Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance
156 Conn.App. 239
Conn. App. Ct.2015Background
- Sarah Puryear, an African-American who participated in Echo Hose Ambulance’s precepting program, alleged race-based harassment, discipline, and eventual removal from membership; she filed a discrimination and retaliation complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO).
- The city of Shelton moved to strike the CHRO complaint, arguing Puryear was not an "employee" under CFEPA or Title VII and therefore could not bring employment discrimination claims.
- The CHRO referee granted the motion to strike, applying the Second Circuit’s "remuneration" test and finding Puryear’s complaint failed to allege direct or indirect remuneration or other substantial benefits from Echo Hose.
- The CHRO appealed to Superior Court; the court affirmed the referee, applying federal Title VII precedent as interpretive guidance for CFEPA and holding the complaint insufficient to plead an employment relationship.
- Puryear appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing Connecticut should apply the common-law "right of control" (agency) test instead of the federal remuneration threshold and that she was denied discovery/evidentiary hearing; the Appellate Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Connecticut should use the common-law "right of control" test (agency test) alone to define "employee" under CFEPA | Puryear: CFEPA should be construed using Connecticut’s common-law right-of-control test to determine employee status | City/CHRO: The common-law control test is insufficient where monetary remuneration is absent; federal Title VII guidance is appropriate | The court held the control test alone is insufficient and may be applied only if an initial hiring/remuneration inquiry is satisfied |
| Whether a remuneration threshold (as applied by the Second Circuit in Title VII cases) is an appropriate antecedent test under CFEPA | Puryear: Court should not be bound to federal remuneration test; state law controls | City/CHRO: Federal Title VII jurisprudence (including the remuneration test) is persuasive guidance because CFEPA mirrors federal law | The court adopted the Second Circuit’s remuneration test as appropriate guidance and required allegations of direct or substantial indirect remuneration to plead employee status |
| Whether Puryear’s CHRO complaint sufficiently alleged employee status | Puryear: Complaint’s factual allegations of duties, membership, and disciplinary actions suffice | City: Complaint lacks allegations of pay or substantial benefits indicative of an employment relationship | Held: Complaint failed to allege direct or substantial indirect remuneration or other indicia of employment and thus was properly stricken |
| Whether Puryear was improperly denied discovery or an evidentiary hearing before dismissal | Puryear: Striking the complaint without discovery/evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion | City: Even with discovery, Puryear could not meet the remuneration requirement; no prejudice | Held: No abuse of discretion; Puryear conceded she could not meet the remuneration test, so additional discovery/hearing would not have helped |
Key Cases Cited
- Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Farmingville Fire District, 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting remuneration test: direct or indirect benefits indicate employee status under Title VII)
- O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997) (remuneration as a threshold requirement; only if hired should right-of-control analysis follow)
- York v. Assn. of Bar of City of New York, 286 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.) (benefits incidental to activity insufficient to satisfy remuneration test)
- Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) (applies remuneration threshold to volunteer firefighter context)
- Marie v. American Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2014) (contrasting approach: remuneration is a factor, not an independent antecedent)
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (observing that the statutory definition "individual employed by an employer" is circular and requires interpretive guidance)
- Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759 (2011) (Second Circuit decisions carry persuasive weight on federal-law issues when the Supreme Court is silent)