Commonwealth v. Bolden
21 N.E.3d 150
Mass.2014Background
- In summer 1993 Maurice Bolden broke into multiple dwellings (Springfield and Agawam), assaulted inhabitants, and stole property; he was indicted and convicted on seventeen indictments including three aggravated burglary counts under G. L. c. 266, § 14.
- Two Agawam indictments charged aggravated burglary based respectively on assaults of Stanley and Alice Glogowski inside the same dwelling.
- A Springfield indictment originally named Carmella Goodrow as the assault victim; before trial the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment to name Sandra Goodrow, and Bolden consented.
- Bolden was sentenced on the two Agawam § 14 convictions to concurrent life terms and on the Springfield § 14 conviction to a minimum ten-year term. Appeals affirmed.
- Years later Bolden filed a postconviction motion to correct illegal sentences, arguing (1) the two Agawam § 14 convictions were duplicative and (2) the amendment to the Springfield indictment violated art. 12 / Commonwealth v. Snow.
- The trial judge denied relief; the Appeals Court affirmed; the SJC granted further review and issued the decision summarized here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Bolden) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether multiple § 14 convictions based on separate assaults of different victims in the same dwelling are duplicative | Each assault was a separate criminal act supporting distinct § 14 prosecutions; unit of prosecution should be victim-based | § 14 is a property-based burglary statute whose unit of prosecution is the dwelling/burglary transaction; multiple assaults within the same continuous breaking/entry yield only one § 14 conviction | Court held convictions duplicative; vacated one Agawam § 14 conviction (Gordon controls) |
| Whether amending the Springfield indictment to change the named victim (Carmella to Sandra Goodrow) violated art. 12 / Snow | Amendment was improper if it altered an essential element or changed the indictment in a way that an original conviction would not bar a new indictment in amended form | The victim’s name was not an essential element for § 14 because a conviction on the original indictment would have barred prosecution of the amended indictment (single burglary per dwelling); amendment was formal and not prejudicial | Court held amendment constitutional and permissible; affirmed conviction on amended Springfield indictment |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Gordon, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (1997) (unit of prosecution for G. L. c. 266, § 14 is the burglary/dwelling; multiple assaults inside same burglary are not separate § 14 convictions)
- Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598 (1930) (amendments impermissible if judgment on original indictment would not bar prosecution on amended indictment; distinguishes material vs. formal changes)
- Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440 (2013) (double jeopardy/continuous-offense analysis and instructive framework for identifying unit of prosecution)
- Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345 (1982) (distinguishes statutes in chapter placement and how that affects unit-of-prosecution analysis for person-based vs property-based offenses)