Com. v. Young, D., Com. v. Young, D. No. 1668 EDA 2016

Dana Everett Young was convicted by jury in 1983 of multiple sexual-assault–related offenses and sentenced in 1985 to an aggregate term of 21 to 42 years.
Young’s judgment of sentence became final on December 31, 1985, after he failed to take further direct appeal following post-trial proceedings.
Between 1995 and 2008 Young filed seven PCRA petitions, all dismissed; he later filed habeas petitions that courts treated as collateral challenges.
On February 8, 2016 Young filed a pro se habeas petition alleging a defective criminal information (challenging jurisdiction and sentence legality); the trial court treated it as his eighth PCRA petition.
The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice and dismissed the petition as facially untimely on May 10, 2016; Young appealed.
The Superior Court affirmed, holding the filing was a PCRA petition, was untimely (filed more than 30 years after finality), and Young did not plead a statutory timeliness exception, so the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Young’s habeas petition challenging a defective Bill of Information was cognizable apart from the PCRA	Young argued the criminal information failed to allege essential elements, so the kidnapping verdict and sentence are void and habeas is appropriate	Commonwealth (trial/PCRA court) treated the filing as a PCRA petition because the claim attacks jurisdiction/sentence and thus falls within PCRA exclusive collateral-review scheme	Court held the claim is cognizable under the PCRA; habeas cannot be used to evade PCRA timeliness rules; petition treated as an eighth PCRA petition
Whether the petition was timely or an exception excused untimeliness	Young argued the defect vitiates the conviction and eliminates timeliness/waiver bars	Commonwealth argued the petition was facially untimely (judgment final in 1985) and Young did not plead any of the §9545(b) exceptions	Court held the petition was untimely; Young failed to plead any statutory exception, so the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits

Commonwealth v. Kubis, 808 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super. 2002) (PCRA is the sole means for collateral relief and subsumes other remedies)
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978 (Pa. 2008) (PCRA subsumes habeas where PCRA provides remedy; timeliness is jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Stout, 978 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2009) (habeas cannot be used to evade PCRA timeliness)
Commonwealth v. Jackon, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (legality of sentence is cognizable under the PCRA)
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091 (Pa. 2010) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1999) (post‑1995 PCRA petitions governed by amended statute)
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2014) (standard of review for denial of PCRA petition)
Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. 2008) (no right to PCRA hearing where record disposes of claims)