Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rayshawn Torrell Greer
63 Va. App. 561
| Va. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Greer was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm after a prior violent felony, a statute that carries a mandatory five-year minimum (which equals the statutory maximum for the class of felony here).
- The trial court properly instructed the jury that the punishment to be fixed was a five-year term.
- During sentencing deliberations the jury asked whether five years was the only option, later reported unanimous agreement on punishment, but returned a verdict fixing punishment at two years (foreperson crossed out “5 years” and wrote “2 years”).
- The trial court accepted and imposed the two-year sentence; the Commonwealth objected and asked the court to set aside the sentence and impanel a new sentencing jury.
- The trial court refused, concluding it lacked authority to increase a jury’s unanimous sentence; the Commonwealth appealed under Code § 19.2-398(C).
- The Court of Appeals held the two-year jury sentence was void ab initio because it violated the statutory mandatory minimum and remanded for resentencing before a new jury.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Greer's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a jury may lawfully impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum after proper instruction | Jury’s below-minimum sentence is unlawful; trial court must set it aside and impanel a new sentencing jury | Jury nullification at sentencing is permissible and the court cannot increase a unanimous jury sentence | Jury’s two-year sentence was unlawful and void ab initio; trial court erred by enforcing it and must impanel a new jury for sentencing |
| Whether the trial court could refuse to impanel a new jury when the jury’s verdict was unanimous but below the statutory minimum | § 19.2-295.1 and J.K. Rawls require a new sentencing hearing when a sentence violates statutory ranges | Trial court lacks authority to change a unanimous jury sentence; impaneling a new jury was unnecessary | Court must follow J.K. Rawls and § 19.2-295.1: reject unlawful jury sentence and remand for new jury sentencing |
| Whether remand for a new jury is required even though only one statutory sentence exists | A new jury is required absent agreement of the parties under § 19.2-295.1 | Defendant preferred jury resentencing and argued judicial economy shouldn’t allow a judge to impose the mandatory term | Remand for a new jury is required; Hines (judicial-economy exception) is distinguishable and does not apply here |
| Whether resentencing by a new jury violates double jeopardy | Commonwealth did not concede double jeopardy; law permits noncapital resentencing | Defendant did not assert a successful double jeopardy bar | Double jeopardy does not bar noncapital resentencing; remand allowed (Monge controlling) |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (jury must find facts that increase punishment beyond statutory range)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (extends Apprendi to mandatory minimums)
- J.K. Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213 (2009) (sentence imposed outside statutory range is void ab initio; new sentencing hearing required)
- J.M. Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334 (2006) (interpretation of statutory maximum/minimum interplay under Code § 18.2-308.2)
- Hines v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 567 (2012) (judicial-economy exception where only a single statutory sentence exists)
- Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (double jeopardy does not bar noncapital resentencing)