeded by Bomar’s and family’s noncooperation; even if deficient, no prejudice given overwhelming aggravators (multiple murders, violent history) | Court: No relief — counsel not ineffective or, alternatively, no prejudice from any alleged omission |
| 4. Reliability/presentation of DNA evidence | Commonwealth misled jury by projecting only one autorad and claiming others matched; defense experts dispute match reliability | Independent review and PSP/FBI protocols were followed; DNA experts corroborated match; defense expert’s critique was impeached at PCRA | Court: Waiver of trial objection; layered ineffectiveness claim fails — forensic testimony reliable and expert attack rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (state must correct false testimony or disclose impeachment evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (Bomar I) (sets factual and procedural background; Bomar exception discussion)
- Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (abrogated rule requiring immediate appellate presentation of ineffectiveness claims; generally defer to PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203 (Pa. 2001) (adoption of Strickland framework under Pennsylvania law)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 2005) (plurality) (competency-to-stand-trial claim is exception to PCRA waiver rule)
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at critical stage; impermissible undercover elicitation after formal charges)
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (exclusion for cause of venirepersons opposed to death penalty may violate defendant’s rights when exclusion is too broad)
- Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011) (standards for mitigation investigation and prejudice inquiry in capital cases)