Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35

Appellant Juan Baez was charged with multiple sexual offenses after an alleged child-victim (K.I.) testified that Baez, then 40, sexually abused her when she was 11 (penetration by penis and fingers; oral contact).
Trial began: jury selected, opening statements made, and three Commonwealth witnesses (including the victim) had testified; a scientific-witness colloquy was underway.
On the second day, Baez accepted a negotiated guilty plea to rape of a child and unlawful contact with a minor; remaining counts were nolle prossed and the Commonwealth recommended 5–10 years’ imprisonment plus 10 years’ probation.
At the plea colloquy Baez briefly denied penile penetration, the court paused and offered to resume trial; Baez nevertheless pled guilty after a full colloquy and was warned the maximum exposure on all charges was 140 years.
Three months later Baez sought to withdraw his pre-sentence guilty plea, asserting innocence and that he pled only because he feared a 65-year sentence; the trial court denied the motion, found the innocence claim implausible and that the Commonwealth would suffer substantial prejudice because it had already presented witnesses.
The Superior Court affirmed, applying Carrasquillo/Hvizda line: a bare claim of innocence must be at least plausible to warrant pre-sentence withdrawal; Baez’s claim was implausible and waived additional theories not raised below.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Baez)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Ct.)	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion denying Baez’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea	A bare assertion of innocence (and fear of a long sentence) is a fair-and-just reason for withdrawal; plea was coerced by threat of a 65-year sentence	Plea was voluntary, fully colloquied, the court correctly applied pre-sentence withdrawal standards; Baez’s innocence claim is implausible and unsupported; withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth	Affirmed: denial upheld — innocence claim not plausible; withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth
Whether Baez’s claim that the plea was coerced by the court’s alleged threat of a 65-year sentence required withdrawal	Baez contends he pled because he was told he would get 65 years if convicted	Record and colloquy show defendant was informed the maximum exposure was 140 years and the plea was voluntary; defendant’s coercion claim contradicted by record	Held: coercion claim refuted by the plea colloquy and trial court’s findings

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015) (pre-sentence plea-withdrawal: a bare assertion of innocence is insufficient; innocence must be at least plausible).
Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015) (companion to Carrasquillo; rejects Lesko approach and upholds denial where innocence claim is implausible and rebutted).
Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185 (Pa. Super. 2017) (pre-sentence withdrawal required where defendant presented plausible, specific evidence supporting innocence).
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983) (applied manifest-injustice standard to negotiated pleas; later disapproved by Hvizda/Carrasquillo).
Commonwealth v. Cole, 564 A.2d 203 (Pa. Super. 1989) (withdrawing plea pre-sentence may be denied where key Commonwealth witnesses have already been presented or are unavailable).
Commonwealth v. Ross, 447 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1982) (upheld denial of pre-sentence withdrawal where Commonwealth relied on plea and dismissed witnesses).
Commonwealth v. Dosch, 501 A.2d 667 (Pa. 1985) (a plea motivated by desire for a lesser sentence is not involuntary).
Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014) (discussed prejudice and negotiated-plea framework; impacted by later Carrasquillo/Hvizda).
Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (previously cautioned against credibility assessments of innocence claims; later authority clarified applicability).