David Paul Dosch was tried by jury and was found guilty of burglary and theft offenses. Although he filed post-trial motions, they were later withdrawn as part of a negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to this agreemеnt, Dosch entered pleas of guilty to numerous additional charges which related to an escape from the Armstrong County Prison. On November 24, 1981, Dosch was sentenced to prison for not less than five nor more than twenty years on the burglary conviction and to not less than two nor more than four years on the escape related offenses. The sentences were to run consecutively. No direct appeal was filed. On May 13, 1983, Dosch filed pro se a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. Counsel was appointed, and an evidentiary hearing was held. Thereafter, the court denied post conviction relief. On appeal therefrom, Dosch’s primary argument is that his pleas of guilty to the escape related offensеs were invalid (1) because they were part of an agreement requiring him to surrender his right to file post-trial motions in a separate proceeding and (2) because it was induced by the threаt of a harsher penalty if he elected to go to trial. Dosch also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in the burglary case (1) because he failed to present a timely рre-trial motion to suppress appellant’s *106 confession and (2) because he permitted appellant to waive an allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling at his trial by withdrawing his post-triаl motions. There is no merit in any of these contentions; and, therefore, we will affirm the order of the P.C.H.A. court.
The plea agreement required appellant to enter pleas of guilty tо some of the escape related offenses — the remainder were to be nol prossed — and to withdraw the post-trial motions pending in the burglary and theft cases. In return, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a five to twenty year sentence for burglary and theft and a consecutive sentence of two to four years for the escape related offenses.
Appellant’s contention that the trial court should not have accepted his negotiated pleas is based upon language contained in the concurring opinion written in
Commonwealth v. Marsh,
Appellant urges us to adopt the rule advocated by the author of the Concurring Opinion. This we cannot do. A majority of the Supreme Court failed to join the cоncurring opinion; and, therefore, it did not preeedentially alter the law of this Commonwealth. The existing state of the law was recited in
Commonwealth v. Stokes,
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has an absolute right tо appeal, Pa. Const, art. V, sec. 9, and the ultimate decision of whether to do so must be made by the defendant and not counsel. Commonwealth v. Hertzog, 492 Pa. [632, 639]425 A.2d 329 [, 333] (1981) (collects cases); Commonwealth v. [Wilkerson],490 Pa. 296 , 299,416 A.2d 477 , 479 (1980). At the same time, it is well settled that a defendant may waive the right to аppeal, provided such waiver is a “knowing and intelligent” act on the part of a defendant. Commonwealth v. Mika,277 Pa.Super. 339 , [343,]419 A.2d 1172 , 117[4] (1980).
Id.,
294 Pa.Superior Ct. at 536-537,
Moreover, in this case appellant has not argued that he should be allowed to reinstate his post-trial motions. His argument, rather, is that his pleas of guilty to the escape relatеd charges were invalid because, as part of the same settlement package, he agreed to waive the right of review of the trial resulting in the conviction for burglary and theft. We reject this contention. It represents a non sequitur to the concerns expressed by the author of the
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concurring opinion in
Marsh.
Appellant’s pleas of guilty in this case were entered voluntarily with a full understanding of thе rights he was surrendering. Sentence was thereafter imposed. He has failed to show any prejudice in the nature of manifest injustice sufficient to permit him to withdraw his pleas of guilty a year and а half after sentence was imposed. See:
Commonwealth v. Lesko,
Appellant’s allegation that his guilty pleas were unlawful because induced by the threat of a harsher sentence is not supported factually or legally. The testimony of trial counsel, which the P.C.H.A. court found credible, was that he had advised appellant that to have any control over the sentence to be imposed upon him, it would be necessary to enter into plea negotiations. This advice was correct. It did not render appellant’s negotiated guilty pleas invalid. Moreover and in any event, a plea is not rendered involuntary merely because it is prompted by a belief that it will enable a defendant to obtain a more lenient sentence. See, e.g.:
Commonwealth v. O’Donnell,
When apрellant withdrew his post-trial motions, he thereby waived the right to obtain appellate review of evidentiary rulings which had been made during the trial resulting in verdicts of guilty. See:
Commonwealth v. Sheid,
Counsel was not ineffective because he recommended that appellant accept the рlea bargain offered by the Commonwealth. Counsel’s recommendation was not only reasonable but clearly calculated to serve the interests of appellant. It was reсommended in order that appellant might receive a sentence recommendation which the District Attorney would not otherwise have made.
Finally, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress appellant’s confession. The only basis for suppressing the confession was that appellant, because of drug abuse, was “disoriented” when, on December 19, 1980, he voluntarily surrendered to police, waived his rights under Miranda, and made an inculpatory statement. His counsel testified, and the P.C.H.A. court found, that aрpellant had told his trial counsel only a few days before trial that he was “disoriented” at the time of his statement and that counsel had moved immediately to suppress the same. Becаuse this was only a few days before trial was scheduled to commence, however, the court dismissed the motion. The P.C. H.A. court found that this delay had been attributable to appellant and thаt counsel had not been ineffective. The record discloses no good reason for interfering with the P.C.H.A. court’s finding.
Moreover, appellant presented evidence at his trial that hе had been “upset” and “disoriented” at the time of making his statement. The evidence which he presented was rejected by the jury. His evidence was wholly inadequate to render his statement invоluntary. He had surren
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dered himself voluntarily, and, in the company of his priest, had voluntarily waived his
Miranda
rights and had made an inculpatory statement. Appellant’s claim of “disorientation” was subjective and was wholly inadequate to support suppression of his statement. See:
United States ex rel. Bishop v. Rundle,
Order affirmed.